ANCIENT LOGIC AND ITS MODERN INTERPRETATIONS SYNTHESE HISTORICAL LIBRARY TEXTS AND STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF LOG IC AND PHILOSOPHY Editors: N. KRETZMANN, Cornell University G. NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden L. M. DE RIJK, University of Leyden Editorial Board: J. BERG, Munich Institute of Technology F. DEL PUNT A, Linacre College, Oxford D. P. HENRY, University of Manchester J. HINTIKKA, Academy of Finland and Stan/ord University B. MATES, University of California, Berkeley J. E. MURDOCH, Harvard University G. PA TZIG, University of Gottingen VOLUME 9 ANCIENT LOGIC AND ITS MODERN INTERPRETATIONS PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUFFALO SYMPOSIUM ON MODERNIST INTERPRETATIONS OF ANCIENT LOGIC. 21 AND 22 APRIL, 1972 Edited by JOHN CORCORAN State University o[ New York at Buffalo D. REIDEL PUBLlSHING COMPANY DORDRECHT-HOLLAND / BOSTON-U.S.A. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 73-88589 ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2132-6 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2130-2 001: 10.1007/978-94-010-2130-2 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, Dordrecht-Holland Sold and distributed in the U.S.A., Canada, and Mexico by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Ine. 306 Dartmouth Street, Boston, Mass. 02116, U.S.A. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover I st edition 1974 No part of thisbook may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means, without written permission from the publisher to Lynn with love TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE IX PART ONE Andent Semantics NORMAN KRETZMANN / Aristotle on Spoken Sound Signi1icant by Convention 3 RONALD ZIRIN / Inarticulate Noises 23 NEWTON GARVER / Notes for a Linguistic Reading of the Categories 27 PART TWO Modern Research in Andent Logic IAN MUELLER / Greek Mathematics and Greek Logic JOHN MULHERN / Modem Notations and Ancient Logic PART THREE Aristotle' s Logic JOHN CORCORAN / Aristotle's Natural Deduction System MAR y MULHERN / Corcoran on Aristotle's Logical Theory PART FOUR Stoic Logic JOSIAH GOULD / Deduction in Stoic Logic JOHN CORCORAN / Remarks on Stoic Deduction 35 71 85 133 151 169 VIII T ABLE OF CONTENTS PART FIVE Final Session of the Symposium JOHN CORCORAN / Future Research on Ancient Theories or Communication and Reasoning 185 A Panel Discussion on Future Research in Ancient Logical Theory 189 INDEX OF NAMES 209 PREFACE During the last half century there has been revolutionary progress in logic and in logic-related areas such as linguistics. HistoricaI knowledge of the origins of these subjects has also increased significantly. Thus, it would seem that the problem of determining the extent to which ancient logical and linguistic theories admit of accurate interpretation in modern terms is now ripe for investigation. The purpose of the symposium was to gather logicians, philosophers, linguists, mathematicians and philologists to present research results bearing on the above problem with emphasis on logic. Presentations and discussions at the symposium focused themselves into five areas: ancient semantics, modern research in ancient logic, Aristotle's logic, Stoic logic, and directions for future research in ancient logic and logic-related areas. Seven of the papers which appear below were originally presented at the symposium. In every case, discussion at the symposium led to revisions, in some cases to extensive revisions. The editor suggested still further revisions, but in every case the author was the finaljudge of the work that appears under his name. In addition to the seven presented papers, there are four other items included here. Two of them are papers which originated in discussions folIowing presentations. Zirin's contribution is based on comments he made folIowing Kretzmann's presentation. My 'Remarks on Stoic Deduction' is based on the discussion whieh followed Gould's paper. A third item contains remarks that I prepared in advance and read at the opening of the panel discussion which was held at the end of the symposium. The panel discussion was tape-recorded and the transcript proved of sufficient quality to merit inclusion in these proceedings with a minimum of editing. Funds for the symposium were provided by a grant to the Philosophy Department of the State University of New York at Buffalo from the University's Institutional Funds Committee. Departments of Mathematies, Clas sies and Linguistics cooperated in the planning and in the x PREFACE symposium itself. Professors Richard Vesley (Mathematics), Ronald Zirin (Classies), Madeleine Mathiot (Linguistics) and Wolfgang Wolck (Linguistics ) deserve thanks, as do the folIowing Professors ofPhilosophy: William Parry, John Kearns, and John GlanviIIe. Special thanks goes to Professor Peter Hare who conceived of the idea for the symposium, aided in obtaining funds for it, and gave help in many other ways as well. David Levin, Terry Nutter, Keith Ickes, William Yoder, Susan Wood, Sule Elkatip, and Alan Soble, all students in Philosophy, aided in various ways. Levin was especiaIly conscientious and generous with his time. JOHN CORCORAN Buffalo, N. Y., November 1972 PART ONE ANCIENT SEMANTICS NORMAN KRETZMANN ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND SIGNIFICANT BY CONVENTION A few sentences near the beginning of De interpretatione (I6a3-8) constitute the most influential text in the history of semantics. The text is highly compressed, and many translations, including the Latin translation in which it had its greatest influence, have obscured at least one interesting feature of it. In this paper I develop an interpretation that depends on taking seriously some details that have been negleeted in the countless discussions of this text. The sentence with which De interpretatione begins, and which immediately precedes the text I want to examine, provides (as Ackrill remarks 1) the program for Chapters 2-6 . ... we must settle what a name is [Chapter 2] and what a verb is [Chapter 3], and then what a negation [Chapters 5 and 6], an affirmation [Chapters 5 and 6], a statement [Chapten, 4 and 5] and asentence [Chapters 4 and 5] are. (16al-2)2 But Aristotle says "First we must settle what a name is ... ", and that is what he does in Chapter 2. The remainder of Chapter I, then, may be thought of as preparatory to the main business of those chapters. And since their main business is to establish definitions, it is only natural to preface them with a discussion of the defining terms. At the beginning of Chapter 2, for instance, Aristotle defines 'name' in these terms: 'spoken sound', 'significant by convention', 'time', and 'parts significant in separation'. These terms continue to serve as defining terms beyond Chapter 2, and the remainder of Chapter 1 (I 6a3-18) is devoted to clarifying them. The special task of the text I am primarily concerned with is the clarification of the proximate genus for the definitions in Chapters 2-6: "spoken sound significant by convention".3 "Emt ~i;v ouv .li EV Tij q>rovfj .mv EV .fj 'l'Uxfj 1tu8rll.Ul"trov m)~~oA.u, Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and writJ. Corcoran (ed.). Ancient Logic and Its Modem Interpretations, 3-21. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 4 NORMAN KRETZMANN Kai. 'til 'Ypaep6J.lEVa 'trov sv 'ttl eprovtl. Kai. 6l<rnep 0088 'YpuJ.lJ.la'ta 7tiim. 'til ao'tu, 0088 ep rova! ai ail'tai' rov j.låV'tOl 'ta()'ta O11J.lEia 7tpo)'trõ, 4 'tao'tll 7tiim. 7ta9iJJ.la'ta die; 'Vuxi'ie;, Kai. rov 'ta()'ta 6J.101IDJ.l'ta 7tpu'YJ.la'ta fj811 'tao'tu. ten marks symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of affections of the soul are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of actual tbingsare also the same. (16a3-8) Ignoring the claims about sameness or difference to begin with, we can pick out four elements and three relations. (I am going to use 'mental impression' only because it is handier than Ackrill's 'affection in [or of] thesoul'.) Elements actual thing mental impression spoken sound written mark Relations is a likeness of is a sign of is a symbol of Aristotle makes four claims in wbich these elements and relations are combined. (1) Written marks are symbols of spoken sounds. (2) Spoken sounds are symbols of mental impressions. (3) Spoken sounds are (in the first place) signs of mental impressions. (4) Mental impressions are likenesses af actual things. I shaH begin by pointing out some obvious features of these claims. (In the long history of this text even what is obvious has aften been overlooked.) There is nothing explicit in these four claims relating spoken sounds or written marks to actual things, nor is there any apparent implicit c1aim about such a relationship. 5 When we are told that spoken sounds are symbols and signs of mental impressions and that mental impressions are likenesses of actual tbings, we are given no license to infer anythlng at all about a relations hip between spoken sounds and actual tbings. Yet tbis is ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 5 just what commentators on this text have regularly done, usually remarking (as if it were obvious) that Aristotle maintains that words stand directly for thoughts and indireetly for things. l think they have been led to do so beeause they have approaehed this text in the belief that it contains Aristotle's general theory ofmeaning. But, as we shaH see, this text makes better sense and fits its context better if it is interpreted as playing a more modest role. If it contains no claim at all, explicit or implicit, about a relationship of spoken sounds to aetual things, then it is not even a sketch of a general theory of meaning. In claims (2) and (3) a spoken sound is said to be a symbol and to be a sign, to bear two apparently different relations to a mental impression. Boethius, however, translated both 'cr6J.1~OAa' and 'O"1lJ.1sia' as 'notae', thereby hiding this difference from the view of Western philosophers for seven eenturies or more, the eenturies during which his translation of De interpretatione was one of the few books which every philosopher discussed.6 I am going to proceed on the hypothesis that this terminological difference reflects a real difference Aristotle recognized. Claim (1) uses one of the two relational terms of claims (2) and (3) in a context in which we ean provide a definite, clear interpretation for it, one that must have been evident to Aristotle as well. In one of the relations a spoken sound bears to a mental impression, a spoken sound is to a mental impression as a written mark is to a spoken sound; and we know how a written mark is to a spoken sound. Consider the written mark 'd-v-9-pro-1t-O-C;'. It is, folIowing claim (1), a "symbol" ofthe spoken sound ofthe Greek word for man. Now that mark is not a name of that sound or a likeness ofit. Nor is that mark a symbolic representation ofthat sound as the owl is of Athena. It is neither a symptom nor a nonsymptomatic index of that sound on the basis of a regular natural association of occurrenee.7 (It occurs on this page, for instanee, in the absence of any associated occurrenee ofthe spoken sound.) To be a symbol, then, is not the same as to be a name, or alikeness, or a symbolic representation, or an index. For x to be a symbol of y is for x to be a notation for y, to be a rulegoverned embodiment of y in a medium different from that in whieh y occurs. Thus the Roman alphabet and the dots and dashes of Morse eode are two notations, or symbolizations, for spoken English. The symbolization of spoken sounds in written marks is independent of any semantie role the sounds may be assigned. We write 'w-o-m-a-n' as the symbol of a 6 NORMAN KRETZMANN spoken sound which happens to be the sound of an English word, but we ean equally well write 'n-a-m-o-w', the symbol of a sound with no semantic role. Aristotle in claim (1) was of course concerned only with phonograms, but the ideograms of a sign-language are also rule-governed embodiments in another medium, with the interesting difference that the original medium is not vocal but mental. These observations about the objectively assessable claim (1) ean be used in interpreting (2): Spoken sounds are symbols ofmentalimpressions. It should now be clear that this is not a claim that spoken sounds are names, or likenesses, or symbolic representations, or indices of mental impressions. They are to mental impressions as written marks are to them; that is, they are rule-governed embodiments of mental impressions in another medium, "ideophones". One way in which a spoken sound plays a semantic role is in symbolizing a mental impression. When Smith asks Jones 'What's a pentacle?' and Jones says 'A five-pointed star', he may be described (at least sometimes) as rendering audible what was only mental, just as Smith, if he then writes down what Jones said, renders visible what was only audible. Spoken sounds, those that constitute words, are rulegoverned embodiments of mental impressions in a vocal medium just as written marks, those that constitute pronounceable sets, are rule-governed embodiments of spoken sounds in a visual medium. The symbol-relation as described so far is symmetric. As written marks are rule-governed embodiments of spoken sounds in another medium, so spoken sounds are rule-governed embodiments of written marks in another medium; and the same applies to the symbol-relation as it obtains between spoken sounds and mental impressions. But written marks are devised as symbols of spoken sounds and not vice versa. I will take account of this asymmetry by distinguishing encoding and decoding symbolization. If Smith writes down what Jones has said and Robinson reads aloud what Smith has written, Smith encodes and Robinson decodes. Claims (l) and (2) could, then, be revised and supplemented in this way: (1 ') Written marks are encoding symbols of spoken sounds. (1") Spoken sounds are decoding symbols ofwritten marks. (2') Spoken sound s are encoding symbols of mental impressions. (2") Mental impressions are decoding symbols of spoken sounds. ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 7 The symbol-relation is clearly irreflexive, because of the stipulation of a different medium if for no other reason. What about transitivity? What, if anything, ean be inferred from claims (l) and (2) regarding a symbolrelation between written marks and mental impressions? If the relation is considered in the broad sense, without the encoding/decoding distinction, it is both irreflexive and symmetric and so cannot be transitive. If the encoding or the decoding relation as described so far is considered separately, it may appear to be transitive. But the rules governing the encoding of mental impressions in spoken sounds are obviously different from the rules governing the encoding of spoken sounds in written marks. For that reason we could infer from (1 ') and (2/) only that written marks encode mental impressions indirectly, or at one remove. The fact that these characteristics of the symbol-relation are what we should expect is some confirmation for this interpretation. From the immediately accessibIe claim (1) I have derived an interpretation of claim (2). Now I want to look at claim (3) in the light of this interpretation of (2). There are two obvious questions of interpretation, even of translation. (A) Are the words 'signs' (crTlI.l&iu) and 'symbols' (O"\)!l~OAU) synonymous here? Bonitz says they are,s and many translators have evidently been so sure of it that they have not bothered to give their readers a chance to raise the question. (B) Is 'in the first place' (npro't"rot;) connected (i) with the primacy of the sign-relation over the symbol-relation or (ii) with the primacy of any semantic relation of spoken sounds to mental impressions over any semantic relation they may bear to actual things? Most interpreters have adopted the second of these alternatives.9 And since an affirmative answer to question (A) precludes recognition of the first alternative, most have adopted (Bii) with no sense of having rejected a competing interpretation. I have aIready adopted a negative answer to (A) as a working hypothesis. This is not the point at which to decide how well the hypothesis works, but I can offer some explanation and support for it. Aristotle's general verb for semantic relations is 'O"1wuiv&W', on a par with our verbs 'mean' and 'signify', and he sometimes uses the closely related noun 'crll!l&iov' for general purposes too,10 somewhat as we sometimes use 'sign'. But the juxtaposition of 'crll!l&iov' with 'cr6!l~OAOV' in these few lines suggests a stricter interpretation, one borne out by the facts of the language. EIsewhere in Aristotle and in other authors before and after him the words 8 NORMAN KRETZMANN 'crTII.lf:tov' and 'crull~oAoV' differ in being associated broadly with natural and with artificial indications, respectively.A medical symptom may be considered the paradigm of a C}"lWEtOV, and an identity token (especially one of two irregular broken halves of a potsherd or a seal on a document) may be considered the paradigm of a crull~OAOV. This naturaljartificial division is the philological basis of my hypothesis. If'crrlllEiov' is interpreted as 'symptom', then claim (3) may be rewritten in this way: (3') Spoken sounds are (in the first place) effects indicative oftheir concurrent causes, mental impressions. I am going to adopt this reading of claim (3) in the further development of my interpretation of this text.ll As (3') suggests, the symptom-relation is logically prior to the symbol-relation between spoken sounds and impressions in the mind of the speaker. (That is my reading of 'in the first place'.) A parrot may produce spoken sounds of which impressions in your mind may be the (decoding) symbols, but because they are not symptoms of the occurrence of such mental impressions in the parrot they are not produced by the parrot as (encoding) symbols. Written marks are symptoms neither of spoken sounds nor of mental impressions although, as we have seen, they are symbols of spoken sounds and perhaps indirectly als o of mental impressions. They are not symptoms of spoken sounds because they are regularly produced in the absence of spoken sounds; and they are not symptoms of mental impressions because they persist past the time of their production as spoken sounds do not. Claim (4) presents difficulties of another sort. Ackrill complains about its vagueness. What precisely are 'affections in the sou!'? Later they are called thoughts.12 Do they include sense-impressions? Are they, or do they involve, images? AristotIe probably calls them likenesses of things because he is thinking of images and it is natural to think of the (visuaI) image of a cat as a picture or likeness of a cat. But the inadequacy of this as an account or explanation of thought is notoriOl.ls.13 One respect in which it is notoriously inadequate is its failure to make sense of the notion of true and false thoughts most obviously of the notion of a true or false existential thought, such as the thought that there is a goat-stag. And since this is the very example of thought which ArisARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 9 stotle uses in the latter half of Chapter 1, where he speaks of VOTU1U tv 'til ",uxil rather than of ltu9ill.lU'tU tv 'til ",uxil, there are good prima jade grounds in the context ofthis text for distinguishing between thoughts and affections in the soul (which I have been calling mental impressions). In the best-known passages elsewhere in which Aristotle speaks of affections of the soul (m19TJ more often than ltu9ilJ.1u'tu) he is typically speaking of emotions and personality traits e.g., shame, irascibility, anger, gentleness fear, pit y, courage, joy, loving, and hating.14 There is no reason to suppose that Aristotle or anyone else would describe such affections of the soul as likenesses of actual things. But in the fint chapter of De anima Aristotle includes "sensing generally" (OA.O)~ uicr9avBcr9m) among affections of the soul, and that must be where the likenesses come in. It seems clear to me that claim (4) is concerned not with thoughts or with emotions and personality traits but with sense-impressions and perhaps with mental images generally, including those of imagination and memory. In De an ima, Book III, Chapter 8 (432a7-14), Aristotle apparently claims that no mental activity can occur without ({iVIm) mental images. I am not sure whether this means that mental images are a necessary concomitant of all mental activity or merelya necessary precondition of all mental activity. But in either case AristotIe clearly distinguishes in those passages between the images on the one hand, and thoughts, mental acts, and other mental entities on the other. Claim (4) is obviously inadequate as "an account or explanation of thought", but the reference to De an ima in 16a8-9 is evidence that Aristotle is not alluding to mental entities or mental acts in general here: "These matters have been discussed in the work on the soul and do not belong to the present subject". Taking 16a3-8 seriously requires us to begin, at least, by interpreting claim (4) in such a way as to give it a chance ofbeing true, and that means considering it as applying only to mental images of actual things. As I have tried to show, there is strong support in AristotIe for such an interpretation. Once the narrow scope of claim (4) has been revealed, it is harder to suppose that this text was intended as a general theory of meaning. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that Chapters 2-6 address themselves to detailed questions regarding meaning and come up with answers that bear no clear resemblance to the account in 16a3-8. But if it is not Aristotle's theory of meaning, as it has almost always been taken to be, what is it? 10 NORMAN KRETZMANN II If the text is read as a unit, the emphasis falls on the claims I have so far left out of consideration, the claims regarding the interpersonal sameness and difference of the four elements: 15 actual things, mental impressions, spoken sounds, and written marks. There are four such claims. (S) Written marks are not the same for all. (6) Spoken sounds are not the same for all. (7) Mental impressions are the same for all. (8) Actual things are the same for all. These claims, I believe, constitute the grounds for Aristotle's subsequent claims (at 16a19, 16a27, and 17a2) that one ar another linguistic entity is significant "by convention" (KU'!U crUV8iJKTJV).16 The point of l6a3-8 is the presentation not of a general theory of meaning but of grounds for the claim that linguistic signification is conventional, a claim that still needed to be made, ar at least made unambiguously, in the generation af ter Plato.17 From the strength of the conventionalist claims and the breadth oftheir application 18 we might have expected Aristotle to have provided a full-fledged argument in their support, but the only support we are given for them is in 16a3-8. Such semantic theoryas is in that text is there, I think, only to the extent to which it contributes to the support for conventionalism. An example will fairly illustrate the int~rpersonal samenesses and differences and Aristotle's intentions in this text generally. Two experimental subjects, Smith and Schmidt, are seated in a darkened room facing a screen. Smith knows only English and Schmidt knows only German. On the screen is projected this shape: 6 . Each subject is then told to dase his eyes and is asked whether he perceives a likeness of the actual thing he saw, and each says that he does. Each is then asked to draw what he perceived in his mind's eye, and each produces a drawing that looks just like this: 6 . Each is then asked to write down under his drawing what that thing IS. Smith writes 't-r-i-a-n-g-I-e' and Schmidt writes 'D-r-e-i-e-c-k'. Each is then asked to read what he has written. Smith says 'triangle' and Schmidt say~ 'Dreieck'. Of course the example is thin and artificial as an instance af linguistic meaning, but if I am right ab out Aristotle's intentions in 16a3-8 he has ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 11 no need af an.ything richer ar more realistic. As I intend to show, something as skimpy as this will serve to elucidate "significant by convention". All the interpersonal samenesses and differences in claims (5)-(8) are illustrated in my example. Dnly those concerning the actual thing and the mental impressions need even a word of explanation. The actual thing the projected figure is numerically the same for Smith and for Schmidt. The mental impression Smith has of it is numerically distinct from Schmidt's mental impression of the figure, but the two impressions are interpersonally the same in that they have a single Aristotelian form (or are two tokens of a single type). This can be confirmed, if not proved, in the drawings made by the two subjects. Ackrill suggests that what I am calling claim (7) is meant to follow from the considerations I expressed in (4) and (8): "different people (or peoples) confront the same things and situations, and have the same impressions of them and thoughts about them (likeness is a natural relation)".19 Inmy article an the history afsemantics I make such a suggestion even more explicitly: "The mental modifications arising from that confrontation are likenesses (6~otrol.l(l't(l) af the things, and they are thus the same for all men toO".20 If Aristotle intended to argue as I there suggested he did, his argument would clearly be unacceptable. Con sider this original - ~ and these two likenesses: 6 /$". . Df course neither of the likenesses is perfect, but imperfection is a regular characteristic of likenesses, more obviously of mental images than of some other sorts. Nevertheless, although the two are not even decent likenesses of each other, ml:lch less the same, each af them is a likeness ofthe original. This line of criticism, suggested in different ways by Ackrill's account and mine, can be directed agatnst Aristotle effectively only if we suppose that he is out to make general claims here regarding mental impressions. If we adopt instead the hypothesis that his purpose is not to do psychology ar epistemology but rather to provide grounds for the conventionalism he is going to proclaim, then we ean see that all he needs here is an illustration a single case like my imaginary experiment. 21 Claim (7) do es not follow from claims (4) and (8); it is not true in general that if A' and A" are two likenesses af A, then A' and A" are alike. But of course there are cases, even when A' and A" are mental impressions (as in my experiment), in which A' and A" are alike while the symbolizing spoken sounds and written marks are not alike, and that is all Aristotle needs here. That 12 NORMAN KRETZMANN is, I am claiming, all he needs here is a single instance in which claims (5), (6), (7), and (8) are true together. Before examining my claim further I want to consider claims (5) and (6). In Aristotle's words the two claims are put this way: "just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds". The 'just as' (manBp) suggests that what is intended in (6) is brought out more clearly in (5). What is clearer about written marks than about spoken sounds, even in the context of a single language and especiaIly from an unsophisticated point of view, is the conventionality of their relation to what they immediately symbolize. Thomas Aquinas puts this clearly and correctly in his commentary on this passage: No one has ever raised any question about this as regards letters. It is not only that the principle of their signifying is by imposition, but also that the formation of them is a produetion of art. Spoken sounds, on the other hand, are forrned naturaIly, and so some men have raised the question as to whether they signify naturally.22 It is of course easy to iIlustrate the lack of universal sameness in written marks, as in the case of 't-r-i-a-n-g-I-e' and 'D-r-e-i-e-c-k'. But the illustration is more to the point if we choose cases in which different marks symbolize one and the same spoken sound-e.g., 'ii' in Greek and 'h-a-y' in English and cases in which one and the same written mark symbolizes different sounds e.g., 'P-H': 'ray' in Greek and 'f' in English. III If I am right in my view that in 16a3-8 Aristotle is providing the grounds for his attribution of conventional signification to linguistic entities, then why does he approach the topic obliquely by way of considering interpersonal sameness and difference rather than pointing out the various principles governing natural and conventional signification? I think there are three reasons for the oblique approach. In the first place, if he did simply point out the principles governing signification resemblance, causal connection, regular association, custom, agreement, imposition he would not be providing any grounds for his subsequent claim that spoken sounds (and written marks) are significant by convention in their capacity as symbols. Saying that they are significant by custom, agreement, or imposition is just a fancier way of saying that they are significant by convention. ARIS TOT LE ON SPOKEN SOUND 13 In the second place, Aristotle is stating his conventionalism against the background of Plato's Cratylus. The fact that he has the Cratylus in mind in these opening chapters of De Interpretatione is indicated by his statement of conventionalism in 17al-2: "Every sentence is significant (not as a to ol ~ut, as we said, by convention)". The phrase 'not as a tool' (06X cl>~ opyavov os) alludes to nothing in De Interpretatione and makes sense only as a reference to the doctrine of the Cratylus. 23 Moreover, at the beginning of the Cratylus the criterion of linguistic naturalness is sameness for all men,24 and one of the important problems of the dialogue is the difficulty of determining exactly what semantic element Plato thinks is the same for all men, regardless of linguistic differences among them. Plato was concerned to distinguish between natural and conventional correctness of names, while Aristotle is concerned with conventional signification. But interpersonal sameness and difference are criteria of naturalness and conventionality generally, and Aristotie's claims (5)-(8) regarding comparatively commonplace semantic elements are clear on points that Plato left mysterious. In the third place, and most important, considerations of sameness and difference do constitute criteria for distinguishing between natural and non-natural signs, and for present purposes we ean simply identify nonnatural and conventional signs. Temporarily ignoring Aristotle's own use ofthese notions, I ean offer this definition (and complementary definition). A natural sign is a sign the correct interpretation(s) of which is (are) necessarily the same for all men. (A non-natural sign is a sign the correct interpretation(s) of which is (are) not necessarily the same for all men.) A few explanatory remarks. I say 'correct' because, of course, there is no assignable limit to incorrect interpretations. An eclipse is not and has never been a natural sign of God's displeasure, no matter what anyone may think or have thought ab out it. Ileave open the possibility of more than one correct interpretation to cover cases of correctness at more than one levelof interpretation. A red sunset is correctly interpreted as a sign of good weather the next day and also, on another level, as a sign of considerable dust in the atmosphere. I say 'necessarily' because it could hap14 NORMAN KRETZMANN pen that all men adopted a single convention e.g., 'Mayday' as a signal of distress and that adoption would certify a single interpretation as correct for all men. But no such decision has any efficacy in establishing the correct interpretation of a natural sign. Although the definition and its complement make no reference to the principles of signification, they do distinguish effectively between natural and non-natural signification. How c10sely do they match Aristotie's remarks ? The most striking dissimilarity may seem to be the shift from Aristotie's consideration of sameness and difference of signs to a consideration of sameness and difference of interpretations. My illustrations of sameness and difference with regard to written marks help to show that this dissimilarity is only apparent. When Aristotle says that "written marks are not the same for all men" he may mean to remind us that one and the same spoken sound - 'ray' is symbolized in Greek letters as 'P-H' and in English letters as 'R-A-Y'; and that is a difference of signs. But he may also be taken to mean that the written mark 'P-H' is not the same for all men in that Greek speakers read it as 'ray' and English speakers as 'f'; and that is a difference of interpretations. (Analogous illustrations can be devised of sameness and difference of spoken sounds as symbols of mental impressions.) As for 'correct', which appears in my formulation but not in Aristotle's, it surely is to be understood in his for just the reasons I gave for inc1uding it in mine. The one real difference between what Aristotle says and what I say may be his omission of 'necessarily'; but, given his purposes, I do not think that omission is in any way damaging. As I see it, all he really wants or needs to do here is to establish on the basis of considerations of sameness and difference that spoken sounds and written marks are non-natural, or conventional, signs. Observing that they are not in fact the same for all men does that very well; a fortiori they are not necessarily the same. From the stand point of my interpretation of this text the most misleading feature of it is c1aim (8): Actual things are the same for all. It is innocuous in itself, and it does not get in the way of my interpretation, but it ean work together with the reference to De anima to give the first half of Chapter 1 the look of a summary statement of the foundations of knowledge and communication, and it is that look which has deceived so many. ARIS TOT LE ON SPOKEN SOUND 15 IV In Chapter 1 AristotIe supplies some content for the notion of a spoken sound significant by convention, a notion he first makes use of in Chapter 2. ~OVOIlIX Il&V o(iv sen:t <pffiVTJ o"'llIlavnKTJ Kata O"UV8ijKT]V ... tO 0& Kata O"UV8ijK11V, an <pUO"Et taev ' ovo- ,.UltffiV OUOBV sO"nv, aA')..! atav 'YBVT]tat O"UIl~oAov' Sltd oT]AouO"i yi; n Kat oi åypa!1!1atot '1'6 q> 01 , OlOV 8T]piffiv, <bv OUOBV iiO"nv ovolla. (l6a19; 26-29) A name is a spoken sound significant by convention ... I say 'by convention' because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol. Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name. How are these passages to be read in the light of my interpretation? A name is said to be a spoken sound and not also a written mark because a written mark is simply an encoding symbol for a spoken sound, which is, in turn, (at least sometimes)25 an encoding symbol for a mental impression. But writing, like speech, is a linguistic medium, as mind is not; and so the primary linguistic element is the spoken sound.26 In his note on the phrase 'spoken sound significant by convention' Ackrill says The linguistic items he wishes to consider are marked oif from sounds not spoken, from spoken sounds that are not significant, and from spoken sounds that are natural signs,27 which seems clearly right. But if my interpretation is correct, there is something misleading about the way in which the third category of excluded entities is described, since on my interpretation conventionally significant spoken sounds are (at least sometimes) primarily natural signs O"tl!1Eia, symptoms of mental impressions. My description of the third category would have to be not 'spoken sounds that are natural signs' but 'spoken sounds considered as natural signs' i.e., all those that are significant only as natural signs and those that are also significant by convention considered in their role as natural signs. I want to try to clarify this point before going on. If in ordinary circumstances Smith asks Jones 'What's in the bottle?' and Jones, af ter 16 NORMAN KRETZMANN examining the contents ofthe bottle, says 'Water', the sound Jones utters is considered mainly (and perhaps exclusively) in its role as a conventional sign. But Smith may be Jones's doctor. He may know that there is water in the bottle but be interested in determining the nature and extent of brain damage in Jones. In this case when Jones says 'Water' the sound he utters is considered mainly (but not exclusively) in its role as a natural sign, as a symptom of his just then forming the mental impression of water or managing to come up with the spoken sound which symbolizes that impression. In this case it would be equally valuable to the questioner if the respondent uttered a nonsense-syllable or a completely inappropriate word. His attention in this case is directed not to the respondent's message but to the respondent; he wants information not about what the respondent has information ab out, but about the respondent. In 16a26-28 Aristotle explains his use of the phrase 'by convention' (KU'tcl cruv9fjKl1V): "because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol". Of course a narne does not becorne a symbol, but a spoken sound (or a name considered simply as a spoken sound) may be said to do so. The point is that no name considered as a narne exists by nature; a name comes into existence only when a spoken sound becomes a symbol. The notion that a spoken sound becornes a symbol is well suited to the view that it is prirnarily a symptom. A spoken sound becomes a symbol by acquiring the same sort of relation to a mental impression as a written mark bears to a spoken sound rule-governed embodiment in another medium. And it acquires that relation, it seems, by being used in certain ways that is, to call attention to, refer to, narne the actual things of which the symbolized impression is alikeness. The relation of the spoken sound 'water' to the actual stuff is that of narne to bearer, which is of course distinct from that of symbol to symbolized (or of symptom to symptomized). But the establishment of the symbolizing relation between the spoken sound and the impression is a necessary condition ofthe establishment ofthe name-to-bearer relation. Necessary, but not sufficient; for 'goat-stag' satisfies the necessary condition (in virtue of which it might, somewhat misleadingly, be called a narne), but in the absence of any actual thing of which the goat-stag image can be the likeness, the establishment of the name-to-bearer relation is impossible. As Ackrill remarks, 28 the first sentence of the passage in which AristotIe explains his use of 'by convention' is meant to be supported by the second ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 17 sentence : "Even inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance ) do indeed reveal something, yet none of them is a name". But the support, I think, is in the form of elucidation rather than argument. All spoken sounds are symptoms of some state of the speaker, or reveal (OTJAOUO"t) something about him. Inartieulate noises (aypã~a'tot 'l'6<pot) are those for which there is no rule-governed embodiment in another medium; they are unwritable (aypã~a'tot). 29 Why is no inarticulate but symptomatic (or revelatory) noise a name? Not simply because it is unwritable. Smith and Jones could agree to play a silly game: "From now on we'll never use the word 'water' but will cough whenever it would be appropriate to use the word". This would count as symbolization, although at least to begin with it would be symbolization not of an impression but of the spoken sound 'water', the encoding medium being inarticulate noise. But if Smith and Jones continued to play their game, the new convention might become so deeply ingrained in them that they would no longer have to "translate" ; and if that could happen, why couldn't their coughing become a name? Names do require establishing, and it would be extremely difficult to establish these various coughing noises as a name. But the crucial consideration is that such establishment could take place only within the context of an aIready established language. The amorphous, unruly character of inarticulate noises would make it impossible to establish the conventions if inarticulate noises were all we had to work with. And, af ter all, what AristotIe says is not that none of them ean be a name but that none of them is a name. And the reason they are not names is that they are intractable to the demands of convention. 30 Ackrill criticizes the sentence I am discussing, AristotIe only weakens the force ofhis remark by mentioning inarticulate noises, that is, such as do not consist of cIearly distinguishable sounds which could be represented in writing. For someone could suggest that what prevents such noises from counting as names is not that they are natural rather than conventional signs, but precisely because they are inarticulate.31 I have been trying to show that what prevents them from counting as names is that they are not conventional signs, and that they are not conventional signs "precisely because they are inarticulate". If I am right about AristotIe's account of conventional signification, then one important feature of it is that it inc1udes one kind of natural 18 NORMAN KRETZMANN signification in an essential capacity. To complicate things further, the semantic element that has the natural signification is a linguistic entity and thus a standard example of a conventional sign. Of course linguistic entities, like anything else, may sometimes occur as natural signs, but Aristotle's account presents their occurring in this capacity as one aspect of their regular occurrence as conventionaI signs. This combination of what seem to be complementary opposite types of signification strikes me as one of the strengths in the Aristotelian account of conventional signification. Language is not a sign-system sui generis, it is just the most complex, most flexible, richest combination of modes of signification; and the more artificai modes are, Aristotle reminds us, constructed on the basis of the less artificial. 32 Cornell University NOTES l In the notes to his translation (J. L. Aekrill, AristotIe's Categories and De Interpretatione, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963; reprinted with eorreetions, 1966), p. 113. 2 I am using AekrilI's translation, the only one in English that shows an understanding of the text. 3 cr. AekriII, op. cit., Notes, p. 115: '''A spoken sound signifieant by eonvention' gives the genus under which fall not only names but also verbs (Chapter 3) and phrases and sentenees (Chapter 4)". 4 Bekker has '1tpart'wc;'. Minio-Paluello (Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949; reprinted with eorreetions, 1956) has '1tpal't'wv' although his sourees have either '1tpo)'t'WC;' or '1tpiil't'Ov'. Evidently he thinks that the two readings are best accounted for by an original that has the omega of the one and the nu of the other. AekriIl's translation is based on Minio-PalueIlo's text, but he translates this passage as if it eontained '1tpa)'t'wc;' rather than '1tpal't'wv' with no indication that he has adopted a variant. The ItaIian translation of Ezio Riondato (in his La teoria Aristotelica dell'enunciazione; Editrice Antenore, Padova, 1957) is the only one I know that foIlows Minio-Paluello's text at this point: "mentre le affezioni deII'anima, di eui questi sone segni come dei (termini) primi (a cui essi si riportano) ... " (p. 131). Since the manuscript testimony is overwhelrningly in favor of the adverbial form here, the only reason for adopting theadjectival form to be found in Minio-PalueIIo's edition is that the adverb makes no sense. Sinee it seems to me to make good sense, and better sense than the adjective, I foIIow Bekker's edition (and AckrilI's translation). 5 The only coneeivable textual basis for a cIaim of this kind is the phrase 'in the first plaee' (1tpal1;wc;) at 16a6, but it supports no doctrine that makes sense. I shaII discuss this phrase Jater. 6 The ninth-century Arabic translation of Is]:liiq ibn l;Iunayn (ed. by A. Badawi; Cairo, 1948) renders both '(l'61l~0A.a' and '01lIlEia' as the active participle 'dall' in the phrase 'dallun (aIa' - 'is indieative of', 'refers to', or 'is an indication of'. AIthough Is]:liiq knew Greek, he translated from the Syriac. (I am grateful to Professor Alfred Ivry for ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 19 this information.) William of Moerbeke's Latin translation of 1268 has 'symbola' and 'signa' (Ammonius: Commentaire sur le Peri Hermeneias d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke (ed. by G. Verbeke) [Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum II; Louvain and Paris, 1961], p. 32; cf. Verbeke's note on 'cr6J.l~oJ..a', p. LXXXIX; cf. also J. Isaac, Le Peri Hermeneias en occident de Boi}ce a Saint Thomas, J. Vrin, Paris, 1953, p. 160). But Moerbeke's correct translation had no discernibIe influence. Even Thomas Aquinas, for whom the translation of Ammonius was made (incorporating the new translation of AristotIe), follows Boethius's translation in his commentary on this passage. (Jean T. Oesterle has thereby been misled into writing, in a note on this passage, "The Greek word o6J.l~0J..ov means 'token' and the Latin word nota used by William of Moerbeke is an exact translation of this" [in her Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan, Marquette Univ. Press, Milwaukee, 1962; p. 23].) Later medieval commentaries I have seen all follow the Boethius translation of this passage. With the sole exception of J. L. Ackrill EngIish translators of AristotIe have done no better than Boethius. H. P. Cook in the Loeb AristotIe has 'symbols or signs' for the first occurrence of 'ouJ.l~oJ..a', 'signs' for the second, and 'primarily signs' for 'oT)J.lda npol'tco<;'; E. M. Edghill in the Oxford AristotIe has 'symbols' (for both) and 'directly symbolize'; J. T. Oesterle (op. cit.) has 'signs' (for both) and 'first signs' . 7 I am using 'index' as the genel'ic term for an effect as indicative of its cause. A symptom is an effect indieative of a concurrent eause e.g., a fever taken as indicative of an infection. A nonsymptomatic index is an effect indicative of a cause no longer current e.g., a sear taken as indicative of a wound. 8 H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, Konigliche Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1870; art. 'ouJ.l~o).ov', Part 3. This is also the view of, for example, H. Steinthal (Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Romern, Berlin 1890, 2nd ed., p. 186) and K. Oehler (Die Lehre vom noetischen und dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles, Miinchen 1962, p. 149). Steinthal's view was developed in opposition to the distinction drawn between the two terms by T. Waitz in his edition Aristotelis Organon graece (Leipzig 1844-46). Recent writers who have distinguished the meanings of'OT)J.lEia' and 'uuJ.l~oJ..a' in this passage include P. Aubenque (Le probleme de l"etre chez Aristote, Paris 1962, pp. 106-112) and R. Brandt (Die aristotelische Urteilslehre, Marburg 1965, pp. 33-35). (Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans kindly called my attention to Brandt's book and thereby to much of the information contained in this note.) 9 As far as I know, I am the only exception. See my article 'History of Semantics', Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan & Free Press, New York, 1967; Vol. 7, pp. 358-406), p. 362. There may well be others among the Greek commentators, who did not have to rely on Boethius's translation. Ammonius, however, takes 'oT)IlEiov' and 'o6J.l~0).ov' to be two names for artificial representations. See Ammonii in libro De interpretatione (ed. by Busse), Berlin 1897, p. 20, lines 1-12. (I owe this observation to Professor Gabriel Nuche1mans.) 10 For example, in De interpretatione, Chapter 3, 16b10, where he says of a verb that "it is always a sign (oT)!lEiov) of what holds, that is, holds of a subject"; and 16b23: "not even 'to be' or 'not to be' is a sign of the actual thing (nor if you say simply 'that which is') ... ". 11 From here on I will use 'sign' as a generic term and 'symptom' as the term specificaIly corresponding to what I take to be AristotIe's use of 'oT)!lEiov' here. It is worth noting that the references to Chapter l in Chapter 14 of De interpretatione contain passages that seem to reflect the distinction I am drawing between symptom ("spoken sounds 20 NORMAN KRETZMANN follow (ch:ol..ouget) things in the mind" 23a32) and symbol ("spoken affirmations and negations are symbols of things in the soul" 24b1). 12 16a9-11: "Just as some thoughts (v6rU.1a) in the soul are neither true nor false while some are necessarily one or the other, so also with spoken sounds." The context and the association with spoken sounds certainly suggest that these "thoughts" are to be identified with the "affections in [or of] the soul" mentioned in 16a3 and 6-7. But there are considerations against such an identification too, some of which I will bring out. In any case it is enough for my purposes to show, as I shaH try to do, that AristotIe does not need a general claim about thoughts in 16a3-8. 13 Op. cit., Notes, p. 113. 14 See Categories Chapter 8 and De Anima, Book I, Chapter 1. 15 The sort of interpersonal sameness and difference that is important to Aristotle here is plainly not just individually interpersonal but intercommunal or interlinguistic. 16 The commentary of Giulio Pacio (recommended by Ackrill, op. cif., p. 156) views these claims in this way and makes some sensible remarks about them (Julius Pacius, In Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Organum commentarius, Frankfurt 1597; reproduced photographically, Georg Olms, Hildesheim, 1966, p. 61). 17 On Plato's views on the contributions of nature and convention to language see my article 'Plato on the Correctness of Names', American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971), 126-138. 18 16a26--29: "I say 'by convention' because no name is a name naturally but only when it has become a symbol". I 7al-2: "Every sentence is significant (not as a tool but, as we said, by convention)". 19 Op. cit., Notes, p. 113; italics added. Ackrill's main aim in this passage is to contrast the naturalness of likeness with the conventionality of the symbol-relation. 20 Encyclopedia o/ Philosophy 7, p. 362. 21 I am not maintaining that Aristotle's intentions are plainly disclosed in the language of 16a3-8. On the contrary, I think that it is hard to tell from that text what he intends there and that it is only by reading back into it what we can learn about his purposes in Chapters 2-6 that we ean see what must be going on here. 22 In libros Peri hermeneias expositio, Liber I, Lectio II, 8 (Leonine ed., Vol. I, p. 13): "Sed hoc quidem apud nullos unquam dubitatum fuit quantum ad litteras : quarum non solum ratio significandi est ex impositione, sed etiam ipsarum formatio fit per artem. Voces autem naturaliter formantur; unde et apud quosdam dubitatum fuit, utrum naturaliter significent" . 23 See Crafylus 385E-390A, especially 387D and 388A, and my article, 'Plato on the Correctness of Names', pp. 128-129. In his second commentary on De interpretatione Boethius expressly linked 17al-2 to the Cratylus and developed the connection between semantic naturalism and the tools doetrine (ed. by Meiser, Vol. 2, pp. 93-94). 24 Cratylus 383B. 25 Physics, Book II, Chapter 1 (193a7) is interesting in this connection: "a man born blind may form sylIogisms concerning colors, but such a man must be arguing about names without having any corresponding thoughts" (voetv 0& l!T]oev). I think it is significant that the blind man is said to be able to form syllogisms concerning colors e.g., 'Whatever is white is colored, and Socrates is white; so Socrates is colored'. It is in their occurrence as syllogistic terms that color-words ean most clearly be detached from the sort of mental imagery they might be thought to be associated with in descriptive statements. 26 This seemingly commonplace view may have been developed, Iike other views in ARISTOTLE ON SPOKEN SOUND 21 these opening chapters, in conscious opposition to the Cratylus, in which Plato recognizes a trans-linguistic name "naturally fitted for each thing" (389D-390A). Elsewhere, where he may not have had the Cratylus in mind, AristotIe speaks casually of discourse in the mind (Posterior Ana/y tics Book I, Chapter IO, 76b24). And Boethius reports that "the Peripatetics" developed a doctrine of three discourses: written, spoken, and mental (in his second commentary on De interpretatione, ed. by Meiser, Vol. 2, pp. 29, 30, 36, and 42). On this doctrine see Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories ofthe Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (Mouton, The Hague 1973), Chapter 8, Section 1.3. 27 Op. eit., Notes, p. 115. 28 Op. eit., Notes, p. 117. 29 Like Plato (Philebus 18C), AristotIe sometimes uses the word 'letters' (YPullllu'tu) to refer to units ofspoken sound rather than to written marks: "Spoken language is made up of letters. If the tongue were not as it is and the lips were not flexible, most of the letters could not be pronounced; for some are impacts of the tongue, others c10sings of the lips" (Parts of Animais, Book II, Chapter 16, 660a3-7). The inarticulate, unwritable (liter ally , unlettered) noises are probably most precisely described as those that cannot be analyzed into these standard units of spoken sound. (I owe this observation to Professor Ronald Zirin, who states it more fully e1sewhere in this volume.) 80 The demands of convention are more stringent for names than for larger units of communication. Language had to begin with inarticulate noises (recognized as, for example, cries for help) playing communicative roles like those now played by certain sentences, but it could not have begun with names. 81 Op. eit., Notes, p. 117. 82 I am very grateful to Sally Ginet, Gabriel Nuchelmans, Eleonore Stump, Nicholas Sturgeon, the members of the Cornell Ancient Philosophy Discussion Club, and the participants in the Symposium on Ancient Logic at the State University of New York at Buffalo for their criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. RONALD ZIRIN INARTICULATE NOl SES Aristotle's definition of a name (noun?) as 'a sound significant by convention' (De Interpretatione, Chapter 2) is interestingly discussed in Professor Kretzmann's paper in this volume. The definition is followed by an elucidating reference to 'inarticulate noises (of beasts, for instance)' which, though they reveal (OT)AoGmv) something, are not names. The Greek word &'ypuJ,lJ,lUtot which is here translated as 'inarticulate' needs further discussion. The metaphor that intelligibie speech is 'articulate', i.e. 'provided with joints' occurs in Aristotle in Historia Animalium, 4.9: OtUA81CtÕ o' ft tii~ <provii~ satt "Cij YAam't\ dltlp()pW(JIC;. Speech is the articulation of the voice by the tongue. The word OtupOpromt; is based on dpOpov 'joint', a word which is also used by Plato (?) in a definition of the syllable, cf. Definitiones, 414 D: ~OAAUP" &'vOpro7tiVT)~ <provii~ lipOpov syypuJ,lJ,lu"Cov. The syllable is a 'joint' of human voice consisting of letters. The metaphor of articulation, however, is not apt in translating &'YPUJ,lJ,lu"COt; which refers not to syllables but to the letters of which they consist. The plain meaning of &'YPuJ,lJ,lUtõ is 'not having letters' either in the sense 'not consisting of letters' or in the sense 'not knowing letters, illiterate' .1 The term, therefore, does not mean inarticulate in the literal sense, and I do not think that it means 'unwritable'. First of all, the sounds of animaIs are writable. Greek used onomatopoetic written representations of the sounds of animals (comparable to 'meow' and 'bow-wow') in precisely the way English does. But more important, the word YPUJ,lJ,lU which literally means 'letter' is often employed by Aristotle in an extended sense. For example, in De Partibus Animalium (660a) there is a discussion ofthe function of the lips and tongue in pronunciation which cleady uses the term YPUJ,lJ,lU in the sense of 'minimal unit of speech-sound': J. Corcoran (ed.). A.ndent Log/c and lts Modern lnterpretatwns. 23-25. A.ll Rlghts Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Re/del Publish/ng CompOIlY. Dordrecht-Holland 24 RONALD ZIRIN o JlEV A6yoe; O <hu 't'ile; cprovile; SK 't'rov ypapp,G.7:rov cr6YKet't'at, 't'ile; OE YAW't"t'T]e; Jl"; 't'ota6t1')<; oucr1')e; Jl1')OE 't'&V xetA-rov oyprov OUK liv fjv cp9syyecr9at 't'u 1tAeicr't'a 't'rov ypaJlJl(l't'rov 't'u JlEV yup 't'ile; YA-WHl'je; sim 1tpocrØoA-ai, 't'u oE crUJlØOA,Ut 't'rov XetA-rov. For vocallanguage is composed of letters. If the tongue were not such as it is, and if the lips were not piiant, it would not be possibie to pronounce most of the letters; for some of them are applications of the tongue and some closings of the lips. The word ypaJ..lJla, then, may be used in reference to language, as the equivalent of cr't'Otxeiov 'minimal unit (of speech-sound)' 2 and the word åypaJlJla't'Oe; could be used to mean 'not resolvable into discrete units of speech-sound'. The phrase åypaJlJla't'Ot 'l'ocpm, then, refers to noises which are not analyzable into discrete units of speech-sound, noises which do not consist of phonemes. The phrase OlOV 91')pirov 'ofbeasts, for example', provides one example of åypaJlJlatot 'l'ocpm. A bit more detail about the sounds of animais is given in Historia Animalium, 488a 33: Kai 't'u [~roa] 'l'ocpT]'t'tKa, 't'u oE acprova, 't'u OE aypaJ..lJla't'a. Some [creatures] emit noise, some are voice1ess, some letterless .. , At a later date, in [Pseudo-] AristotIe, Problems (895a) 'letterless' speech is imputed to both beasts and young children: 0Jlo{roe; oE ol 't'e naioee; Kai tU 9T]pia oT]A-oucrtv: ou yap nro ouoe 't'u natoia cp9syyov't'<lt 't'u ypaJlJla't'a. Children and beasts express themselves in the same way, for children do not yet utter letters. In conclusion, the term ypaJlJla was used to refer to minimal units of speech-sound. Rence theterms åypaJlJ..la't'oe; and syypaJlJ..la't'Oe; when applied to vocalization should be taken to mean 'not resolvable into discreteunits of speech-sound' and 'resolvable into discrete units of speech-sound' respective1y. It follows that the characteristic of human language that AristotIe refers to in the passage under discussion is that the sound of human speech is resolvable into phonemes. State University of New York at Bujfalo INARTICULATE NOlSES 25 NOTES l The opposite of dYPu/l/lu't'~ is åYYPu/l/lutoC;, which is used in the definitions of language (MyoC;) given in Plato (?) Definitiones 414 D: MyoC; <pOlV1) åYYPu/l/lu't'oC; ... , "language is voice consisting or (resolvable into) letters ... ". 2 This is the term which Plato generally uses to refer to speech sounds in the Cratylus, and is also used in this sense by Aristotle in the Poetics. NEWTON GAR VER NOTES FOR A LINGUlSTIC READING OF TRE CATEGORIES 1. If AristotIe's Categories provide a classification of things and not of sayings, as is traditionally insisted, the things classified are at any rate 'things that ean be said'. It is interesting, therefore, to inquire whether the Categories may be regarded as eontaining, in rudimentary form, results that might be more appropriately and more eompletely presented in terms of eurrent methods of linguistie analysis, applied to a levelof language or discourse that linguists usually ignore. 2. Both the name 'eategories', whieh signifies predications or sayings, and the position ofthe work at the beginning ofthe Organon, which deals with maUers of logic and language, reinforee the temptation to interpret the Categories linguistically. Although neither the title nor the position of the work in the eorpus is directly due to Aristotle, they do show that the inclination to treat the Categories as at least partially linguistic goe sback to the very earliest tradition of Aristotelian scholarship. 3. The determination that the eategories ean be given a linguistic interpretation even the eonclusion that they are linguistic, AekriIl 1 and Benveniste 2 notwithstanding would not suffice to show that they are not also (in some sense) metaphysical, nor that they are not universal. 4. The most usefullinguistic method to employ in this inquiry is distinctive feature analysis, 3 whieh has been used in several kinds of linguistic analysis. Passages in the Categories ean be interpreted as employing a related method, if not an early version of the method itself. 5. This method is based on a eomplex presupposition: that nothing is linguistieally significant (or real) unless it eontrasts with something else, that what it eontrasts with is an alternative possibility within a systematie array of possibilities, and that the possibie alternatives are determined by binary (sometimes ternary, positive/negative/neutral; or at any rate J. Corcoran (ed.), Andent Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, 27-32. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel PubIishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 28 NEWTON GARVER finitary) alternation along a finite number of dimensions, called features. 6. It is unlikely that all types of phenomena admit of a fruitful distinctive feature analysis. The method does not, for example, seem fruitfully applicable either to mechanics or to formallogie. Admitting of a distinctive feature analysis may be a distinctive feature of some types of linguistic phenomena. 7. In phonology there are, theoretically, a finite number of articulatory and acoustic dimensions along which spoken sound ean vary. In the phonemic analysis of a given language, each phonological dimension is either relevant or irrelevant for the identification of given phonemes, and the relevant dimensions, or features, are either positive or negative. Phonemes ean then be regarded as bundles (that is, simultaneous collocations) of distinctive features. The English phoneme Ipl, for example, ean be described as the simultaneous presence of one set of phonetic features (the positive ones) and absence of another set (the negative ones), with the remaining phonetic features (e.g. aspiration) being nondistinctive or irrelevant. 8. In semantic theory lexicaI meanings ean analogously, though somewhat more precariously, be regarded as bundles of abstract semantic markers.4 9. AristotIe does not define the categories, but he is careful to say what is distinctive about each. Some features, such as whether something in the category ean be said to be more or less so, are specified either positively or negatively for each category. 10. Katz 5 has suggested that AristotIe's categories ean be interpreted as abstract semantic markers which (a) are entailed by other semantic markers and (b) do not themselves entail other semantic markers. Even leaving aside epistemological questions that arise about the entailments, Katz' suggestion is implausible. His account does not fit what AristotIe listed as categories, it gives no place to the features that Aristotle singled out as distinctive, and it presupposes a full-blown logical apparatus instead of providing a basis for it. A LINGUlSTIC READING OF THE 'CATEGORIES' 29 11. Aristotle's categories are not semantic categories. 12. Aristotle's categories are deri ved from predication: theyare the kinds or species of the values of the variables in the form X is predicated of some a. This is not to say that every member of each category ean be predicated of something, but only that it must be distinctively involved in such predication and that it is what it is because of this distinct sort of involvement. A 'this', for example, cannot be predicated of anything, but it may be the subject of a predication, either as a substance or as something inhering in a substance. 13. Predication, or making truth-claims, is a genus of speech acts (language-games). Aristotle assumes it ean be distinguished from other sorts, such as inferring, praying, commanding, imploring, promising, reciting poetry, and so on. Viewed linguistically, therefore, Aristotle's Categories form a small subsection in the general theory of speech acts. 14. It is certain that predication is more basic than some other sorts of language acts (such as inferring, which clearly presupposes predication), and there are considerations from generative grammars and from common sense which suggest that it may be the most basic sort of speech aet. This suggestion is to be regarded as contentious; 6 but even if it were to be granted, its significance would depend on predication having been recognized or identified initially as one kind of speech aet among many. 15. Speech acts are distinguished, one kind from another, by two sorts of criteria, the circumstances in which they are appropriate and the sort of questions and comments that ean be made in response to them. 7 The features that Aristotle cites to distinguish the categories belong mainly to the second group. 16. Ackrill points out (p. 79) that "one way in which he [Aristotle] reached categoricai classification was by observing that different types of answer are appropriate to different questions". This is true, and useful for seeing the overall design of the Categories. But the distinctive features that AristotIe cites are based on the reverse insight, that different questions are appropriate to different sorts of predication. 30 NEWTON GARVER 17. Some examples: (a) 'Substance, it seerns, does not admit of a more and a less' (3b33). Suppose X is predicated of some a (someone says, 'a is X'); It goes hand-in-hand with X being in the category of substance that no question ean be raised whether a is more X than b or less X than a was yesterday. Ifthe question ean be raised, the predicate must belong to some other category, where this feature is positive or neutral rather than negative. If someone says, 'a is more a man than b', the presence of the word 'more' shows the predication to be qualitative rather than substantial, even though 'man' normally signifies a substance. (b) A substantial predication involves not only predicating X of a but als o saying X of a. The latter (but not the former) carries with it a commitment to predicate the definition of X of a; that is, both the genus of X and the differentia of X are also implicitly predicated of a, when X is said of a. This obviously shapes the subsequent discourse possibilities: for example, I ean attack a substantial predication by contending that the definition of the predicate do es not apply to the subject; but I could not attack a quantitative predication in this manner. 18. Each feature governs a specific range of possibie discourse: they are discourse jeatures. When a feature is positive, a certain set of responses (questions, challenges, comments, etc.) is open or permitted to predications in that category. When a feature is negative, another set ofresponses is open or permitted. 19. From this point ol' view, therefore, categories are (or are equivalent to) distinct clusters of discourse possibilities. 20. This account has been sketchy and programmatie, and is not intended to establish a definitive reading ofthe Categories. 21. One advantage of such a linguistic reading is that it brings the discussion of categories into a field of active scholarly research. It thereby makes possibie a rational and potentially useful criticism of Aristotle's work. Within his category of substance, for example, discourse features can certainly be found to distinguish substances in the modern sense (gold, coal, mud, water, etc.) both from individuals and from natural kinds (species and genera) perhaps making use of the distiction between mass nouns and count nouns. 8 A LINGUlSTIC READ IN G OF THE 'CATEGORIES' 31 22. There are nonetheless serious reservations to be kept in mind. AIthough predication is a universal speech aet, and probably necessarily so, it is not at all clear that the discourse features which distinguish the categories are universal; nor is it clear what the import would be of their not being universal. Another ground for caution is that discourse features seem to belong to the domain of rhetoric whereas the categories have always seemed to belong to the domain of logic. A third concern is that the theory of speech acts (which has the potential for revitalizing rhetoric in the way that the theory of quantification revitalized logic), within which this reading of the Categories is to be developed, is itself in a primitive state, and its precise relation to other branches of linguistics remains uncertain. 23. These issues must be kept in mind as further research is done on this linguistic reading of the Categories. The reading proposed must be taken as tentative and exploratory. In the long run it may prove to shape our understanding of the theory of speech acts and the science of rhetoric as well as our understanding of Aristotle. Slate University of New York of Buffalo NOTES 1 J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle' s 'Categories' and 'De Interpretatione', Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p. 71. I have used Ackrill's translation. His notes, to which I refer here, are both helpful and stimulating. 2 E. Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, Univ. of Miami Press, Coral Gabies; 1971, Chapter 6. 3 This method of analysis is due to Roman Jakobson more than to anyone else. See R. Jakobson, C. G. M. Fant, and M. HalIe, Preliminaries to Speech Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1952; N. Chomsky and M. HalIe, Sound Pattern of English, Harper and Row, New York, 1968; and Fred W. Householder, Linguistic Speculations Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1971. Most recent linguistic textbooks have a discussion of features. 4 The best presentation of semantic theory from this perspective is J. J. Katz, Philosophy of Language, Harper and Row, New York, 1966. 5 Op. cit., pp. 224-239. 6 I take it to have been contested, for example, by Malinowski, with his emphasis on phatic communion, in the appendix to Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 10th ed. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949; by Husseri, with his insistence on the primacy of prepredicative judgment in Formal and Transcendental Logic, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969; by Wittgenstein in the early sections of Philosophical Investi32 NEWTON GARVER gations, BIaekweII, Oxford, 1953; and by Derrida in Speeeh and Phenomena, Northwestern Univ. Press, Evanston, 1973. 7 See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1962; J. R. Searle, Speeeh Aets, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1969; and L. Wittgenstein, Philosophieallnvestigations, Basi! BIaekweII, Oxford, 1953, esp. pp. 1-25,304. 8 This sort of development was suggested to me by John Corcoran, to whom I am also indebted for suggestions incorporated at several places. PART TWO MODERN RESEARCH IN ANCIENT LOGIC IAN MUELLER GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 1. INTRODUCTION By 'logic' I mean 'the analysis of argument or proof in terms of form'. The two main examples of Greek logic are, then, Aristotle's syHogistic developed in the fint twenty-two chapters of the Prior Analytics and Stoic propositionallogic as reconstructed in the twentieth century. The topic I shaH consider in this paper is the relation between Greek logic in this sense and Greek mathematics. I have resolved the topic into two questions: (1) To what extent do the principles of Greek logic derive from the forms of proof characteristic of Greek mathematics? and (2) To what extent do the Greek mathematicians show an awareness of Greek logic? Before answering these questions it is necessary to clear up two preliminaries. The first is chronological. The Prior Analytics probably predates any surviving Greek mathematical text. There is, therefore, no possibility of checking Aristotle's syHogistic against the actual mathematics which he knew. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that the mathematies which he knew differs in any essential way, at least with respect to proof techniques, from the mathematics which has come down to us. The major works of Greek mathematics date from the third century B.C. For determining the role of logic in Greek mathematics it seems sufficient to consider only Euclid's Elements. It is the closest thing to a foundational work in the subject. The surviving works of the other great mathematicians of the period, Archimedes and Apollonius, are more advanced and therefore more compressed in their proofs. The absence of signs ofthe influence oflogic in them is not surprising. The evidence is too obscure to assign a date to the development of Stoic propositionallogic, but I shall take as a date the floruit of its major creator, Chrysippus (280-207). Doing so means denying any influence of Stoic logic on the Elements and, tacitly, on Greek mathematics in general. I hope that the over-all plausibility of my reconstruction in this paper will provide a J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modem Interpretations, 35-70. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 36 IAN MUELLER sufficient justification for the denial. But now I wish to discuss, as the second preliminary, a question relevant to the issue: How does one decide whether a given mathematical argument or work is influenced by a given logic? In Elements 1,19 Euclid proves that, given two unequal angles of a triangle, the side opposite the greater angle is greater than the side opposite the lesser. He proceeds as follows: l (1) Let ABC be a triangle having the angle ABC greater than the angle BCA; I say that the side AC is also greater than the side AB. (2) For, if not, AC is either equal to AB or less. Now AC is not equal to AB; (3) for then the angle ABC would also have been equal to the angle ACB; (4) but it is not; therefore (5) AC is not equal to AB. Neither is AC less than AB; (6) for then the angle ABC would also have been less than the angle ACB; (7) but it is not; therefore (8) AC is not less than AB. And it was proved that it is not equal either. Therefore (9) AC is greater than AB. Therefore in any triangle the greater angle is subtended by the greater side. Q.E.D. Much of the argument here can be analyzed in terms of Chrysippus's anapodeiktoi logoi. Thus (5) follows from (3) (an instance of a previously proved proposi tion, I. 5) and (4) (a 'trivial consequence' of (l» by the second anapodeiktos. And (8) is related similarly to (6) and (7). If (2) is taken as an expression of trichotomy, then (9) follows from (2), (5), and (8) by two applications of the fifth anapodeiktos.2 There are many other cases in the Elements which could be analyzed simiIarly. But since reasoning in accordance with the ruIes of a Iogic does not in itseIf impIy knowIedge of the Iogic, the possibiIity of anaIyzing a Euclidean proof in terms of Stoic propositional Iogic does not justify attributing to Euclid a knowledge of Stoic logic. Justification of such an attribution requires, at the very least, clear terminological parallels. However, there are none. GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 37 The paper which follows has three main sections. In the fint I discuss the character of Euclidean reasoning and its relation to Aristotle's syllogistic. In the second I consider the passages in the Prior Analytics in which Aristotle refers to mathematics ; my purpose here is to determine whether reflection on mathematics influenced his formulation of syllogistic. In both sections my conclusions are mainly negative. Euclid shows no awareness of syllogistic or even of the basic idea of logic, that validity of an argument depends on its form. And Aristotle's references to mathematies seem to be either supportive of general points about deductive reasoning or, when they relate specifically to syllogistic, false because based on syllogistic itself rather than on an independent analysis of mathematical proof. In the third main section of the paper I consider the influence of mathematics on Stoic logic. As far as Chrysippean propositionallogic is concerned, my conclusions are again negative. However, it is clear that at some time logicians, probably Stoic, began to consider mathematical proof on its own terms. Although they never developed what I would call a logic to cover mathematical proof, they at least realized the difference between it and the logicaJ rules formulated in antiquity. Much of the third section is devoted to an attempt to reconstruct in outline the history of logical reflections on mathematics in the last two centuries B.C. In conclusion I recapitulate briefly my conclusions about the relation between Greek mathematics and logic. 2. EUCLID'S Elements AND LOGIC One still reads that Euclid's logic is Aristotelian syllogistic.3 But one need only try to carry out a single proof in the Elements by means of categoricai syllogisms to see that this claim is false. If Euclid has any logic at all, it is some variant of the first order predicate calculus. In order to bring out the specific character of Euclidean reasoning, I reproduce the first proposition of the Elements together with an indication of the customary Greek divisions of a proposition.4 protasis ekthesis On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle. Let AB be the given finite straight line. 38 diorismos kataskeue IAN MUELLER D E Thus it is required to construct an equilateral triangle on the straight line AB. With center A and distance AB let the circ1e BCD be described; again, with center B and distance BA let the circ1e ACE be described; and from the point C, in which the circ1es cut one another, to the points A, B let the straight lines CA, CB be joined. apodeixis Now, since the point A is the center of the circ1e CDB, AC is equal to AB. Again, since the point B is the center of the circle CAE, BC is equal to BA. But CA was also proved equal to AB; therefore each of the straight lines CA, CB is equal to AB. And things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another; therefore CA is also equal to CB. Therefore the three straight lines CA, AB, BC are equal to one another. sumperasma Therefore the triangle ABC is equilateral; and it has been constructed on the given finite straight line AB. Quod erat faciendum. In modern terms all of this proposition except the protasis and diorismos would be considered proof. But, as the terminology suggests, only the apodeixis was considered proof by the Greeks. I shall here analyze proposition 1 primarily in terms of Gentzen's system of natural deduction for the predicate calculus.5 This analysis presupposes a somewhat artificial reformulation of portions of the text. For example, the protasis is not an assertion at all and hence can not be proved in the strict sense. I shall discuss the character ofthe protasis briefly below. Here I shall take it as a general statement: On any straight line an equilateral triangle can be constructed. The ekthesis is, then, a particular assumption ('AB is a straight line') GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGI C 39 from which a conc1usion ('An equilateral triangle ean be constructed on AB') will be derived. In the kataskeue the drawing of the two circ1es and of the lines CA and CB is justified by the postulates l and 3: Let it be postulated to draw a straight line from any point to any point; and to describe a circle with any center and distance. I know of no logic which accounts for this inference in its Euclidean formulation. One 'postulates' that a certain action is permissibIe and 'infers' the doing of it, Le., does it. An obvious analogue of the procedure here is provided by the relation between rules of inference and a deduction. Rules of inference perrnit certain moves described in a general way, e.g., the inferring of a formula of the form A v B from a formula of the form A. And in a deduction one may in fact carry out such amove, e.g., write '(P & Q) v R' after writing 'P & Q'. The carrying out of a deductive step on the basis of a rule of inference is certainly not itself an inference. For neither the rule nor the step is a statement capable of truth and falsehood. And if the analogy is correct, Euclid's constructions are not inferences from his constructional postulates ; they are actions done in accord with them. There is a further correspondence between constructions and inferences which lends support to the analogy. If one wants to study inference with mathematical precision, one treats deductions as fixed objects, sequences of formulas satisfying conditions specified on the basis of the rules of inference. In other words, when inference is studied mathematicaIly, acts of inference are dropped from consideration and replaced by objects which could have been created by a series of inferences but for which the question of creation is irrelevant; objects satisfying the conditions are simply assumed to exist. The analogy with geometry should be clear. In the modern formulation ofEuclid's geometry 6 there are no constructions of straight lines or circ1es. The axioms are stated in such a way as to guarantee the existence of these objects. Rather than construct the circ1e with center A and distance AB, the modern geometer simply derives the theorem asserting the existence of such a circ1e. The analogy proposed here is easily extended to explain the character of the protasis of proposition 1. The Greeks called proposition 1 a problem, construction to be carried out, and opposed problems to theorems, 40 IAN MUELLER assertions to be proved. 7 The analogy suggests that proposition 1 be likened to a short-cut rule of inference justified by showing that application of it is tantamount to a series of applications of the original rules. And, of course, Euclid does use the construction of an equilateral triangle on a given line directly in subsequent proofs (e.g., in 1,2). The apodeixis is on the surface very simple, very easy to understand, but logicaIly it is fairly complex. The inferences to the equality of A e with AB and of Be with BA are based on definitions 15 and 16 of book I: A circle is a plane figure contained by one line such that all the straight lines falling upon it from one point among those lying within the figure are equal to one another; and the point is called the center ofthe circle. It is clear Euclid is making some kind of deductive argument at the beginning of the apodeixis. But it is not at all clear that he thinks of it as a formal argument, an argument based on formal logical laws. In modern notation the definition of 'circle' may be represented as follows: (1) x is a circle+-+(i) x is a plane figure & (ii) (E!y) [y is a line containing x & (iii) (E!z) (z is a point within x & (u) (v) (u is a straight line from z to y & v is a straight line from z to y -t U equals v))]. From (l) and 'eDB is a circle' one can infer the definiens of (l) with 'eDB' substituted for 'x'. Such an inference could be referred to Aristotle's syllogistic if one were willing to allow singular terms in syllogisms 8 and to treat the complex term corresponding to the definiens as a term in a categoricaI proposition. But doing these two things will not suffice to recover the whole argument. As a next step we need to apply a propositional rule, &-elimination, to get (2) (E!y)[y is a line containing eDB & (E!z) (z is a point within eDB & (u) (v) (u is a straight line fromztoy & v is a straight line from z to y-tu equals v»)]. Reconstructing the next piece of Euclid's argument seems to be impossible. For in proposition l Euclid makes no reference to the distinction GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 41 between the circ1e and its circumference, a distinction which is expressed in the definition of circle. I shaH pass over the difficulty here by dropping cause (ii) and identifying the circ1e with its circumference. As aresult we hlave (3) (E!z) (z is a point within CDB & (u) (v) (u is a straight line from z to CDB & v is a straight line from z to CDB-+ u equals v». We wish to infer from (3) and 'A is the center of CDB' (4) A is a point within CDB & (u) (v) (u is a straight line from A to CDB & v is a straight line from A to CD B-+ uequals v). Obviously the definition of 'center' is heing invoked for this step, and the move is 10gicaHy sound. However, the apparatus involved in justifying the step goes beyond any Greek logical theory known. Since Euc1id seems to treat his geometric definitions as concrete specifications ofintuitive objects rather than as abstract characterizations,9 he would probably not recognize that any step of inference at all is involved here. From (4) by &-elimination we obtain that any two straight lines from A to CDB are equal. The inference from this assertion and 'AB and AC are straight lines from A to CDB' to 'AB equals AC' is an example ofthe most common form of explicit inference in the Elements. The form recurs in the apodeixis ofI,1 when Euc1id establishes the equality of CA and CB using the first common notion, 'Things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another'. In modern notation this argument runs (S) (u)(v) (w) (u equals w & v equals w-+ u equals v); (6) CA equals AB; (7) CB equals AB; (8) therefore CA equals CB. In later antiquity this argument became the paradigm of a mathematical argument. IO The Peripatetics, intent upon defending Aristotle, claimed tha t the argument is reallya categoricai syllo gism : 42 (A) IAN MUELLER Things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another; CA and CB are things equal to the same thing; therefore CA and CB are equal to each other.H What is the minor term of this 'syllogism'? Presumably 'CA and CB', i.e., the pair (CA, CB). The modem analysis, according to which the the minor premiss and the conclusion each assert that a certain relation holds between two subjects CA and CB, seems more natural than one according to which the premiss and the conclusion each assert a propert y of a pair taken as a single thing. But so long as the inference from (S), (6) and (7) to (8) is treated in isolation, there is no way to refute the Peripatetic analysis. Yet the context of the inference makes clear why the Peripatetics were wrong. The following represent plausible renderings of the proofs of (6) and (7) as categoricai syllo gisms: (B) Straight lines from A to CD B are equal to each other; CA and AB are straight lines from A to CD B; therefore CA and AB are equal to each other. (C) Straight lines from B to ACE are equal to each other; CB and AB are straight lines from B to ACE; therefore CB and AB are equal to each other. The minor premiss of (A) is presumably to be inferred directly from the conclusions of (B) and (C). Clearly it cannot be inferred by a categoricai syllogism since such a syllogism will require five terms, 'CA and AB', 'CB and AB', 'CA and CB', 'equal to each other', and 'equal to the same thing'. Thus although (A), (B), and (C) can be construed as categoricai syllogisms, they cannot be combined to yield asyllogistic reconstruction of Euclid's apodeixis. For it depends on the relations among the three straight lines and not on properties ofthem taken as pairs. In ancient logic the sumperasma is the conclusion inferred from the premisses of an argument. In the Elements, however, the sumperasma is not so much aresult of inference as a summing up of what has been established. This summarizing character is made clearer in the case of theorems for which the sumperasma consists of the word 'therefore', followed by a repetition of the protasis, followed by 'Q.E.D.' (See the proof of I, 19 quoted above.) From the modem point of view the apodeixis ends with a particular conclusion reached from particular assumptions; GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 43 tacit in the sumperasma are steps of conditionalization to get rid of the assumptions and of quantifier introduction or generalization. Throughout antiquity, indeed down into the nineteenth century, the latter step was not seen as a matter of logic.12 The inference was brought into the domain of logic only with the invention of the quantifier and the discovery of the rules governing it. I have analyzed Elements 1,1 in order to show that Euclid's tacit logic is at least the first order predicate calculus, nothing less. His logic may even be more than that, since representing his reasoning in the first order predicate calculus would seem to require reformulations foreign to the spirit of the Elements. I hope I have als o sufficiently emphasized that in antiquity only the apodeixis would have been thought of as possibly subject to logical rules, and it is often a very small portion of a Euclidean proposition. I would now like to argue that Euclid does not show an awareness of one ofthe most basic ideas oflogic, logical form. Characteristically logicians make clear the importance of form for determining the validity of an argument by obvious artificial devices. When AristotIe writes, "If A is predicated of all B and B of all C, necessarily A is predicated of all C", he uses the letters 'A', 'B', 'C' to indicate the truth of the assertion (or correctness of the inference), no matter what terms are put in their place. The Stoics make a similar claim when they call "If the first then the second; but the first; therefore the second" valid: any substitution of sentences for ordinal number words produces a correct inference. Of course, artificial indications of form are not likely to occur in applications of logic, but a series of correct deductive arguments cannot be said to show a sense of logic unless it shows a sense of form. But Greek mathematics does not show this sense. In it one finds parallel proofs of separate cases which could be treated simultaneously with only slight generalization. In the Elements there are separate proofs of properties of tangent and cutting circles when only the points of contact are relevant.l3 Better known in Euclid's separate treatment of one and the other numbers 14 and of square and cube numbers when all that is relevant is one number's being multiplied by itself some number of times.l5 Similar examples can be found in Archimedes and Apollonius. The usual explanation of this proliferation of cases invokes the concreteness of Greek mathematics. What is insufficiently stressed is how a sense of derivation 44 IAN MUELLER according to logical rules, had it existed, would have undercut this concreteness. Greek geometers obviously trusted their geometric intuition much more strongly than any set of logical principles with which they may have been familiar. The proof ofI,19 presented above is logically very elementary. One has a set of alternatives all but one of which imply an absurdity, and so one infers the remaining alternative. A person with a sense of logic probably would not bother to carry out such a proofwith Euclid's detail even once. But he certainly would not repeat the same proof with different subject matter several times. Euclid repeats the proof exactly in deriving 1,25 from 1,4 and 24, and V,1O from V,8 and 7. Another example is perhaps even more surprising. Euclid repeatedly moves from a proof of a proposition of the form (x)(Fx-+Gx) to an explicit proof of (x)(-Gx-+ -Fx): assume -Ga and Fa; then, since all F are G, Ga, contradicting -Ga. I have noticed five cases in which such an argument is carried out and two others in which the stylized argument is avoided. 16 One of the main themes of nineteenth-century mathematics was the demand for complete axiomatization, and one ofthe main charge s levelled against Euclid was his failure to make explicit all of the assumptions on which his proofs relied in particular, assumptions about continuity or betweenness,17 The absence from the Elements of first principles covering these assumptions is another indication of the intuitive character oftheir work, but it does not seem to me to throw light on the question whether Euclid wished to axiomatize his subject completely. I do not know what Euclid would have said if challenged to establish the existence of the point C in which the two circles of the proof of proposition I cut each other. But I do believe that he intended to make explicit in the postulates of book I all geometric assumptions to be used in hook J. I stress 'in book I' because there is no reason to suppose that Euclid intended his postulates to suffice for the whole of the Elements, since they do not in fact suffice, since they are stated within book I, and since the Elements include the theory of ratios, arithmetic, and solid geometry. I stress 'geometric' because Euclid's proofs depend on other more general assumptions, some of which are stated in the common notions but most of which are not. Discussion of the common notions is complicated by the issue of interpolation. I shall here simply state my view that only the first three are due to Euclid,18 At the end of the paper I shall suggest why the other comGREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 45 mon notions were added. In any case even the most extensive list of common notions in the manuscripts is inadequate to cover all of Euclid's inferences. I illustrate this point by reproducing in outline a segment of the apodeixis (a reductio) of 1,7. (i) angle ACD equals angle ADC; (ii) therefore angle ADC is greater than angle DCB; (iii) therefore angle CDB is 'much' greater than angle DCB. C A ~----+--')D 8 In this argument, (i) is properly derived from earlier assumptions. (ii) would seem to be derived from (i) plus (iv) angle ACD is greater than angle DCB, and the general principle (v) (u)(v)(w) (uequals v & visgreaterthan w-+uisgreaterthan w). (iv) may be justified by reference to the common notion numbered 8 by Heiberg,19 which asserts that the whole is greater than the part; more probably it is simply a truth made obvious by the diagram. The principle (v) is nowhere stated explicitly by Euclid, although it would seem to be neither more nor less obvious than the first common notion. Approximately the same thing ean be said about the inference to (iii), which follows from (ii) plus (vi) angle CDB is greater than angle ADC, and the principle of transitivity for 'greater than', again a principle equally as obvious as the first common notion. I mention these tacit principles to show that the deductive gaps in the Elements occur at a much more rudimentary level than the levelof continuity or betweenness. But more important, this example, which could be buttressed with many others, seems to me to shift the burden of proof to those who claim that 46 IAN MUELLER Euclid intended to produce a complete axiomatization of even bo ok I. I have so far concentrated primarily on book I ofthe Elements because I believe that, at least as far as logic is concerned, it is Greek mathematics par excellence and because it se ems to be the main contact point between later Greek logic and mathematics. However, I would like now to con sider book V of the Elements, which has been described by some scholars as (more or less) formal in the logical sense. 20 There is no question that the theory of proportion of book V is in a way abstract; but, as I hope to make clear, the abstraction involved does not yield a theory based on logic. Rather it yields a theory only slightly less concrete than Greek geometry or arithmetic. The theory of book V represents Eudoxus's solution to the problem of dealing mathematicaIly with the relation of one quantity to another when the relation cannot be represented as a ratio between two integers. Aristotle apparently refers to this theory and praises it for a kind of abstraction. Another case is the theorem about proportion, that you can take the terms alternately; this theorem used at one time to be proved separately for numbers, for lines, for solids, and for times, though it admitted of proof by one demonstration. But because there was no name comprehending all these things as one I mean numbers, lengths, times, and solids, which differ in species from one another they were treated separately. Now however, the proposition is proved universally; for the propert y did not belong to the subjects qua lines or qua numbers, but qua having a particular character which they are assumed to possess universally. (Posterior Analytics, 1.5.74a17-25, trans!. by T. Heath) Aristotle here writes as if the whole matter were terminological, as if separate proofs ofthe law Ã~BuC~~D-Ã~CuB~~D were given for different kinds of objects simply because no one term covered them all. But it is generally agreed that Eudoxus did not just supply a new term, 'magnitude' (megethos), in the Elements; he provided a new foundation for the theory of proportion. This foundation survives in Definitions 5 and 7 ofbook V. DEFINITION 5. Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third to the fourth, when, if any equimuItiples whatever be taken of the first and the third and any equimultiples whatever of the second and the fourth, the former equimultiples alike exceed, are alike equal to, or alike fall short of, the latter equimuItiples respectively, taken in corresponding order. GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 47 DEFINITION 7. When of equimultiples the multiple of the first magnitude exceeds the multiple of the second but the multiple of the third does not exceed the multiple of the fourth, then the first is said to have a greater ratio to the second than the third has to the fourth. In modem notation: 21 (S) (A, B)=(C, D)~ (m)(n)[(m*A>n-B--+m*C>n-D) & (m*A=n-B--+m*C=n*D) & (m*A<n-B--+m*C<n* D)J. (7) (A, B»(C, D)~(Em)(En)(m*A>n*B & -(m*C>n* D». In these definitions comparisons of size between ratios are reduced to comparison of size between multipIes of magnitudes. To see what the definitions mean, one need only think of A, B, C, D as real numbers, (X, Y) as XI Y, 'm' and 'n' as ranging over integers, and give' .', '>', '<', and' = ' their standard meanings. Definition S is then equivalent to (S') ~ = C ~(m)(n)[(~> ~ --+ ~ >~) & (~= -"- --+ C =~) & BD BmDm BmDm (~ < ~ --+ C < ~)J. B m D m But AIB and CfD may be thought of as arbitrary real numbers, since any real can be represented as a ratio of two reals and any such ratio represents a real. Thus, Definition S can be thought of as saying that two reals are equal if they make the same cut in the system of rationals Dedekind's account of equality for reals. 22 If the same interpretation is applied to Definition 7, it becomes (7') - >-~(Em)(En) - > - & - -- >- , A C (A n (C n)) B D B m D m i.e., a first real is greater than a second if and only if there is a rational nim separating them. In terms of Greek mathematics one remarkable feature of Definitions S and 7 is that they attach relatively abstract explanations to the relatively intuitive notions of equality and inequality of ratio. And the explanations are the basis for proving some intuitively obvious facts, e.g., (V.7) (V. Il) A=B--+(A, C) = (B, C); (A, B)=(C, D) & (E, F)=(C, D)--+(A, B) = (E, F). 48 IAN MUELLER Intuitions concerning ratios are undoubtedly intended to play no role in the derivations ofbook V. However, the derivations are not purely logical. Euclid makes constant use of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division of magnitudes operations which are characterized nowhere in Greek mathematics. He also assumes laws governing the performance of these operations and laws governing comparisons of size. 23 The tacit assumptions in book V should probably not be attributed to intuitions about magnitudes and operations on them. For Aristotle's remarks show that 'magnitude' is intended in a general sense. And there is no single intuitive notion of, say, addition for all the different kinds of objects to which the word is supposed to apply. Moreover, in other parts of Greek mathematics which are either Eudoxus's work or stem from it, the operations in question are performed on geometric objects (e.g., cirdes in Elements XII,2; parabolic segments in Archimedes's Quadrature o/ the Parabola) for which the operations could not be given a precise intuitive (i.e., constructive) sense. This deviation from the generally constructive tendency of Greek mathematics is probably not an oversight. Rather, the deviation represents the only available means of solving certain problems. So too in the theory of proportion Eudoxus deviates from the generally intuitive character of Greek mathematics, reducing the theory to generalized notions of magnitude, addition, multiplication, etc. But these notions remain informal. No attempt is made to characterize them by means of first principles. Hence the underpinning of the theory of proportion is the theory of magnitudes rather than logic. 3. MATREMATICS IN TRE Prior Analytics In his systematic presentation of the categorical syllogism in the first twenty-two chapters ofthe Prior Analytics, Aristotle never invokes mathematics. His examples are always ofthe 'white'-'man'-'animal' variety, and they suggest a dose connection between Aristotle's logic and the somewhat mysterious dialectical activities associated with Plato's Academy.24 The difficulty of fitting mathematical argument into syllogistic form may explain the absence ofmathematical references in these chapters. But even in later chapters where Aristotle does invoke mathematics to support some points, a substantial majority ofhis considerations are either directly pointed at dialectical argument or more obviously relevant to it than to GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 49 anything else. It seems clear to me that mathematics could not have played in the development of Aristotle's syllogistic anything like the role it played in the development of modem quantification theory. However, it is perhaps worthwhile to examine the mathematical references in the Prior Analytics to determine what role mathematics did pay. I fint describe references which have no special relevance to the categoricai syllogism. (A) 1.30.46a19-22. Aristotie illustrates the empirical basis of our knowledge of the first principles of a deductive science by reference to astronomy, presumably of the kind found in Euclid's Phenomena and Autolycus's On the Moving Sphere and On Risings and Settings. (B) I.31.46b26-3S. Aristotle invokes the incommensurability of the side of a square with its diagonal to illustrate the impossibility of establishing an unknown fact by means ofPlatonic division. (C) I.41.49b33-S0a4 is a difficuIt passage to interpret. Aristotle compares his use of ekthesis to the geometer's calling 'this line a foot long and that line straight and breadthless when it is not.' 25 Apparently Aristotle is thinking of the ekthesis of a geometric proposition and pointing out that the diagram to which the geometer seems to be referring may not satisfy the description he gives and yet does not affect the correctness of his argument. Ross 26 points out the different ways in which Aristotle uses the word ekthesis: None of them provide a satisfactory basis for interpreting Aristotle's remark here. Yet, whatever Aristotle means, he is clearly only making an analogy between his use of ekthesis and geometric ekthesis. His point would applyequally well whatever logical principles are taken to be involved in mathematical argument. (D) II.l6.6Sa4-7. Aristotle illustrates 'begging the question' with a brief reference to "those who think they draw parallel lines". A satisfactory explanation of this passage would throw light on the history of mathematics but not on syllogistic. For the illustration occurs in a general description of 'begging the question' and would be compatibie with any deductive logic. (E) II.17.6Sbl6-21 and 66all-15 are equally general. In the former Aristotle gives a presumably fictitious example of a reductio ad absurdum in which the absurdity is not attributable to the hypothesis refuted, namely, an attempt to derive a Zenonian paradox from the hypothesis of the commensurability of the side of a square with its diagonal. In the second he illustrates that a falsehood may follow from more than one set of 50 IAN MUELLER premisses by means of another mathematically fascinating example: 'Parallels meet' follows from 'The interior [angle] is greater than the external' and from 'The angles of a triangle are greater than two right angles'. Since what Aristotle says does not depend in either case on the form of derivation involved, there is no reason to connect these passages with the categoricaI syllogism. The remaining references to mathematics in the Prior Analytics have a much more obvious connection with syllogistic. The first is perhaps the most important. Having run through the various figures of the various forms of syllogism, Aristotle turns in 1.23 to establishing a very general claim: every syllogism in the general sense (i.e., every deductive proof) is a syllogism in the technicaI sense (i.e., a categoricaI syllogisrn). He repeats this claim more than once in the Prior Analytics, and there ean be no doubt that Aristotle includes mathematical proofs among syllogisms in the general sense. His first step in establishing the claim is to assert, without justification, that the conclusion of every proof is a categoricaI proposition. Necessarily every proof and every syllogism proves that something belongs [to something] or does not belong, and either universally or in part. (40b23-2S) It is easy enough from our standpoint to produce counterinstances to this assertion, but from Aristotie's it is not. Consider an example he uses commonly, the proposition which Euclid states as "the three interior angles of any triangle are equal to two right angles" (Elements 1,32, second part). Aristotle renders this proposition rather sueeinetly as 'Every triangle has two right angles'. 27 A more precise rendering would be 'Every triangle has its interior angles equal to two right angles'. The imprecision is indicative of Aristotie's casual attitude toward translation into categoricaI form. Even more significant is his casual attitude toward the analysis of categoricaI propositions into terms. According to him, the terms in 'Every triangle has two right angles' are 'triangle' and 'two right angles'. It seems clear, however, that the verb 'have' must be included in the predicate of the proposition, since what is predicated of every triangle in 1,32 is having two right angles, not being two right angles. Aristotle apparently considers such distinctions irrelevant as far as deduction is concerned. In Prior Ana/y ties 1.38 he considers a number of valid arguments which, according to him, differ from categorical syllogisms only GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 51 because of the grammatical case of one of the terms, e.g., "If wisdom is knowledge and wisdom is of the good, the conclusion is that knowledge is of the go od" and "Opportunity is not the right time because opportunity is god's, but the right time is not". For Aristotle these arguments are syllogisms with the terms 'wisdom', 'knowledge', 'go od' and 'opportunity', 'right time', 'god' respectively. We say generaIJy about all instances that the terms are aIways to be set out in the nominative case, e.g., 'man' or 'good' or 'opposites', not 'of man' or 'of good' or 'of opposites', but the premisses are to be taken with the appropriate case, e.g., 'equal' with the dative, 'double' with the genitive, 'striking' or 'seeing' with the accusative, or in the nominative, e.g., 'man' or 'animal', or if the noun occurs in the premiss in some other way. (I.36.48b39-49a5) As Lukasiewicz has pointed out, "Aristotelian logic is formal without being formalistic. "28 That is to say, Aristotleis throughly aware that the validity of an argument depends on its form, but he is not very strict in his determination of the form of a statement in an argument. The freedom of paraphrase which he allows himself in representing statements may well have been a major factor in his conclusion that a proof is always of a categoricai statement. Certainly, given Aristotle's liberal standards, all the theorems in Euclid could be transformed into categoricai statements. When Aristotle wrote the Prior Analytics probably no one was aware of the possibility of a formalistic logic. But the Stoics apparently did move toward one.29 Unfortunately the idea does not seem to have spread outside Stoic circles. Alexander of Aphrodisias, commenting on Aristotle's remark that words and phrases with the same meaning may be interchanged in arguments, asserts: "The syllogism does not have its being in the words but in what they signify" . 30 Even if one believes this assertion, one cannot deny that the insistence on strict formalization characteristic of modem logic has made clear a number of things which reliance on meaning obscures. As we shall see, later Peripatetics were able to defend Aristotle's claim of universality for the categoricai syllogism because they were content with rather loose formulations of arguments. It would be impossible to refute Aristotle's liberal attitude toward translation into categoricai form, aIthough the succes s of modem logic surely shows the attitude to be unfortunate. However, one might even concede that only categoricai propositions are proved in mathematics without admitting the syllogistic character of mathematical proof. The 52 IAN MUELLER analysis of Elements 1,1 was intended to show how far from the categorical syllogism EucIidean reasoning is. Aristotle, however, produces in Prior Analytics l,23 a general argument for the universality of the categorical syllogism. The main point of the argument is the need for amiddle term to establish a categoricai proposition. There is no reason to examine the argument in detail, since it presupposes the universality of reasoning based on the predicational relation of terms. The important point is that no thorough investigation of mathematical proof would support Aristotie's claim. Aristotle's own mathematical examples are consistently vague. In 1.35 he writes as though the proof that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles requires only the proper specification of a middle term. Almost certainly the proof he has in mind involves the drawing of a parallel line, as in the fint or second diagram, and arguingthat angle B=angle B', angle C = angle C', and angle A + angle B + angle C = two right angles. In such a proofthe terms 'triangle' and 'two right angles' cannot function as categoricaI terms because the proof involves breaking the triangle and the two right angles into parts, and the spatial relations of the parts are crucial. EIsewhere Aristotle simply asserts that categoricai syllogisms are used in the derivation of a contradiction from the assumption of the commensurability of side and diagonal (l,23,41a21-37 and l,44.50a29-38). And, to take the most extreme case of all, he is content to describe a very elaborate attempt of Hippocrates to square the circle 31 with the folIowing cryptic remark : If D is 'to be squared', E 'rectilinear', F 'circ1e', if there be only one rniddle for the [proposition] EF, the circle with lunes becoming equal to a rectilineal [figure l, we should be close to knowledge. (II.25.69a30-34) Here AristotIe apparently thinks of Hippocrates's quadrature of a circIe plus a lune as the insertion of a middle term between 'rectilinear' and 'circle'. In itself this interpretation of the quadrature is dubious, but the crucial point is that no concern is shown for the details of Hippocrates's GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 53 reasoning. Aristotle is contented with a vague statement of the general result. The closest Aristotie comes in the Prior Analytics to considering a mathematical proof in detail is in 1.24 where he wishes to show that at least one premiss of a valid syllogism must be universal. This wish is somewhat strange, since a simple survey of the detailed presentation in the first twenty-two chapters would suffice to establish the point. Aristotle uses examples to make it plausible. The first is non-mathematical. For let it be put forward that musical pleasure is worthwhiIe. If pleasure is assumed to be worthwhiIe but 'all' is not added, there won't be a syllogism. And if it is taken to be some pleasure, then, if it is a different pleasure [than musical pleasurel, it does not help for the thesis, and if it is the same, the question is begged. (41b9-13) Here Aristotle seems to lose sight completely of the notion of formal validit y which is so crucial in his original presentation. Re could have simply pointed out that the argument with 'some' is invalid because it is of a form aiready shown to be invalid, or, more directly, because there are interpretations which make the premisses true and the conclusion false. In any case, Aristotle continues: This is made clearer in geometrical propositions, e.g., that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. Let the straight lines A and B be drawn to the center. Then if one takes (l) the angle AC to be equal to the angle BD without assuming (Al) the angles of a semicircle to be equal in general, and again that (2) C is equal to D without adding that (A2) all angles of the segment are equal, and further that since the whole angles are equal and the subtracted angles are equal, (3) the remainders E, Fare equal without assuming that (A3) if equals are subtracted from equals the resuIts are equal, he wiII beg the question. (41b13-22) Aristotle's presentation here is somewhat obscure and hardly rigorous by Euclidean standards. But the drift of the proof which he describes is clear. In the diagram, bede/is a circle with center a. According to Aristotle, the following argument involves petitio principii: (1) mixed angle ade = mixed angle a/e ; 54 IAN MUELLER (2) mixed anglefde=mixed angle dfe; (3) therefore, rectilineal angle adf=rectilineal angle afd. The addition of three general premisses is required to correct the reasoning: (Al) The angles made by diameters and circumferences of circles are always equal. (A2) The two angles made by a chord and the circumference of a circle and on the same side ofthe chord are equal. (A3) If equals are subtracted from equals, the results are equal. Quite clearly the proof which AristotIe has in mind here is logically very similar to the apodeixis of Elements 1,1. This proof is slightly more complicated (and less syllogistic) because there is a subtraction involved between steps (2) and (3). Exactly how AristotIe would have tried to syllogize the proof is anybody's guess. There is no evidence that he ever did try, and I suspect that he never considered the problem of reducing mathematical proofto syllogistic form in a systematic way. In the present passage he is simply using a mathematicai example as inductive evidence for his claim that a valid syllogism requires a universal premiss. And perhaps Aristotle is here using the word 'syllogism' in the broader rather than the narrower sense. His failure to refer to the earlier chapters of the Prior Analyties for a clear substantiation of his claim, his inconclusive treatment ofthe argument yielding 'Musical enjoyment is worthwhile', and the vagueness of his discussion of the mathematical proof incline me to think so. I would be certain except for Aristotle's references to the modes and figures ofthe syllogism at the end of1.24. It looks, then, as though Aristotle did not study mathematical proof carefully or make any detailed attempt to vindicate his claims for the universality of syllogistic. A general argument based on a rather superficial analysis of mathematical theorems was sufficient for his purposes. This point of view is confirmed by the semi-mathematical arguments in other Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian works. None of them show any closer relation to syllogistic than the main texts of Greek mathematics do. Further evidence is provided by Eudemus's presentation of Hippocrates's quadratures of lunes and circles plus lunes.32 Eudemus was a pupil of AristotIe with at least some interest in logic, 33 but nothing in his GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 55 presentation suggests an interest in connecting mathematics with syllogistic. Alexander of Aphrodisias is too late a figure to serve as a direct indicator of Aristotle's own ideas, but the surviving parts of his commentaries on the Organon are our best source of information on what became of those ideas among the later Peripatetics. Alexander makes clear in many passages that, for him, the doetrine of the universality of the categoricai syIlogism has the status of a dogma. In one such passage he discusses Aristotle's claim that the derivation of a contradiction from the assumption of the commensurabiIity of the side of a square with its diagonal is syIlogistic.34 Alexander reproduces a protracted but essentiaIly correct derivation that is no more syIlogistic in style than any proof in the Elements. He simply asserts that the derivation is syllogistic. For him any interesting conclusive argument must be a categoricai syllogism. Thus far I have argued as if Aristotle acknowledged no form of conclusive argument other than the categoricai syllogism. In faet he does acknowIedge a general class of non-syIlogistic argument which he calls argument from a hypothesis. 35 An especiaIly important member of the class is the reductio ad absurdum. However, Aristotle always treats the general class and its most important member separately, and I shall follow him in my discussion. Argument from a hypothesis is for Aristotle basically modus ponendo ponens. Wishing to prove Q, one adds P-" Q as a hypothesis and proves P. Aristotle represents argument from a hypothesis as a form of dialectical reasoning. The hypothesis P -" Q is a matter of agreement between two opponents. The opponent who denies P but concedes P -" Q is declaring a proof of Q unnecessary once a proof of P has been found; he is not providing a premiss which might be used in a proof of Q. Thus Aristotle does not conceive of modus ponens as a rule oflogical inference. As far as he is concerned, the proof in an argument from a hypothesis is the proof of P. Since he assumes that P will be categorical, he assumes that the proof of P will be a series of categoricai syllogisms. Lukasiewicz argued that Aristotle was oblivious to the use of ruIes of propositionallogic in his own deveIopment ofsyIlogistic.36 His obliviousness to their use in mathematics seems at least as clear. On the other hand, reductio arguments are an obvious feature ofmathematies. And Aristotle's standard example of a reductio proof is the indireet derivation of the incommensurability of the side of a square and its diagonal. Aristotle's analysis of reductio is obviously intended to be like S6 IAN MUELLER his analysis of argument from a hypothesis, but the detail s of the analysis of reductio are less clear. Primafacie, one would expect the hypothesis of a reductio to be the assumption refuted; but, if it is, the analogy with argument from a hypothesis breaks down. Unfortunately AristotIe contents himself with saying that the hypothesis in a reductio is not agreed to in advance "because the falsehood is obvious" (I.44.S0a3S-38). The ob* vious falsehood would seem to be the contradiction derived from the assumption refuted. In saying that no advance agreement is made, Aristotle is apparentIy again envisaging a dialectical situation: one person claims P; the other derives a contradiction from P; the falsehood is so blatant that no explicit agreement is needed to get the first person to abandon P. One might then consider the hypothesis of a reductio to be the law of proposition al logic '(P --+ (Q & Q» --+ P', but there is no evidence that Aristotle even tried to reformulate it. For him the crucial points are (1) the reductio part of an indirect proof is syllogistic, and (2) the nonsyllogistic part is a matter of tacit agreement rather than logic. Rowever, reductio is a part ofmathematics and is recognized as such by Aristotle. Was he then forced to recognize a non-syllogistic feature of mathematics ? ApparentIy not, for AristotIe also realized that "everything which can be inferred directly (deiktikos) can be inferred by reductio and vice versa, and by the same terms" (II.14.62b38-40). In other words, (A & B)--+ C is a valid categoricai syllogism if and only if (A & C) --+ B is (with negated statements properly formulated). Thus any theory whose logic is syllogistic has no need of reductio proof. It is unfortunate that no one ever tried to illustrate this truth about the categoricai syllogism by recasting indirect proofs from mathematics into direct ones. An attempt to do so would have made the limitations to the categoricai syllogism obvious. AristotIe seerns, then, to have had a largelyapriori conception of the relation between his logic and mathematical proof. Re may have taken the formulation of mathematical theorems into account in trying to justify his estimation of the significance of the categoricai proposition in demonstrative science, but his notion ofthe categoricai proposition was so broad that virtuaIly any general statement would satisfy it. On the other hand, AristotIe does not seem to have looked at mathematical proof in any detail, at least as far as its logic is concerned. Re recognizes some common features of mathematica! proof, e.g., the use of reductio ad absurdum GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGI C 57 and the reliance on universal assumptions, but he is apparently content to rely on the abstract argument of 1.23 to establish the adequacy of syllogistic for mathematics. His Peripatetic successors do not seem to have gone much beyond him either in logic or in the logical analysis of mathematical proof. 4. STOIC LOGIC AND GREEK MATHEMATICS Some of the Stoics do seem to have shown an awareness of the complexity of mathematical proof. Unfortunately the scatteredness and scantiness of the evidence makes it diflicult to determine the details of Stoic logical theory and, in particular, to assign a chronology to its development. Recent interpreters of Stoic logic have disagreed sharply with their predecessors on questions of analysis and evaluation, but both have forsworn the attempt to provide a chronology. And certainly there is littie hope of reconstructing a preciseand detailed chronology, since probably the majorit Y of SOUfces describe only "what the Stoics (or dogmatists or recent philosophers) say" about some question. On the other hand, some SOUfces attribute particular doctrines to particular people. The material quoted by Diogenes Laertius from Diocles Magnes is especiaIly rich in these attributions, and they are almost certainly reliable. Of course, when a doctrine is assi gned to a person we cannot be sure that he was the first person to espouse it, but it seems to me we should assume he was in the absence of other negative evidence or of countervailing systematic considerations. Almost equal strength, I think, should be assigned to associations of doctrines with students or followers of a person, usually referred to as "those about" (hoi peri) him. Normally there are no grounds for distinguishing the views of "those about a person" from the views of the person himself. What I have said so far about scholarly methodology is uncontroversial. The crucial issue arises with respect to ascriptions to "the more recent philosophers" (hoi neoteroi). The more recent philosophers are almost always Stoics, but it is difficult to determine the chronological boundary between more recent philosophers and others. In some authors the neoteroi seem to be Stoics in general or at least to include Chrysippus. Iamblichus 37 speaks generally of the original philosophers and more recent ones and goes on to discuss the views ofPlato, AristotIe, and Chry58 IAN MUELLER sippus. Galen associates with the more recent philosophers two terms (diezeugmenon axioma, sunemmenon axioma 38) which are certainly Chrysippean, as Galen himself says elsewhere in the case of one of them. 39 Rowever, the important source to be evaluated is Alexander of Aphrodisias, who uses the phrase hoi neoteroi more often than anyone else. As far as I have been able to determine, the following characterization holds for his usage. On occasion Alexander does contrast the neoteroi with the older Peripatetics (rather than the older StoiCS).40 Re also sometimes uses the word neoteroi interchangeably with 'Stoics'41 and sometimes associates with neoteroi doctrines or practices common in the Stoic school. 42 But he never ascribes to the neoteroi terminology or doctrine elsewhere attributed explicitly to Chrysippus. And in some cases terminology or doctrine associated with the neoteroi by Alexander can be determined with reasonable plausibility to be post-Chrysippean. The most certain case is the idea of the argument with one premiss, e.g., 'You breathe; therefore you are alive',43 which Sextus Empiricus explicitly dissociates from Chrysippus and attributes to Antipater (flor. 2nd cent. B.C.).44 Another aImost equally certain case is the use of the word proslambamenon or proslepsis 45 for the 'minor premiss' of a hypothetical syllogism. At leas t Diocles Magnes ascribes to those about Crinis, a contemporary of Antipater, the description of an argument as consisting of /emma, proslepsis, and epiphora.46 In his commentary on the Topics Alexander says that the neoteroi caU a certain kind of question a pusma, a word used for questions requiring more than a 'yes' or 'no' answer.47 There is some reason to regard this word as post-Chrysippean, since from the book titles in Diogenes Laertius it appears that Chrysippus used the word peusis with the same meaning. 48 The ground, however, is not very firm because peusis and pusma seem to have been used interchangeably in later antiquity. In the matter of arguments, what can be attached most firmly to Chrysippus are the five anapodeiktoi. 49 None ofthe obscure four themata are ever ascribed explicitly to him, nor does the word thema occur in the list of his works given by Diogenes Laertius. Alexander attributes a second and a third thema to the neoteroi. 50 Per haps Chrysippus did put forward some themata for reducing arguments to his five anapodeiktoi. But Alexander's ascription of the second and third themata to the neoteroi, combined with the absence of any clear presentation ofthe themata in surviGREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 59 ving discussions of Stoic logic, suggests at least that the themata never became fixed in the way in which the anapodeiktoi more or less were. The other arguments which Alexander attributes to the neoteroi are, according to him, useless. They are the diphoroumenoi (e.g., 'If it is day, it is day; but it is day; therefore it is day'), the adiaphoros perainontes ('Either it is day or it is night; but it is day; therefore it is day'), the so-called infinite matter, 51 arguments semantically but not formally equivalent to categorical syllogisms and called hyposyllogisms,52 and correct arguments which are not formally valid called amethodos perainontes, unsystematically conclusive ('The first is greater than the second; the second is greater than the third; therefore the first is greater than the third').53 None of these arguments is ever associated with a specific person. To dissociate them from Chrysippus there is only Alexander's apparently consistent use ofthe word neoteroi and the absence of any titles containing the words diphoroumenoi, adiaphoros perainontes, 'infinite matter', 'hyposyllogism,' or 'unsystematically conclusive' in Diogenes Laertius's long list ofthe works of Chrysippus. If the arguments are dissociated from Chrysippus, a rather clear picture of one aspect of the development of Stoic 10gic emerges. In the mid-third century Re. Chrysippus developed or codified the propositional 10gic which became the core of Stoic logic. After him, in the period of transition from the old to the middle Stoa, other Stoics introduced into consideration certain curious propositional arguments and other apparently valid arguments not satisfying either Stoic or Peripatetic accounts ofvalidity. With this rough chronological framework it is possibie to investigate the relation between Stoic 10gic and Greek mathematics somewhat more precisely. I shall consider propositionallogic first. I have aiready given an example of a propositional argument in the Elements. Familiarity with modem logic makes it easy to find many more, both explicit and implicit. However, the evidence indicates rather strongly that no Stoic ever conceived of propositionallogic as a basic tool of mathematics. Mathematical illustrations of propositional arguments are practically non-existent. There are none in Sextus Empiricus or Diogenes Laertius or Alexander, for example. Indeed, the only extended illustrations are given in the sixth century A.D. by John Philoponus in his discussion of Aristotle's treatment of argument from a hypothesis. 54 The most interesting part of the discussion for my purposes is Philoponus's c1aim that reductio ad absur60 IAN MUELLER dum involves application of two Stoic anapodeiktoi, the second and the fif th. Re illustrates his claim in terms of Aristotle's example, the proof that the side and the diagonal of a square are incommensurable. Fifth anapodeiktos: (l) The diagonal is either commensurate or incommensurate with the side; (2) But it is not commensurate (as I will show); (3) Therefore it is incommensurate. Second anapodeiktos: (4) Ifthe diagonal is commensurate with the side, the same number will be even and odd; (5) But the same number is not even and odd; (6) Therefore the diagonal is not commensurate with the side. Philoponus presumably thinks of (I) and (5) as immediate truths, and, like Aristotle and Alexander, he insists that (4) requires a proof by categoricai syllogism. Thus, although Philoponus grants Stoic propositional logic more status than Alexander does, he still main tai ns the false Peripatetic view ofthe dominance ofthe categoricai syllogism. It is, of course, possibie that the propositional part of Philoponus's analysis ultimately deri ves from an early Stoic source. But such a derivation seems unlikely. For Philoponus does not formulate arguments in the Stoic manner. Re does not place the word 'not' at the front of the sentence in (2), (5), and (6); he does not formulate (1) as adisjunction but as a simple sentence with a disjunctive predicate; and he formulates (4) artificially, perhaps to make it seem more categoricaI. (Literally (4) runs: The diameter with the side, if it is commensurate, the same number will be even and odd.') There are similar features of Philoponus's whole discussion of hypothetical syllogisms which indicate that its origin is in later eclectic thinking. Rowever, the exact origin is not known to me. I have traced it back as far as Proclus who, in commenting on proposition 6 of book I of the Elements, refers to the role of the second anapodeiktos in indirect proofs: In reductions to impossibility the construction corresponds to the second of the hypotheticals. For example, if in triangles having equal angles the sides subtending the equal angles are not equal, the whole is equal to the part; but this is impossible; therefore, GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 61 in triangles having equal angles the sides subtending the equal angles are themseIves equal.55 Proclus, of course, taught Ammonius on whose lectures Philoponus's commentary on the Prior Analytics seems to have been based. Thus, Chrysippean propositional logic would not seem to have been developed out of reflection on mathematics. Any connection between Stoic logic and Greek mathematics must be sought in the later refinements aiready mentioned. And among these there is one obvious candidate for consideration, the unsystematically conclusive argument. The example given above is c1early mathematical. So is another, also due to Alexander, the inference to the equality of CA and CB in Elements I, 1.56 But the following fairly common example shows that the domain of unsystematically conclusive argument extends beyond mathematics: 'It is day; but you say that it is day; therefore you speak the truth' 57 The first question I wish to consider is how the conception of these arguments arose. After discussing categoricai and hypothetical syllogisms, Galen introduces in chapter xvi of his Institutio Logica a third form of syllogism, namely, the relational (kata to pros ti genesthai). Re gives examples analogous to the unsystematically conclusive arguments above and mentions the frequency of relational syllogisms in mathematics. Galen apparently takes credit for the name 'relational' and for recognizing that relational syllogisms depend for their validity on some axiom, by which he means a self-evident proposition. There is no reason to deny Galen's origination of the term 'relational', since it is used in this way only in the Institutio. Rowever, it is important not to read too many modem connotations into the term. For there is no evidence that Galen made any attempt to explain the validity of a relational syllogism by reference to what are now called the logical properties of a relation, such as transitivity or asymmetry, or to classify relations in terms of such properties. Indeed, there is no general treatment of relations at all. Each relational argument is to be examined in isolation to determine if there is an axiom which makes it valid. 58 Moreover, many of Galen's examples do not depend on logical properties of relations but on mathematical or semantic truths, e.g., '(a=2b & b=2c) ---+ a=4c' or "'son' is the converse of 'father"'. It seems fair to say that Galen calls the arguments he is considering relational because they contain a relation word. Re does not conceive of the idea of a logic of relations. And his account of the validity 62 IAN MUELLER of relational syllogisms as deriving from an axiom would apply to any argument turning on the meaning of some of its terms, even if the terms were not relation words. In the last chapter of the Institutio Galen dis misses from consideration several kinds of argument as being redundant in his presentation of logic. One is "called unsystematic, with which one must syllogize when there is no systematic argument at all".59 There is no reason to doubt that Galen is referring to unsystematically conclusive arguments and classing them with his own relational arguments. It is not clear, however, in what way relational syllogisms constitute a bro ad er class than unsystematically conclusive arguments. Perhaps all Galen did was to produce a few new examples of such arguments and provide a new label for them. A more important question concerns Galen's claim to originality in his account of the validity of relational syllogisms. At the end of his discussion of the relational syllogism 60 he admits that the Stoic Posidonius (ca. 135-ca. 50 B.C.) called such arguments "valid on the strength of an axiom". It looks, then, as though the fundamental idea of Galen's account was put forward more than two centuries before him. Moreover, it looks as though the Peripatetics held the same view of unsystematically conclusive arguments as Galen, but in a more specific form. Galen eriticizes the Aristotelians for trying by force to eount relational syllogisms as categorica1.61 The subsequent discussion in the Institutio, supplemented with Alexander's logical eommentaries, makes it virtuaIly certain that the Peripatetic way of treating Galen's relational syllogisms was to add a universal premiss corresponding to Galen's axiom and to reformulate the argument as a 'categorieal syllogism'. To give one example, Alexander transforms the unsystematically conclusive argument 'A is greater than B; B is greater than C; therefore A is greater than C' into Everything greater than a greater is greater than what is less than the latter; A is greater than B which is greater than C; Therefore A is greater than C.62 Galen's criticism of sueh transformations as foreed is mild, to say the least. The transformations make no logical sense. Alexander makes them only beeause he is bent on defending Aristotle's general claims about the universality of the eategorical syllogism. GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 63 Galen's own attitude toward the added axiom and the resulting argument is harder to figure out. Mter criticizing the Aristotelians for forcing relational syllogisms into an arbitrary mold, he goes on to propose reducing the syllogisms to categoricai form. 63 But shortly thereafter, he con siders a 'reduction' apparently as ridiculous as the one just given and clearly prefers a 'reduction' to a propositional argument by adding a conditional premiss.64 Galen is so antiformalistic that it is impossible to tell how serious he is about reduction to categoricai form. His main stress is on the tacit assumption in relational syllogisms of an axiom, which he usually describes as universal. But one cannot ten whether for him the result of adding the axiom is always a categoricai syllogism, always either a categoricai or hypothetical syllogism, or sometimes neither. I am inclined to accept the last alternative, but with inconclusive reasons. Galen introduces the relational syllogism as a third form or species of syllogism, and if he believed it was really an enthymemic form of the first two, he could eas ily have said so. Alexander accepts the first alternative for unsystematically conclusive arguments and is very explicit about it. In any case, Galen and probably every other logician in antiquity showed no interest in developing a speciallogic to account for relational arguments. In describing what Galen calls relational syllogisms as valid on the strength of an axiom, Posidonius was probably offering an explanation of the conclusiveness of unsystematically conclusive arguments, which, as Galen's description ofunsystematic arguments suggests, were regarded as simply unsystematic i.e., incapable of analysis. It is uncertain when the amethodos perainomes arguments were first introduced, or in what connection. But the evidence I have given suggests dating their introduction in the second century B.C., that is, between Chrysippus and Posidonius. Probably the connection between these arguments and mathematical proof was not at first recognized or, at least, emphasized. I have aiready pointed out that some of the acknowledged unsystematically conclusive arguments were not mathematical. However, even the mathematical argument 'A is equal to B; C is equal to B; therefore A is equal to C' cannot have originally been considered in a context like Elements I, l. For there the role of the axiom (common notion) 'Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other' is clear. But apparently amethodos perainontes arguments were thought of as containing no general premisses of tbis kind.65 Perhaps, then, Posidonius used mathematical examples 64 IAN MUELLER like the proof of I, 1 to explain the unsystematicaIly concIusive arguments as valid on the strength of an axiom.66 Subsequently the Peripatetics cIaimed that the axiom was always a universal statement which, when added to the argument, turned it into a categorical syllogism. Posidonius's use ofthe word 'axiom' (axioma) is curious. For the Stoics any proposition is an axiom.67 Galen's use of 'axiom' to mean 'self-evident proposition' is derived ultimately from Aristotle.68 Posidonius could, of course, have been using 'axiom' in the standard Stoic sense. He could have been pointing out the possibility of turning any amethodos perainon argument into a valid propositional argument by adding as an additional premiss the so-called corresponding conditional: the conditional with the conjunetion of the original premisses as antecedent and the concIusion as consequent. But to suppose he did this is to accuse Galen of misrepresentation or misunderstanding. Moreover, Posidonius is known to have been a philosophicai ecIectic. There is no great surprise in his using a Stoic word with a Peripatetic sense. ProcIus's commentary on bo ok I of the Elements contains enough references to Posidonius and to his pupil Geminus to confirm Posidonius's interest in the fundamentals of Greek mathematics. Particularly interesting in connection with logic are ProcIus's references to Posidonius's replies to an attack on geometry by the Epicurean Zeno of Sidon. Zeno's motivation was probably destructive skepticism,69 although VIastos has tried to represent Zeno as a 'not unfriendly' and 'constructive' critic of EucIid's Elements.7o I shaIl not pursue the question of motivation here because the crucial thing for my purposes is the form of Zeno's criticism. He is cIassed by ProcIus as one who concedes the truth of geometric first principles but insists on the need for further assumptions in order to complete the proofs.71 According to ProcIus, Posidonius wrote a 'whole book' refuting Zeno's attack on geometry.72 Unfortunately Proclus refers to this controversy in an explicit way only in connection with Elements I, 1. 73 He reproduces only two replies by Posidonius to Zeno. In both Posidonius denies the need for the additional assumption which Zeno cIaims is required. Nevertheless it seems quite possibie that the controversy with Zeno is the source of Posidonius's account of relational arguments as valid on the strength of an axiom. The evidence which I have given for this possibility is sparse and basically circumstantial. To this evidence I would like to add one GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 65 more consideration. In discussing Elements I, 10, the bisection of a straight line,74 Proclus refers to 'some' who say that "this appears to be an agreed principle in geometry, that a magnitude consists of parts infinitely divisible". In reply Proclus invokes Geminus's statement that the geometers do assume, "in accordance with a common notion", that the continuous is divisible. Later Proclus refers to this assumption as an axiom. Cronert has identified Zen o with the 'some' referred to by Proclus. 75 Perhaps Cronert is right, but in any case replies like the one ascribed to Geminus in the passage under consideration would have to be attributed to Posidonius if a connection is to be made between his controversy with Zeno and his analysis of Galen's re1ational arguments. The hypothesis I propose is the foUowing: Posidonius may have been unable to fiU some of Zeno's aUeged gaps in mathematical proofs and may have noticed the correspondence between Stoic unsystematically conclusive arguments and the proofs with gaps. Obviously it is no reply to a critic to caU a proof unsystematicaUy conclusive. Nor will it do to invoke the corresponding conditional, since establishing that is tantamount to establishing the correctness of the conclusion directly.76 Hence Posidonius may have invoked self-evident principles axioms to fiU the gaps he could not analyze away. And he may have described the proofs with gaps, and unsystematically conclusive arguments in general, as valid on the strength of an axiom. Af ter the composition of the Elements the common notions or axioms were a matter of great controversy, which centered on the need or lack of need for more axioms than the first three. 77 The result of this controversy was the incorporation of a total of ten axioms into the main texts of the Elements. The additions are undoubtedly due to a desire to fiU aUeged gaps in Euc1id's argumentation. The date of the inception of this controversy is uncertain. I would like to suggest that it begins with the skeptical attack of Zeno and the more positive reply of Posidonius. The earliest person mentioned by Proclus in connection with the controversy is Heron, who attempted to limit the axioms to three, apparently the first three.78 It would seem that by Heron's time the list ofaxioms had aiready been expanded. Unfortunately Heron's dates are uncertain; scholars have placed him everywhere between 200 B.C. and 300 A.D. Neugebauer's dating of Heron's floruit in the first century A.D.79 seems now to have won general acceptance. We do not know who added to the Elements the 66 IAN MUELLER common notions rejected by Heron. Proclus never mentions Posidonius in connection with the axioms and postulates but does mention Geminus, who wrote extensively on mathematics,80 several times. Geminus seems to be a plausible but by no means certain candidate. 5. RECAPITULA TION (1) Aristotle's formulation of syllogistic in the fourth century is basically independent of Greek mathematics. There is no evidence that he or his Peripatetic successors did careful study of mathematical proof. (2) Similarly, the codification of elementary mathematics by Euclid and the rich development of Greek mathematics in the third century are independent oflogical theory. (3) Likewise, Stoic propositional logic, investigated most thoroughly by Chrysippus in the third century, shows no real connection with mathematical proof. (4) Subsequent to Chrysippus, hoi neiJteroi considered various new forms of argument, including the unsystematically conclusive. Some of these new forms of argument may have come from mathematics. However, as the name 'unsystematically conclusive' suggests, no attempt was made to provide a logic for these arguments. (5) Around the end of the second century B.C. Zeno of Sidon (and perhaps other skeptics and Epicureans) tried to underrnine mathematics by pointing out gaps in proofs. Posidonius replied to Zeno, in many cases denying the existence ofthe gaps. But Posidonius also recognized that some geometric arguments, which resemble unsystematically conclusive arguments, depended on unstated principles. He considered the unstated principles seIf-evident and therefore called the arguments valid on the strength of an axiom. However, he made no progress in developing a logic to apply to these arguments. The debate over the need for further axioms in geometry continued for centuries and affected the text of the Elements itself. (6) The reawakening of interest in Aristotle's works in the first century B.C.81 produced a Peripatetic reaction to Posidonius's analysis of ordinary mathematical argument. Aristotle's general remarks about the univers ality ofthe categoricaI syllogism became a dogma to be defended at all costs. Unsystematically conclusive arguments were made systematic by adding GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 67 a universal premiss and attempting to transform the result into a categorical sylIogism. The attempt was uniformlya failure. (7) In Galen's Institutio Logica there is a more balanced view of unsystematically conclusive arguments, which Galen calIs relational. Relational arguments depend for their validity on an addition al axiom which is usually universal and usuaIly categorical, but relationaI syllogisms are distinct from both categoricaI and hypothetical syllogisms. However, there is no evidence that Galen made any attempt to formulate a logic of relational syIlogisms. The University o/ Chicago NOTES 1 The translations of the Elements are by T. Heath, The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements, 3 vols., Cambridge, England, 1925. 2 John Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica Priora Commentaria (ed. by M. Wallies), Berlin, 1905, 246.3-4, gives a similar illustration of the fifth anapodeiktos: 'The side is either equal to or greater than or less than the side; but it is neither greater nor less; therefore it is equal'. For details on the anapodeiktoi and other aspects of Stoic logic, see B. Mates, Stoic Logic, Berkeley 1961. 3 For example, one reads in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 1 (1970), 372: "And what of Greek geometry? What are its characteristics? It employs no symbols, for it is concerned not with structures formed by relations between mathematical objects, but with the objects themselves and their essential properties. It is not operational, but contemplative; its logic is the predicate logic of AristotIe's Organon". A footnote adds: "Indeed, the Organon includes, with one or two rare exceptions, no elements of relational logie" . 4 These divisions and their names are taken from Proclus, In Primum Euclidis Elementorum Librum Commentarii (ed. by G. Friedlein), Leipzig, 1873, 203.1-210.16. The rigidity whieh they suggest is fully eonfirmed by Euclid's Elements; and the terms themselves, or forms of them, ean all be found in third-century mathematical works. For references, see C. Mugler, Dictionnaire Historique de la terminologie geometrique des grecs, Paris 1958. 5 See 'Investigations into Logica1 Deduetion', in The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen (ed. by M. E. Szabo), Amsterdam 1969, pp. 68-81. 6 As in D. Hilbert, Foundations ofGeometry (trans!. by L. Unger), La Salle, Dl., 10th ed., 1971. 7 Proclus, In Primum Elementorum, 77.7-81.22. 8 J. Lukasiewiez, Aristotie's Syllogistic, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1957, p. 1, asserts that AristotIe does not allow singular terms in syllogisms. If Lukasiewiez is right, then no Euclidean argument would be an Aristotelian syllogism. 9 See, for example, H. Zeuthen, Geschichte der Mathematik im Altertum und Mittelaiter, Copenhagen 1896, p. 117. 10 At the beginning of Galen's Institutio Logica (ed. by C. Kalbfleiseh), Leipzig 1896, 1.2, the reader is introdueed to the idea of proof by means of the folIowing example: 68 IAN MUELLER 'Theon is equal to Dion; Philon is equal to Dion; things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another; therefore Theon is equal to Philon'. 11 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Analyticorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium (ed. by M. Wallies), Berlin 1883, 344.13-20. 12 For inadequate attempts to explain the move, see Proc!us, In Primum Elementorum, 49.4-57.8; and J. S. Mill, A System of Logic, London, 9th ed., 1875, 1II.ii.2. 13 E.g., in III, 5, 6. 14 E.g., in VII, 9, 15. 15 E.g., in VIII, 11, 12. 16 The cases with the stylized proof are VIII, 16, 17 and X, 7, 8, 9. The cases where the possibility of the stylized proof is apparently overlooked are X, 16, 18. Each of these examples except X, 7, 8 actually contains two instances of failure to recognize the elementary logical equivalence. 17 See, for example, F. Klein, Elementary Mathematics from an Advanced Standpoint (trans!. by E. R. Hedrick and C. A. Noble), New York 1939, IT, pp. 196-202. 18 Heath gives five common notions in his translation ofthe Elements, but in discussing the fourth and fifth (I, 225, 232) he admits that they are probably interpolations. 19 In the standard edition of the Elements (Leipzig 1883), I, 10, now reissued under the direction of E. S. Stamatis (Leipzig 1969). 20 H. Hasse and H. Scholz, 'Die Grundlagenkrisis in der griechischen Mathematik', Kant-Studien XXXllI (1928), 17, call it a first attempt at an axiomatization in the modem sense. 21 The notation '(X, Y)' for 'the ratio of X to Y' is taken from E. J. Dijksterhuis. See his Archimedes (trans!. by C. Dikshoorn), Copenhagen 1956, p. 51. The symbols '.', '<', '>', and '=' do not have their usual numerical sense, since '.' designates an operation on magnitudes, and the other three symbols designate relations of size holding between either magnitudes or ratios of magnitudes to one another. 22 See 'Continuity and Irrational Numbers' in R. Dedekind, Essays on the Theory of Numbers (trans!. by W. Beman), Chicago 1924, pp. 15-17. 23 F. Beckmann, in 'Neue Gesichtspunkte zum 5. Buch Euklids', Archivefor History of Exact Sciences IV (1967/8), 106-107, lists twenty-four 'tacit assumptions' of Book V. 24 Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic, p. 6, denies Platonic influence. But see W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford 1962, pp. 44, 67-68. 25 Translation by T. Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, Oxford 1949, p. 26. This is an excellent work to consult for detaiIs of the mathematica! aspects of the passages I am discussing. 26 W. D. Ross, Aristotie's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1949, pp. 412-414. 27 See, for example, Prior Analytics, II.21.67aI2-16, or 1.25.48a33-37. 28 Aristotle's Syllogistic, p. 15. 29 See, for example, Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 373.29-31, or Galen, Institutio, IV.6. 30 In Analyticorum Priorum, 372.29-30. 31 For the detaiIs, see Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Priores Commentaria (ed. by H. Dieis), Berlin 1882, 60.22-68.32. 32 See the passage cited in n. 31. 33 The evidence is collected in F. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, Basel/Stuttgart, 2nd ed., 1969, VIII, 11-20. 34 In Analyticorum Priorum, 260.9-261.28. GREEK MATHEMATICS AND GREEK LOGIC 69 35 Aristotie discusses argument from a hypothesis briefly in 1.23.41a22-41b5 and in somewhat more detail in 1.44. 36 Aristotie's Syllogistic, pp. 49, 74. 37 Quoted by Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium (ed. by C. Kalbfleisch), Berlin 1907, 394.13-395.31. 38 Institutio, III.3, 4. 39 Institutio, V.5 (said of those about Chrysippus). Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum (ed. by H. S. Long), Oxford 1964, VII.190, lists amons Chrysippus's works 'On a true diezeugmenon' and 'On a true sunemmenon' . 40 See In Analyticorum Priorum, 262.28-32. 41 See, for example, In Analyticorum Priorum, 21.30-31; 22.18. 42 FolIowing the words, not their meanings (In Analyticorum Priorum, 373.29-30); espousing the hypothetical syllogism (ibid., 262.28-29); using the words adiaphora and proegmena (In Aristotelis Topicorum Libros Octo Commentarium (ed. by M. Wallies), Berlin 1891, 211.9-10). 43 Attributed to the neoteroi by Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 17.11-12. 44 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VIII.443, in Opera n (ed. by H. Mutschmann and J. Mau), Leipzig 1914. Alexander associates the one-premissed arguments with 'those about Antipater' (In Topicorum, 8.16-19). Other relevant passages are collected in C. Prant!, Geschichte der Logik im Abendiande, Leipzig 1855, I, 477-478. 45 Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 19.4-6, 262.9, 263.31-32, 324.17-18. 46 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, VII.76. 47 In Topicorum, 539.18. 48 Vitae Philosophorum, VII.191. 49 Vitae Philosophorum, VII.79-81; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VIlI.223-226; Galen, Institutio, V1.6. 60 In Analyticorum Priorum, 164.30-31, 278.6-14. At 284.13-17 Alexander ascribes to hoi apo tes Stoas the second, third, and fourth themata. On the themata, see O. Becker, Ober die vier Themata des stoischen Logik, in Zwei Untersuchungen zur antiken Logik, Klassisch-philologische Studien xvn (1957), 27-49. 51 Explicit attribution of these three arguments to the neoteroi is found at In AnaylticorumPriorum, 164.28-30. The examples of the fust two are taken from Alexander's commentary on the Topics, 10.8-12. Nothing is known about the infinite matter argument. For a guess as to its character, see O. Becker, Ober die vier Themata, 38. 52 In Analyticorum Priorum, 84.12-15. 53 Ascribed by Alexander to the neoteroi (In Analyticorum Priorum, 22.18; 345.13), but elsewhere simply to the Stoics. However, these arguments are discussed in dose conjunction with the one-premissed arguments at 21.10-23.2, the source of the example in the text. This example and others are discussed below, p. 27ff. 54 In Analytica Priora, 245.24-246.32. 55 In Primum Elementorum, 256.1-8. 56 In Analyticorum Priorum, 22.3-7. 57 In AnalyticorumPriorum, 22.17-19. 58 Institutio, XVII.7. Alexander takes the same approach (In Analyticorum Priorum, 344.9-345.12). 59 Institutio, XIX.6. 60 Institutio, XVIII.8. 61 Institutio, XVI.1. 62 In Analyticorum Priorum, 344.23-27. 70 IAN MUELLER 63 Institutio, XVI.5. 64 Institutio, XVI.10-11. The argument in question is of the form 'a is the son (father) of b; therefore b is the father (son) of a'. The conditional premiss to be added is, of course, 'If a is the son (father) of b, then b is the father (son) of a'. The categorical premiss is unfortunately lacking in the manuscript. 65 Alexander's and Galen's discussions would seem to presuppose this. See especiaIly Alexander, In Analyticorum Priorum, 68.21-69.1; 345.13-346.6. 66 In his article 'Posidonius d'Apamee, theoricien de la geometrie', Revue des etudes grecques XXVII (1914), 44-45 (reprinted in Etudes de philosophie antique), E. Brehier argues that Posidonius was the first (and also the last) Stoic with a "theory of the logic of geometry". 67 See, for example, Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, VII.65. Other references are given in Mates, Stoic Logie, pp. 132-133. 68 See the passages in H. Bonitz, 'Index Aristotelicus', in Aristotelis Opera (ed. by I. Bekker), Berlin 1831-70, V, 70b4-13. 69 According to Cicero's Academica, I.xii.46 (ed. by O. Plasberg), Leipzig 1922, Zeno attended lectures by the skeptie Carneades and admired him very mueh. 70 G. VIastos, 'Zeno of Sidon as a Critie of Euclid', in The Classical Tradition (ed. by L. Wallaeh), Ithaca, N.Y., 1966, pp. 154-155. 71 Proclus, In Primum Elementorum, 199.11-200.1. 72 In Primum Elementorum, 200.1-3. 73 In Primum Elementorum, 214.15-218.11. I shall diseuss the detaiIs of this passage in another paper. 74 In Primum Elementorum, 277.25-279.11. 75 W. Cronert, Kolotes und Menedemos, Studien zur Palaeographie undPapyruskunde VI (1906), 109. 76 This is a very eommon ancient eriticism of the first anapodeiktos. See, for example, Sextus Empirieus, Adversus Mathematieos, VIII.440-442. 77 See Proclus, In Primum Elementorum, 193.10-198.15. 78 In Primum Elementorum, 196.15-18. 79 O. Neugebauer, tJber eine Methode zur Distanzbestimmung Alexandria-Rom hei Heron, Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab XXVI (1938),21-24. 80 See. K Tittel, De Gemini Stoiei Studiis Mathematicis Quaestiones Philologae, Leipzig 1895. Brehier('Posidonius d'Apamee', pp. 46-49) thinks that Geminus's work on mathematies is derived entirely from Posidonius. 81 See E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig, 5th ed., 1923, pt. 3, sec. 2, pp. 642-645. The same material is found in E. Zeller, A History o/ Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy (transl. by S. F. Alleyne), London 1883, pp. 113-117. The importance of the reawakening ofinterest in AristotIe's work for the history of logic is stressed by J. Mau, 'Stoisehe Logik', Hermes LXXXV (1957),147-158. The historicaI reeonstruetion of the present paper seems to provide support for Mau's views. JOHN MULHERN MODERN NOTATIONS AND ANCIENT LOGIC To what extent does ancient logic admit of accurate interpretation in modern terms? Blanche [3] and Durr [14] published general surveys of research on ancient logic in the mid-1950's. My aim in the present paper is to identify studies made available duringthe quarter-century 1945-1970 that illustrate the influence modern notations have had on our understanding of ancient logical texts. Accepting Bochenski's division of ancient logic into four temporally distinct stages, I mention research on the Prearistotelian, Aristotelian, Stoic and Commentatorial logics in Sections 1-4. In Section 5, I offer some generalizations on the utility of modern notations in writing the history of ancient logic. 1. PREARISTOTELIAN LOGI C Of the four stages of Greek logic, the Prearistotelian, which goes back perhaps as far as Parmenides (sixth century, B.C.) or beyond, has received least attention during the quarter-century of this study. The sources for Prearistotelian 10gic the Presocratic fragments and the dialogues of Plato contain many arguments that exemplify argument schemata but none of the schemata themselves. Bochenski wrote in 1951 ([4], p. 15), "we know of no correct logical principle stated and examined for its own sake before Aristotle"; and he gave no example of even an incorrect logical principle stated and examined at this stage. Where there are no principles stated in the naturallanguage of the text, there are none to be transcribed directly into a modern notation. Accordingly, historians of logic have had to settle for discovering and recording the logical principles exemplified by philosophical arguments stated in the natural language materials of this first stage. While little work of this sort has been done with the Presocratic fragments, some inroads have been made on the dialogues ofPlato (427-347). In 1945, Durr [13], 'Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik', made extensive use of modern notations to clarify the argument of parts of J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modem Interpretation., 71-82. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. Dordrecht-Holland 72 JOHN MULHERN Plato's Sophist. A year later, Beth [2] summarized the results of his partly transeriptional analyses of the Theory of Ideas and the Theory of Ideal Numbers, along with similar analyses of Presoeratie logie, Aristotelian logie, and Stoic logic. Then, in 1951, Boehenski [4] east doubts on the enterprise of Diirr, Beth, and the like by stating flatly of Plato: "Correet logie we find none in his work". Boehenski had transeribed what he eonsidered a flagrant example of the intolerable goings-on in the dialogues the false prineiple r Sap::::J Sal', exemplified in Gorgias 507A as evidenee for his view. Sprague [31] pointed out in 1962, however, that the text in question needn't be transeribed as Boehenski had transeribed it, that otherwise transeribed it exemplified a true prineiple, that similar but true principles were exemplified elsewhere in the Platonic writings, and that the principle's being false, if false it was, might be aeeounted for by the literary form of the dialogue as well as by the logieal ineptitude of its author: an author of dramatic literature need not be held responsibie for the logical deficiencies of his mixed bag of eharaeters. To Sprague belongs the eredit for distinguishing intelleetual biography from history of logie and for showing that the clear and unmistakable exemplifieation of a false logieal prineiple in a dialogue, if it is supposed de1iberate, may well interest the historian of logic just as much as would the exemplifieation of a true prineiple. Since 1954, many seholarly papers have been written that eall attention to a false metalogical principle a violation of type ruIes in Plato's Parmenides. A bibliography of the literature is given in VIastos [35]. One seholar writes of this as "a still-rising flood of literature, intended to c1arify Plato's text but tending to wheIm it with the symbols of modem logie" ([8], p. 369). Aetually, the use of modem notations in these papers is eomparatively modest, aIthough it is fair to say that the controversy over the Parmenides has given eurreney and respeetability to transeriptions of the logical material that one finds in this and other dialogues. In 1955, this vioIation of type ruIes was eonsidered systematically in Wedberg [37], Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics, whieh used some importations from formal language to reeonstruet the Theory ofIdeas and the Platonie philosophies of geometry and arithmetie. Readers of this literature are not agreed that the Platonie writings eontain any interesting 10gieaI doetrines. Some, sueh as VIastos, find at MODERN NOTATIONS AND ANCIENT LOGIC 73 crucial points only a "record of honest perplexity" where arguments in the dialogues seem to go astray ([36], p. 254); others suggest "it is a work of Plato's genius that some of the problems he confronted are closely related to current problems in logical theory" (Van Fraassen [34], p. 498). My own judgment is that both true and untrue logical principles are exemplified in the dialogues and that the treatment of syntactical and semantical problems in the dialogues is almost always instructive. The literary form of the dialogues allows the historian of logic neither to affirm nor to deny that the author of the dialogues subscribed to this or that logical doetrine ; but it does not prevent his affirming that Plato was acquainted with a variety of metalogical doctrines and that he knew how to perform numerous interesting logical operations (ef. [25]). 2. ARISTOTELIAN LOGI C The basic assumptions that governed early postwar research on Aristotelian logic are traceable to prewar works by Lukasiewicz (notably [19] and [20]). Lukasiewicz supposed that there were two quite distinct ancient systems of logic, the Aristotelian and the Stoic, and that these systems differed from one another in that only term variables occurred in Aristotelian syllogisms while only propositional variables occurred in Stoic syllogisrns. In drawing this distinction, Lukasiewicz was attributing to AristotIe (384-322) exactly those analytical syllogisms that belong to the traditional four figures, counting in the non-Aristotelian fourth figure syllogisms while excluding all the other logical material that Aristotle's definition of syllogism (An. Pr. 24b18-22; Top. lOOa25-27) provides for. Lukasiewicz adapted the A, E, I, and O of the mediaeval syllogistic mnemonics for use as a functorial notation with term variables to represent antecedent and consequent sentences. This notation he supplemented with the truth-functional prefixes 'K' and 'C', the latter taking the place of the Greek expression si, English 'if', which commonly occurs at the beginning of Aristotle's syllogisrns. Rendering si by 'C' was tantamount to embracing the view that Aristotle's analyticai syllogisms were implicational rather than inferential. It was a short step from this to distributing the moods of syllogistic construed as logical theses among axioms and theorems, and then using the former to derive the latter. Lukasiewicz took this step directly. 74 JOHN MULHERN By using this functorial notation for syllogistic antecedent and consequent sentences instead of a quantificational notation with truthfunctors, and by leaving this notation unanalyzed, Lukasiewicz was able to keep the problems of existential import from arising in his transcription of syllogistic, even if at the cost of failing to provide any analysis of syllogistic sentence structure. Indeed, Lukasiewicz expressly rejected the use of quantifiers in representing syllogistic antecedent and consequent sentences, although he did settle on the universal quantifier as an appropriate sign for indicating the necessity of syllogistic moods. In 1951, Lukasiewicz restated his prewar view of syllogistic in monographic form under the title AristotIe's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic [18], adding to it certain historicai observations and a chapter on the problem of decision for assertoric analytical syllogistic. The year of Lukasiewicz's monograph was the year also of Bochenski [4], Ancien! Formal Logic, which has been cited aiready. Bochenski surveyed not only the assertoric but also the modal analytical syllogistic, differing from Lukasiewicz in admitting quantifiers to the transcription of analytical syllogisms. Bochenski avoided the problems of existential import by letting the laws of subalternation hold and construing the term variables accordingly. In his treatment of Aristotle, Bochenski was building on his La logique de Theophraste [6] a study completed before the war but not generally circulated until 1947. Here Bochenski had shown that the schema of Theophrastus' sentences KaTa n:p6crA:rI'JllV was expressible with quantifiers as CIIx4JxIIxt/lx ([6], p. 48). Subsequently he found that Aristotle's syllogisms also were susceptible of a quantificational transcription showing function and argument, and he cited An. Pr. 49b14 ff in this connection (he might have cited 32b25 ff as well). Once the analyticai syllogisms had been provided with a quantificational transcription, it became plausible to regard Lukasiewicz's functorial notation as an abbreviation for a set of quantificational formulae; Prior suggested four years later that the functorial notation be so regarded ([27], p. 121). The most distinctive feature of Bochenski's writing on Aristotelian MODERN NOTATIONS AND ANCIENT LOGIC 75 logic, however, was the concem it displayed for non-analytical formulae. As he wrote himself, Modem commentators of AristotIe were fascinated by the Aristotelian [sc. analytical] syJlogistics to an extent that they often overlooked the wealth of non-anaJyticaJ formulae which the Organon contains ([4], p. 63; see also [7]). These included formulae belonging to the logic of clas ses, predicates, identity, and relations, as well as to propositional calculus. Bochenski ended his exposition of this material by remarking: "Further research would probably discover more non-analytical laws in the Organon, especiaIly in the Topics" ([4], p. 71). Bochenski used the famiIiar notations of the several parts of non-analytical logic, mainly those of Principia Mathematica, for transcribing this material. Already in 1951, then, Bochenski had gone beyond the prewar view according to which only term variables occurred in Aristotelian syllogisms and these syllogisms themselves were object language impIications rather than inference schemata. In his Formale Logik [5], which appeared in 1956, to be followed by an English translation [5e] in 1961, Bochenski presented an ordinary language transcription of the principal texts used for the history of ancient logic, supplemented by a bare minimum of special notation. Lukasiewicz added three chapters on AristotIe's modallogic to a second edition of Aristotle' s Syllogistic [18 2 ] in 1957. In the course ofthis exercise, Lukasiewicz broke with the concepts and notations of the older modem modallogic that Becker [1] had reIied on in his Aristotelian studies and other scholars had used afterward. Lukasiewicz believed that a satisfactory modallogic would have to be four-valued, and that only a satisfactory modallogic would suffice for understanding AristotIe. From the standpoint of his new four-valued modal logic (the C-n-8-p system), Lukasiewicz claimed to be able to "explain the difficulties and correct the errors of the Aristotelian modal syllogistic" ([18 2 ], p. v). His procedure was to set up the system, transcribe Aristotle's modal syllogisms into its notation, and then see how the transcript compared to the system. Lukasiewicz's work was criticized and built upon in 1959 by Patzig [26] five essays presented under the collective tide Die Aristotelische Syllogistik which appeared in an English translation [26e] in 1968. Patzig picked up many points of detail in earlier historians that wanted 76 JOHN MULHERN correction. His thematic, however, amounted to assigning to analyticai syllogistic the status of a special part of the logic of binary relations. He did not drop the A-E-I-O functorial notation in favor of the usual notation for relations, but rather construed the functorial notation as having to do with binary relations; and he supplemented this with notations drawn from the logic of predicates and classes. If we leave out of account W. and M. Kneale [17], The Development of Logic (1962), which avoids the use of modem notations for Aristotelian logic, the next important item to appear was McCall [24], AristotIe's Modal Syllogisms (1963). Unlike Lukasiewicz, McCall adopted an intuitive approach to Aristotle's modallogic, working from the intuition to the formalism rather than the other way round. Rejecting Lukasiewicz's four-valued apparatus as well as the quantified modallogic of Becker [1] and the non-formal approach of Rescher [28], "Aristotle's Theory of Modal Syllogisms and Its Interpretation" (which was not published until 1964), McCall presented a complicated axiom system of unquantified modallogic that was c1aimed to coincide exactly with Aristotle's intuitions about 'apodeictic' analyticai syllogisms and, to alesser extent, with his intuitions about 'contingent' syllogisms. Two years later, in 1965, the revival ofinterest in Aristotle's non-analyticallogic was rewarded by the appearance of de Pater [11], Les Topiques d' Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne. This work consolidated a great deal of the research done on the Topica during the last hundred years and more. De Pater transcribed Aristotle's non-analytical formulae into an amalgam of ordinary language and logical notation, using sentence schemata with name and predicate variables. In order to reflect Aristotle's distinction of predicables from one another according to their logical features and powers, de Pater provided that, in his transcriptions, l/J should be replaced by the names ofproperties only, '" by the names of accidents, " by the names of differentiae, and D by the names of definitions. The last important monograph on Aristotle's logic in this quartercentury was Rose [30], Aristotle' s Syllogistic. Rose followed an aside of Prior ([272 ], p. 116) in suggesting that Aristotle had formulated his assertoric analyticai syllogisms as inference schemata in the metalanguage rather than as laws in the object language. Accordingly, he denied that these syllogisms ought to be construed as implications. In denying this, Rose was not recommending a return to the four schemata of tradiMODERN NOT A TIONS AND ANCIENT LOGIC 77 tional syllogistic as instruments for interpreting Aristotle; he was proposing instead a return to Aristotle's own abbreviated capital letter variable notation, in which the capital letter variables have predicables as their substitution instances. Rose's Aristotelian notation had the advantage that it allowed for only three figures of analyticaI syllogisms rather than four and that it thus countered the view held by Bochenski, Lukasiewicz, and Ross that either Aristotle was wrong in finding only three figures or else he was wrong when he said he was dividing the figures according to the position of the middle term. In 1970 (cf. Corcoran [IOD 'A Mathematical Modelof Aristotle's Syllogistic' , argued against viewing the assertoric analyticaI syllogistic as an axiom system, in this respect introducing a major revision of the Lukasiewicz interpretation. According to Corcoran, Aristotle's syllogistic was concerned not merely with the validity of syllogistic arguments or the truth of syllogistic laws but also, even mainly, with the structure of syllogistic proofs, after the manner of a modern natural deduction system. Corcoran represented Aristotelian deductions first in ordinary language, sentence by sentence, and then in an abbreviatory notation using the four traditional functors (renamed A-N-S-$) with term variables. These deductions were identical with the traditional reductions of imperfect to perfect syllogisrns. His result was a representation that showed the details of Aristotelian deductions in an obvious fashion. Corcoran did not conditionalize these deductions but left his premisses marked as as sumptions, thus avoiding the implicational interpretation of syllogistic. 3. STOIC LOGIC The major achievements of modern research on Stoic logic are accessibIe in Mates [22] and W. and M. Kneale [17]. Among these have been the identification of inference schemata that belong to the modern propositional ca1culus. The Stoics distinguished five indemonstrable (ava1t60etK'tot) propositional inference schemata. These have been discussed by Mates and the Kneales, as have the theorems derived from them. Both Mates and the Kneales use modern notations to clarify the derivations of theorems from the indemonstrables. According to these historians, the sort of implication one finds in the indemonstrables and in the theorems is material implication. This matter 78 JOHN MULHERN appears to be settled. The Stoics, however, recognized other varieties of implication as well; and these other varieties of implication have been a problem for modern scholars. The prewar assumptions of Lukasiewicz concerning two ancient logics were as infiuential with historians of Stoic logic as with their Aristotelian counterparts. In 1934, Lukasiewicz [20] had assimilated Philonian implication to material implication, as apparently all scholars continue to do, and Diodorean implication to Lewis's strict implication. Other seholars, notably Hurst Kneale [16] and Chisholm [9], naturally followed this precedent, sinee there were no varieties of implication commonly known except material and strict for propositional calculus, and no notations for these implications commonly used except the three main ones (Peano-Russell, Hilbert, and Polish prefix) for material implication and the Lewis fishhook for striet implieation. Further clarifieation of Diodorean implication awaited further development in specialized logics and their notations. The first important breakthrough appeared in Mates [21], 'Diodorean Implication' (1949), later ineorporated into [22], Stoic Logic (1953). Diodorus, aecording to Mates, had held the view that "a conditional holds ... if and only if it holds at all times in the Philonian [i.e. material] sense" (ef. [22], p. 45). Expressing this required the invention of a tense operator that worked like a quantifier, and Mates settled on the following definition, in which '--+' represents Diodorean implieation: (F--+ G) == (t) (F(t):::J G(t)). Starting from this point, Prior and others began to reeonstrue temporal operators by analogy with modal operators, opening up interesting if eontroversial avenues of research both in the history of Stoic logic and in the contemporary logie of tense and modality. The development of research on Diodorean implication thus appears to exemplify a pattern of trial and error in transcription. This pattern is exemplified again in research on the logic of the commentators. 4. COMMENT A TORlAL Lome Probably the most striking example of this pattern to occur in recent research on Commentatoriallogic, which, like research on Prearistotelian MODERN NOTATIONS AND ANCIENT LOGIC 79 logic, remains underdeveloped, is that concerning certain formulae in the De syllogismo hypothetico ofBoethius (480-524). Here the first important work was Durr [12], 'Aussagenlogik im Mittelalter' (1938). Durr, under the infiuence of Lukasiewicz, began by transcribing the Latin expressions 'si', 'cum', and 'aut' into the prefix notation for propositional calculus. It turned out subsequently, however, that, in Diirr's transcription, several Boethian formulae were false. This situation was remedied when van den Driessche [33], 'Le De syllogismo hypothetico de Boece' (1949), showed that a uniform transcription of these Latin expressions each by a single truth-functor was mistaken, and that Boethius had intended by 'si' sometimes 'C' (for implication) and sometimes 'E' (for equivalence), by 'cum' sometimes 'C' and sometimes 'K' (for conjunction), and by 'aut' sometimes, but not always, 'A' (for non-exc1usive alternation) (cf. Mates [23]). Durr subsequently published a monograph on Boethius [15] which he had written before the war. Two other figures ofthis last stage ofancient logic Apuleius (125-171) and Galen (129-199) have been the subject of recent monographs. According to the thorough researches of Sullivan [32], Apuleius now appears to have exercised a much greater infiuence on early mediaeval logic than was recognized formerly, either in the original or through the excerpts of Martianus Capella, Cassiodorus, and Isidore of Seville. Sullivan presents Apuleius' syllogistic as a system of conditionalized laws of inference; sentence schemata that occur in the conditionals are stated in the traditional notation of term variables with mnemonic letters. The rules on which Apuleius is supposed to have based his syllogistic reductions are transcribed as rules of propositional calculus. Whereas Sullivan has made extensive use of modem notations, however, Rescher [29] has not had occasion to make use of them in his discussion of Galen. 5. GENERALIZA TIONS At the beginning ofthis paper, I asked to what extent ancient logic admits of accurate interpretation in modem terms. While no final answer to this question will be available until research in the field has gone a good deal further than it has so far, still the progress since 1945 has been remarkable, and it is not too early to consider its causes. In his history of the history of logic, Bochenski wrote as follows: 80 JOHN MULHERN The rise of modern history of logic concerning all periods save the mathematical was made possibie by the work of historians of philosophy and philologists in the 19th century. These published for the first time a series of correct texts edited with reference to their context in the history of literature. But the majority of ancient philologists, medievalists and Sanskrit scholars had only slight understanding of and litde interest in formallogie. History of logic could not be established on the sole basis of their great and laborious work. For its appearance we have to thank the faet that formallogie took on a new lease of life and was reborn as mathematica!. Nearly all the more recent researches in this history were carried out by mathematical logicians or by historians trained in mathematicallogic. ([5e], pp. 9-10.) The trained researchers who have worked on the ancient materials have had to do much more than merely transcribe into modern notations logical treatises originally written in ancient natural languages. Just finding suitable transcriptions has had to wait on considerable analysis of the ancient texts. Transcription into modern notations presupposes some community of understanding and purpose with the andent logicians, and this community is something that needs to be argued for. In general, a department of ancient logic lends itself to being dealt with in notation if and only if its corresponding department of modern logic lends itself to being dealt with in notation. Logistic systems and their interpretations lend themselves to this to a great extent, theoreticai syntax and especiaIly semantics to a much les ser extent. Where a modern notation foIlows or reproduces or elucidates the logical form of asentenee or inferenee or sehema that interests an ancient logieian, then its use is in order. The studies diseussed in Seetions 1-4 of this paper point to the conclusion that the judicious use of modern notations has been one eause of progress over the last two deeades and a half in our understanding of ancient logic. Bryn M awr College BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] Becker, A., Die Aristotelische Theorie der Moglichkeitschliisse, Berlin 1933. [2] Beth, E. W., 'Historicai Studies in Traditional Philosophy', Synthese 5 (19461947), 258-270. [3] Blanche, R., 'Vues nouvelles sur l'ancienne logique', Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (1956), 183-208. [4] Bochenski, I. M., Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdam 1951. [5] Bochenski, I. M., Formale Logik, Freiburg 1956. [5e] Bochenski, I. M., A History o/Formal Logic (trans!. by I. Thomas), Notre Dame 1961. MODERN NOTATIONS AND ANCIENT LOGI C 81 [6] Bocheilski, I. M., La Logique de Theophraste, Freiburg 1947. [7] Bochenski, I. M., 'Non-Analytical Laws and Rules in AristotIe' ,Methodos 3 (1951), 70-80. [8] Cherniss, H. F., 'The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues', in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (ed. by R. E. Allen), New York 1965, pp. 339-378. [9] Chisholm, R., 'Sextus Empiricus and Modern Empiricism', Philosophy o/ Science 8 (1941), 371-384. [IO] Corcoran, J., 'A Mathematical Modelof AristotIe's Syllogistic', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 55 (1973), 191-219. [11] de Pater, W. A., Les Topiqlles d'Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne, Freiburg 1965. [12] Durr, K., 'Aussagenlogik im MittelaIter', Erkenntnis 7 (1938), 160-168. [13] Diirr, K., 'Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik: Ein Beitrag zur Erkliirung des Dialoges Sophistes', Museum Helveticllm 2 (1945), 166-194. [14] Diirr, K., 'Moderne historische Forschung im Gebiet der antiken Logik', Studia Philosophica 13 (1953), 72-98. [15] Durr, K., The Propositional Logic o/ Boethius, Amsterdam 1951. [16] Hurst Kneale, M., 'Implication in the Fourth Century B.C.', Mind 44 (1935), 484--495. [17] Kneale, W. and M., The Development o/ Logic, Oxford 1962. [18] Lukasiewicz, J., Aristotie's Syllogistic/rom the Stand point o/ Modem Formal Logic, Oxford 1951. [182] Lukasiewicz, J., Aristotie's Syllogistic from the Stand point o/ Modem Formal Logic, 2nd ed., Oxford 1957. [19] Lukasiewicz, J., Element y logik; matematycznej, Warsaw 1929. [201 Lukasiewicz, J., 'Z historii logiki zdan', Przeglad Filozoficzny 37 (1934), 417437. [21] Mates, B., 'Diodorean Implication', Philosophical Review 58 (1949),234-242. [22] Mates, B., Stoic Logic, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1953. [23] Mates, B., Review of van den Driessche, R., 'Le De Syllogismo Hypothetico de Boeee', Journal o/ Symbolic Logic 76 (1951), 150. [24] McCall, S., Aristotle's Modal Syllogisms, Amsterdam 1963. [25] Mulhern, J. J., Problems o/ the Theory o/ Predication in Plato's 'Parmenides', 'Theaetetus', and 'Sophista' (Ph.D. dissertation in Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo) 1970. [26] Patzig, G., Die Aristotelische Syllogistik, G5ttingen 1959. [262] Patzig, G., Aristotie's Theory o/ the Syllogism (trañ1. by J. Barnes), Dordrecht 1968. [27] Prior, A. N., Formal Logic, Oxford 1955. [272] Prior, A. N., Formal Logic, 2nd ed., Oxford 1962. [28] Rescher, N., 'AristotIe's Theory of Modal Syllogisms and Hs Interpretation', in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (ed. by M. Bunge), Glencoe 1964, pp.152-177. [29] Rescher, N., Galen and the Syllogism, Pittsburgh 1966. [30] Rose, L. E., Aristotle' s Syllogistic, Springfield 1968. [31] Sprague, R. K., Plato's Use o/ Fallacy, New York 1962. [32] Sullivan, M. W., Apllleian Logic, Amsterdam 1967. [33] van den Driessche, R., 'Le De syllogismo hypothetico de Boeee', Methodos 1 (1949), 293-307. 82 JOHN MULHERN [34] Van Fraassen, B. c., 'Logical Structure in Plato's Sophist', Review o/ Metaphysics 22 (1969), 482-498. [35] VIastos, G., "Plato's 'Third Man' Argument (Parmo 132AI-B2): Text and Logic", Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1969), 289-301. [36] VIastos, G., 'The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides', (1954), in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (ed. by R. E. Allen), New York 1965, pp. 231-263. [37] Wedberg, A., Plato's Philosophy o/ Mathematics, Stockholm 1955. PART THREE ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC JOHN CORCORAN ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM Here and elsewhere we shalI not obtain the best insight into things untiI we actually see them growing from the beginning. AristotIe In the present article we attempt to show that Aristotie's syllogistic is an underlying logie which includes a natural deductive system and that it is not an axiomatic theoryas had previously been thought. We construct a mathematical model which reflects certain structural aspects of Aristotle's logic and we examine both the mathematical properties of the model and the relation of the model to the system of logic envisaged in certain scattered parts of Prior and Posterior Ana/ytjes. Our interpretation restores Aristotle's reputation as a logician of consummate imagination and skill. Several attributions of shortcomings and logical errors to Aristotle are shown to be without merit. Aristotle's logic is found to be self-sufficient in several senses. In the :fint place, his theory of deduction is logicaIly sound in every detail. (His indirect deductions have been criticized, but incorrectly on our account.) In the second place, Aristotle's logic presupposes no other logical concepts, not even those of propositionallogic. In the third place, the Aristotelian system is seen to be complete in the sense that every valid argument expressible in his system admits of a deduction within his deductive system; i.e., every semantically valid argument is deducible. There are six sections in this article. The :fint section includes methodological remarks, a preliminary survey of the present interpretation and a discussion of the differences between our interpretation and that of Lukasiewicz. The next three sections develop the three parts of the mathematical model. The fifth section deals with general properties ofthe model and its relation to the Aristotelian system. The final section contains conclusions. J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modem Interpretations, 85-131. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 86 JOHN CORCORAN 1. PRELIMINARIES 1.1. M athematical Logics Logicians are beginning to view mathematicallogic as a branch of applied mathematics which constructs and studies mathematical models in order to gain understanding of logical phenomena. From this standpoint mathematicallogics are comparable to the mathematical models of solar systems, vibrating strings, or atoms in mathematicai physics and to the mathematical models of computers in automata theory 1 (cf. Kreisel, . p. 204). Thus one thinks of mathematicallogics as mathematical models of real or idealized logical systems. In the most common case a mathematicallogic can be thought of as a mathematical model composed of three interrelated parts: a 'language', a 'deductive system' and a 'semantics'. The language is a syntactica1 system often designed to reflect what has been called the logical form of propositions (cf. Church, pp. 2, 3). The elements of the language are called sentences. The deductive system, another syntactical system, contains elements sometimes called formal proofs or formal deductions. These elements usually involve sequences of sentences constructed in accord with syntactical rules themselves designed to reflect actual or idealized principles of reasoning (cf. Church, pp. 49-54). Finally, the semantics is usually a set-theoretic structure intended to model certain aspects of meaning (cf. Church, pp. 54ft), e.g., how denotations attach to noun phrases and how truth-values attach to sentences. 2 Many theories of logic involve a theory of propositional forms, a theory of deductive reasoning and a theory of meaning (cf. Church, pp. 1, 3, 23). Such theories are intended to account for logical phenomena relating to a natural language or to an ideal language perhaps alleged to underlie natural language, or even to an artificial language proposed as a substitute for natural language. In any case, it is often possibie to construct a mathematicai model which reflects many of the structural aspects of 'the system' envisaged in the theory. Once a mathematical logic has been constructed, it is possibie to ask definite, well-defined questions concerning how well, or to what degree and in what respects, the model reflects the structure of 'the system' envisaged by the theory. Such activity usually contributes toward the clarification of the theory in question. Indeed any attempt to construct such a model necessarily involves an organized and ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 87 detailed study of the theory and often raises questions not considered by the author of the theory. 1.1.1. Underlying logies. Because some articulations of the ab ove viewpoint admit of certain misunderstandings, a few further comments may be in order. Consider a deductive science such as geometry. We may imagine that geometry presupposes its own subject matter which gives rise to its own laws, some of which are taken without deductive justification. In addition, geometry presupposes a geometrical language. The activity of deductively justifying some laws on the basis of others further presupposes a system of demonstrative discourses (the deductions). The activity of establishing by means of reinterpretations of the language of geometry that certain geometrical statements are independent of others further presupposes a system of reinterpretations of the language. The last three presupposed systems taken together from the underlying logic (cf. Church, p. 58, 317; Tarski, p. 297) of geometry. Although the underlying logic is not a science it ean be the subject matter of a scientific investigation. Of course, there is much more to be said about this approach to the study of deductive sciences, but what has been said should be sufficient to enable the reader to see that there is a clear distinction to be made between logic as a scientific study of underlying logics on one hand, and the underlying logic of a science on the other. It is roughly the difference between zoology and fishes. A science has an underlying logic which is treated scientifically by the subject called logic. Logic, then, is a science (in our sense, not Aristotle's), but an underlying logic of a science (Aristotle's sense) is not a science; rather it is a complex, abstract system presupposed by a science. Some of the possibility for confusion could be eliminated by using the term 'science' in Aristotle's sense and the term 'metascience' to indicate activities sueh as logic. Then we eould say that a science presupposes an underlying logie which is then studied in a metascienee, viz. logic. It is unfortunate that in a previous article (Coreoran, 'Theories') I spoke of the 'science of logic' for what I should have terrned 'the metascience, logic' or 'the science of logics'. That unfortunate usage, among other things, brought about Mary Mulhern's justified eriticism (ef. her paper below) to the effect that lam myself guilty ofblurring adistinetion which I take to be crucial to understanding Aristotle's logic (metascience). 88 JOHN CORCORAN Readers of Mulhern's article should be advised that the present paragraphs were added as a resuIt of Mulhern's remarks, which are still important and interesting but, hopefuIly, no longer applicable to me. 1.2. The Data In the present paper we consider only Aristotle's theory of non-modal logic, which has been caIIed 'the theory of the assertoric syIlogism' and 'Aristotle's syllogistic'. Aristotle presents the theory almost completely in Chapters l, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the first book of Prior Analytics, aIthough it presupposes certain developments in previous works especiaIly the folIowing two: first, a theory of form and meaning of propositions having an essential component in Categories (Chapter 5, esp. 2a34-2b7); second, a doctrine of opposition (contradiction) more fully explained in Interpretations (Chapter 7, and cf. Ross, p. 3). Bochenski has called this theory 'Aristotle's second logic' because it was evidently developed after the relatively immature logic of Topics and Sophistical Refutations, but before the theory of modal logic appearing mainly in Chapters 3 and 8-22 of Prior Analytics I. an the basis of our own investigations we have come to accept the essential correctness of Bochenski's chronology and classification of the Organon (Bochenski, p. 43; Lukasiewicz, p. 133; Tredennick, p. 185). Although the theory is rather succinetly stated and developed (in five short chapters), the system of logic envisaged by it is discussed at some length and detail throughout the first bo ok of Prior Analytics (esp. Chapters 7, 23-30, 42 and 45) and it is presupposed (or applied) in the fust bo ok of Posterior Analytics. Book II of Prior Analyties is not relevant to this study. 1.3. Theories of Deduetion Distinguished From Axiomatie Sciences We agree with Ross (p. 6), Scholz (p. 3) and many others that the theory of the categoricai syIIogisms is a logical theory concerned in part with deductive reasoning (as this term is normally understood). Because a recent chaIIenge to this view has gained wide popularity (Lukasiewicz, Preface to 2nd ed.) a short discussion of the differences between a theory of deduction (whether natural or axiomatic) and an axiomatic science is necessary. A theory of deduction puts forth a number of principles (logi cal axioms ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 89 and rules of inferences) which describe deductions of conclusions from premises. All principles of a theory of deduction are necessarily metalinguistic they concern constructions involving object language sentences and, as was said above, a theory of deduction is one part of a theory of logic (which deals with grammar and meaning as well). Theories of deduction (and, of course, deductive systems) have been classified as 'natural' or 'axiomatic' by means of a loose criterion based on the prominence of logical axioms as opposed to rules the more rules the more natural, the more axioms the more axiomatic. On one extreme we find the so-called Jaskowski-type systems which have no logical axioms and which are therefore most properly called 'natural'. On the other extreme there are the so-called Hilbert-type systems which employ infinitely many axioms though only one rule and which are most properly called 'axiomatic'. The reason for the choice of the term 'natural' may be attributed to the fact that our normal reasoning seems better represented by a system in which rules predominate, whereas axiomatic systems of deduction seem contrived in comparison (cf. Corcoran, 'Theories' , pp. 162-171). A science, on the other hand, deals not with reasoning (actual or idealized) but with a certain universe or domain of objects insofar as certain properties and relations are involved. For example, arithmetic deals with the universe of numbers in regard to certain properties (odd, even, prime, perfect, etc.) and relations (less than, greater than, divides, etc.). Aristotle was clear about this (Posterior Analytics I, 10, 28) and modern efforts have not obscured his insights (Church, pp. 57,317-341). The laws of a science are all stated in the object language whose nonlogical constants are interpreted as indicating the required properties and relations and whose variables are interpreted as referring to objects in the universe of discourse. From the axioms of a science other laws of the science are deduced by logical reasoning. Thus an axiomatic science, though not itself a logical system, presupposes a logical system for its deductions (cf. Church, pp. 57, 317). The logic which is presupposed by a given science is called the under/ying logic of the science (cf. Church, p. 58 and Tarski, p. 297). It has been traditional procedure in the presentation of an axiomatic science to leave the underlying logic implicit. For example, neither in Euclid's geometry nor in Hilbert's does one find any codification of the logical rules used in the deduction of the theorems from the axioms and 90 JOHN CORCORAN definitions. It is also worth noting that even Peano's axiomatization of arithmetic and Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory were both presented originally without expIicit description of the underlying logic (cf. Church, p. 57). The need to be explicit concerning the underlying logic developed late in modern logic. 1.4. Preliminary Discussion of the Present Interpretation We hold that in the above-mentioned chapters of Prior Analytics, AristotIe developed a logical theory which included a theory of deduction for deducing categoricaI conclusions from categoricaI premises. We further hold that AristotIe treated the logic thus developed as the underlying logic of the axiomatic sciences discussed in the first book of Posterior Analytics. The relation of the relevant parts of Prior Analytics to the first book of Posterior Analytics is largely the same as the relation of Church's Chapter 4, where first order logic is developed, to the part of Chapter 5 where the axiomatic science of arithmetic is developed with the preceding as its underlying logic. This interpretation properly includes the traditional view (cf. Ross, p. 6 and Scholz, p. 3) which is supported by reference to the Analytics as a whole as well as to crucial passages in the Prior Analy/ics where AristotIe teIIs what he is doing (Prior Analytics I, 1; and cf. Ross, p. 2). In these passages AristotIe gives very general definitions in fact, definitions which seem to have more generality than he ever uses (cf. Ross, p.35). In this article the term syllogism is not restricted to arguments having only two premises. Indeed, were this the case, either here or throughout the Aristotelian corpus, the whole discussion would amount to an elaborate triviality. Barnes (q. v.) has argued that at least two premises are required. Additional reasons are available. That Aristotle did not so restriet his usage throughout is suggested by the form of his definition of sylIogism (24bI9-21), by his statement that every demonstration is a sylIogism (25b27-31; cf. 71 b17, 72b28, 85b23), by the content of Chapter 23 of Prior Analytics I and by several other circumstances to be mentioned below. Unmistakable evidence that AristotIe appIied the term in cases of more than two premises is found in Prior Analytics 1,23 (esp. 41al7) and in Prior Analytics II, 17, 18 and 19 (esp. 65b17, 66a18 and 66b2). However, it is equalIy clear that in many places AristotIe does restriet the term to the two-premise case. It may be possibie to explain ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 91 AristotIe's emphasis on two-premise syllogisms by reference to his discovery (Prior Ana/y tics I, 23) that if all two-premise syllogisms are deducible in his system then all syllogisms without restrietion are so deducible. As mentioned above, in this article the term has the more general sen se. Thus 'sorites' are syllogisms (but, of course, enthymemes are not). The Ana/ylies as a whole forms a treatise on scientific knowledge (24a, 2Sb28-31). an AristotIe's view every item of scientific knowledge is either known in itself by experience (or some other non-deductive method) or else deduced from items known in themselves (Posterior Ana/y tics, passim, esp. II, 19). The Posterior Analytics deals with the acquisition and deductive organization of scientific knowledge. It is the earliest general treatise on the axiomatic method 3 in sciences. The Prior Ana/y tics, on the other hand, develops the underlying logic used in the inference of deductively known scientific propositions from those known in themselves ; but the logic of the Prior Ana/y ties is not designe d solely for sueh use (cf., e.g., 53b4-1 l ; Kneale and Kneale, p. 24). According to Aristotle's view, once the first principles have been discovered, all subsequent knowledge is gained by means of 'demonstrative syllogisms', syllogisms having antecedently known premises, and it is only demonstrative syllogisms which lead to 'new' knowledge (Posterior Ana/y tics I, 2). af course, the knowledge thus gained is in a sense not 'new' because it is already implicit in the premises (Posterior Ana/y tics 1,1). According to more recent terminology (cf. Mates, E/ementary Logic, p. 3) a premise-eonclusion argument (P-e argument) is simply a set of sentences called the premises together with a single sentence called the eonclusion. af course the conclusion need not follow from the premises, if it does then the argument is said to be valid. If the conclusion does not follow, the argument is invalid. It is obvious that even a valid argument with known premises do es not prove anything one is not expected to come to know the conclusion by reading the argument because there is no reasoning expressed in a P-e argument. For example, take the premises to be the axioms and definitions in geometry and take the conclusion to be any complicated theorem which actually follows. Such a valid argument, far from demonstrating anything, is the very kind of thing which needs 'demonstrating'. In 'demonstrating' the validity of an argument one adds more sentences until one has construeted a ehain of reasoning pro92 JOHN CORCORAN ceeding from the premises and ending with the conclusion. The result of such a construction is called a deductive argument (premises, conclusion, plus a chain of reasoning) or, more briefty, a deduction. If the reasoning in a deduction actually shows that the conclusion follows from the premises the deduction is said to be sound; otherwise unsound. Given this terminology we ean say that by perfect syllogism Aristotle meant precisely what we mean by sound deduction and that Aristotle understood the term syllogism to include both valid P-c arguments and sound deductions 4 (cf. 24bI9-32). For Aristotle an invalid premise-conclusion argument is not a syllogism at all (cf. Rose, pp. 27-28). In an imperfect syllogism the conclusion follows, but it is not evident that it does. An imperfect syllogism is 'potentially perfect' (27a2, 28a16, 41 b33, and Patzig, p. 46) and it is made perfect by adding more propositions which express a chain of reasoning from the premises to the conclusion (24b22-25, 28al-1O, 29a15, passim). Thus a demonstrative syllogism for Aristotle is a sound deduction with antecedently known premises (71b9-24, 72a5, passim). That 'a demonstrative syllogism', for Aristotle, is not simply a valid P-c argument with appropriately known premises is aiready obvious from his view that such syllogisms are produetive of knowledge and conviction (73a21; Ross, pp. 508, 517; also cf. Chureh, p. 53). Afortiori, a syllogism cannot be a single sentence of a certain kind, as other interpreters have suggested (see below; ef. Coreoran, 'Aristotelian Syllogisrns' and cf. Smiley). Aristotle is quite clear throughout that treatment of seientific knowledge presupposes a treatment of syllogisms (in partieular, of perfeet syllogisms). In order to be able to produee demonstrative syllogisms one must be able to reason deduetively, i.e., to produce perfect syllogisms. Demonstration is a kind of syllogism but not vice versa (25b26-31, 71 b22-24). Aeeording to our view outlined above, Aristotle's syllogistie includes a theory of deduction whieh, in his terminology, is nothing more than a theory of perfeeting syllogisms. More speeifically and in more modem parlanee, Aristotle's syllogistie includes a natural deduction system by means of which eategorical conclusions are deduced from eategorieal premises. The system countenances two types of deductions (direct and indirect) and, exeept for 'eonversions', each applieation of a rule of inference is (literally) a first figure syllogism. Moreover, as wiIl be clear below, Aristotle' s theory of deduction is fundamental in the sense that it preARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 93 supposes no other logic, not even propositional logic. 5 It also turns out that the Aristotelian system (cf. Section 5 be1ow) is complete in the sense that every valid P-c argument composed of categoricai sentences can be 'demonstrated' to be valid by means of a formal deduction in the system. In Aristotelian terminology this means that every imperfect syllogism ean be perfected by Aristotelian methods. As will become clear below in Section 4, our interpretation is able to account for the correctness of certain Aristotelian doctrines which previous scholars have had to adjudge incorrect. For example, both Lukasiewicz (p. 57) and Patzig (p. 133) agree that Aristotle believed that all deductive reasoning is carried out by means of syllogisms, i.e., that imperfect syllogisms are perfected by means ofperfect syllogisms, but they als o hold that Aristotle was wrong in this belief (Lukasiewicz, p. 44; Patzig, pp. 135). Rose (p. 55) has wondered how one syllogism can be used to prove another but he did not make the mistake of disagreeing with Aristotle's view. Indeed, in the light of our own research one ean see that Rose was very close (p. 53) to answering his own question. We quote in part: We have seen how AristotIe establishes the validity of... imperfect [syllogisms] ... This amounts to presenting an extended argument with the premises of the imperfect [syllogism] ... as ... premises ... using several intermediate steps, ... finally reaching as the ultimate conc1usion the conc1usion of the imperfect [syllogism] ... being established. A natural reaction ... is to think of the first figure [syllogisms] ... as axioms and the imperfect [syllogisms] ... as theorems and to ask to what extent Aristotle is dealing with a formal deductive system. This would be natural indeed to someone not concerned with formal 'natural' deductive systems. To someone concerned with the latter, it would be natural to consider the first figure syllogisms as 'applications' of rules of inference, to consider the imperfect syllogisms as derived arguments, and then to scrutinize Chapters 2 and 4 (Prior Analytics I) in search of parts needed to complete the specification of a natural deductive system. What Rose calls 'an extended argument' is simply a deduction or, in Aristotle's terms, a discourse got by perfecting an imperfect syllogism. Rose had aiready seen the relevance of pointing out (p. 10) that the term 'syllogism' had been in common use in the sense of 'mathematical computation'. One would not normally apply the term 'computation' to mere data-and-answer reported in the form of an equation, e.g. (330 + 1955 = =2285). The sine qua non of a computation would seem to be the inter94 JOHN CORCORAN mediate steps, and one might be indined to call the mere data-plus-answer complex an 'imperfect computation' or a 'potential computation'. A 'perfect' or 'completed' computation would then be the entire complex of data, answer and intermediate steps. At one point Patzig seems to have been doser to our view than Rose. We quote from Patzig (p. 135), who sometimes uses 'argument' for 'syllogism' . ... the odd locution 'a potential argument' (synonymous with 'imperfect argument' ... ) which, as was shown, properly means 'a potentially per/ect argument' ... has no clear sense unless we assume that AristotIe intended to state a procedure by which 'actual' syllogisms could be produced from these 'potential' ones, i.e., actually evident syllogisms produced from potentially evident ones. Although Rose seems to have missed our view by failing to consider the possibility of a natural deduction system in AristotIe, Patzig was diverted in less subtle ways, as well. In the fint place Patzig uncritically accepted the false condusion of previous interpreters that all perfect syllogisms are in the first figure and thus arrives at the strange view that imperfect syllogisms are "as it were disguised first figure syllogisms" (loc. cit.). Secondly, and surprisingly, Patzig (p. 136) seems to be unaware of the distinction between a valid P-c argument and a sound deduction having the same premises and conc1usion. 1.5. The Lukasiewicz View and Its Inadequacies In order to contrast our view with the Lukasiewicz view it is useful to represent categoricai statements with a notion which is mnemonic for readers of twentieth century English. Amd All m are d. Smd Some m is d. Nmd No m is d. $md Some m is not d. Lukasiewicz holds that Aristotle's theory of syllogistic is an axiomatic science which presupposes 'a theory of deduction' unknown to Aristotle (p. 14, 15, 49). The universe of the Lukasiewicz science is the c1ass of secondary substances (man, dog, animal, etc.) and the relevant relations are those indicated above by A, N, S, and $, i.e., the relations of inc1usion, disjointness, partial inc1usion and partial non-inc1usion respectively (pp. 14-15). Accordingly, he understands Aristotle's schematic letters (alpha, ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 95 beta, gamma, mu, nu, xi, pi, rho and sigma) as variables ranging over the class of secondary substances and he takes A, N, S and $ as non-Iogical constants (ibid.). Some of the axioms of the Lukasiewicz science correspond to Aristotelian syllogisms. But his axioms are single sentences (not arguments) and they are generalized with respect to the schematic letters (see Mates, op. cif., p. 178). For example, the argument scheme All Z are Y. All X are Z. So All X are Y. corresponds to the following sort ofaxiom in the Lukasiewicz system 'v'xyz«Azy & Axz) => Axy). It should be noted, however, that Lukasiewicz does not use quantifiers in his reeonstruction of Aristotle's syllogistie (p. 83). Universal quantification is nevertheless expressed in the theorems of the Lukasiewicz reeonstruction it is expressed by means of 'free variables', as ean be verified by notieing the 'Rule ofSubstitution' that Lukasiewicz uses (p. 88). Indeed, the deductive system of the underlying logic presupposed by Aristotle (aceording to Lukasiewicz) is more than a propositionallogicit is what today would be called a free variable logic, a logic which involves truth-functions and universal quantification (expressed by free variables). Lukasiewicz refers to the deductive system ofthe underlying logic as 'the theory of deduction' and he sometimes seems to ignore the fact that a free variable logic is more than simply a propositionallogic. [Using propositionallogic alone one cannot derive Ayy from Axx (i.e., 'v'yAyy from 'v'xAxx) but in a free variable logic it is done in one step.] The Lukasiewicz view is ingenious and his book contains a wealth of useful scholarship. Indeed it is worth emphasizing that without his bo ok the present work could not have been done in even twice the time. Despite the value of the book, its viewpoint must be ineorrect for the following reasons. In the first place, as mentioned above, Lukasiewicz (p. 44) does not take seriously Aristotle's own claims that imperfect syllogisms are "proved by means of syllogisms" . Re even says that Aristotle was wrong in this claim. In the second place, he completely overlooks the many passages in which Aristotle speaks ofperfecting imperfect syllogisms (e.g., Prior Analytics, 27a17, 29a30, 29bl-2S). Lukasiewicz (p. 43) understands 96 JOHN CORCORAN 'perfect syllogism' to indicate only the [valid] syllogisms in the first figure. This leads him to negleet the crucial faet that Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Prior Ana/y tics deal with Aristotle's theory of deduction. Thirdly, Aristotle is clear in Posterior Ana/y tics (I, 10) about the nature ofaxiomatic sciences and he nowhere mentions syllogistic as a science (Ross, p. 24), but Lukasiewicz still wants to regard the syllogistic as such. (Lukasiewicz does seem uneasy (p. 44) about the faet that Aristotle does not call his basic syllogisms 'axioms'.) Indeed, as Scholz has aiready noticed (p. 6), Aristotle could not have regarded the syllogistic as a science because to do so he would have had to take the syllogistic as its own underlying logic. Again, were the Lukasiewicz system to be a science in Aristotle's terms then its universe of discourse would have to form a genus (e.g., Posterior Ana/y tics I, 28) but Aristotle nowhere mentions the class of secondary substances as a genus. Indeed, on reading the tenth chapter of the Posterior Analytics one would expect that if the syllogistic were a science then its genus would be mentioned on the first page of Prior Ana- [y tics. Not only does Aristotle fail to indicate the subject matter required by the Lukasiewicz view, he even indicates a different one viz. demonstration but not as a genus (Prior Ana/ytjes, first sentence).6 In the fourth place, if the syllogistic were an axiomatic science and A, N, S and $ were relational terms, as Lukasiewicz must have it, then awkward questions ensue: (a) Why are these not mentioned in Categories, Chapter 7, where relations are discussed? (b) Why did Aristotle not seek for axioms the simplest and most obvious of the propositions involving these relations, i.e., 'Everything is predicated of all of itself' and 'Everything is predicated of some of itself'? In faet Aristotle may have deIiberately avoided 'self-predication', although he surely knew of several reflexive relations (identity, equality, congruence). Lukasiewicz counts this as an oversight and adds the first ofthe ab ove self-predications as a 'new' axiom. In connection with the above questions we mayaIso note that the relations needed in the Lukasiewicz science are of a different 'logical type' than those considered by Aristotle in Categories the former relate secondary substances whereas the latter relate primary substances, Fifth, if indeed Aristotle is axiomatizing a system of true relational sentences on a par with the system of true relational sentences which characterize the ordering ofthe numbers, as Lukasiewicz must and does claim (pp. 14, 15,73), then again awkward questions ensue: (a) Why is there no discussion ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 97 anywhere in the second logic of the general topic of relational sentences? (b) Why does Aristotle axiomatize only one such system? The 'theory of congruence' (equivalence relations) and the 'theory of the ordering of numbers' (linear order) are obvious, similar systems and nowhere does Aristotle even hint at the analogies. Sixth, as Lukasiewicz himself implicitlY recognizes in a section called 'Theory of Deduction' (pp. 79-82), if the theory of syllogisms is understood as an axiomatic science then, as indicated above, it would presuppose an underlying logic (which Lukasiewicz supplies). But all indications in the Aristotelian corpus suggest not only that Aristotle regarded the theory of syllogistic as the most fundamental sort of reasoning (Kneale and Kneale, p. 44, and even Lukasiewicz, p. 57) but also that he regarded its logic as the underlying logic of all axiomatic sciences.7 Lukasiewicz himself says, "It seems that Aristotle did not suspect the existence of a system of logic besides his theory of the syllogism" (p. 49). Seventh, the view that syllogisms are sentences of a certain kind and not extended discourses is incompatible with Aristotle's occasional but essential reference to ostensive syllogisms and to per impossibile syllogisms (4Ia30-40, 45a23, 65b16, e.g.). These references imply that some syllogisms have internat structure even over and above 'premises' and 'conclusion'. Finally, although Lukasiewicz gives a mathematicaIly precise system which obtains and rejects 'laws' corresponding to those which Aristotle obtains and rejects, the Lukasiewicz system neither justifies nor accounts for the methods that Aristotle used. Our point is that the method is what Aristotle regarded as most important. In this connection, Aristotle obtained metamathematical results using methods which are clearly accounted for by the present interpretation but which must remain a mystery on the Lukasiewicz interpretation.s It will be seen that Aristotie's theory of deduction contains a selfsufficient natural deduction system which presupposes no other logic. Perhaps the reason that Aristotle's theory of deduction has been overlooked is that it differs radically from many of the 'standard' modem systems. It has no axioms, it involves no truth-functional combinations and it lacks both the explicit and implicit quantifiers (in the modem sense). 1.6. The Importance of the Issue Universally absent from discussions of this issue is reference to why it 98 JOHN CORCORAN is important. My opinion is this: ifthe Lukasiewicz view is correct then Aristotle cannot be regarded as the founder of logic. AristotIe would merit this titIe no more than Euclid, Peano, or Zermelo insofar as these men are regarded as founders, respectively, ofaxiomatic geometry, axiomatie arithmetic and axiomatic set theo ry. (AristotIe would be merely the founder of 'the axiomatic theory of universals'.) Each ofthe former three men set down an axiomatization of a body of information without explicitly developing the underlying logic. That is, each of these men put down axioms and regarded as theorems of the system the sentences obtainable from the axioms by logical deductions but without bothering to say what a logical deduction is. Lukasiewicz is claiming that thi s is what Aristotle did. In my view, logic must begin with observations explicitly related to questions concerning the nature of an underlying logic. In short, Iogic must be explicitly concerned with deductive reasoning. II Lukasiewicz is correct then the Stoics were the genuine founders of logic. Of course, my view is that in the Prior Analytics Aristotle developed the underlying logic for the axiomatically organized sciences that he discussed in the Posterior Analytics and that he, therefore, is the founder of logic. 2. THE LANGUAGE L In formulating a logic which is to serve as the underlying logic for severaI axiomatic science s it is standard to define a 'master language' which involves: (1) punctuation, (2) finitely many logical constants, (3) infinitely many variables and (4) infinitely many non-Iogical constants or content words (cf. Church, p. 169). Any given axiomatic science will invoIve all of the logical constants and all of the variables, but onIy finitely many content words. The full infinite set of content words plays a role only in abstract theoreticaI considerations. In Aristotle there is no evidence of explicit consideration of a master language, aIthough theoreticaI considerations involving infinitely many content words do occur in Posterior Analy tics (I, 19,20,21). It is worth noticing that there is no need to postulate object language variables for AristotIe's system. The vocabulary of the master language (L) involved in the present development of AristotIe's logic consists in the four logical constants (A, N, S and $) and an infinite set U of non-Iogical constants (Ul' U2' U3' •.• ). The latter play the roles of 'categoricaI terms'. The rule of formation ARISTOTLE'S NATURA L DEDUCTION SYSTEM 99 which defines 'sentence of L' is simply the folIowing : asentence of L is the result of attaching a logical constant to a string of two distinct nonlogical constants. Thus each sentence of L is one of the folIowing where x and y are distinct content words: Axy, Nxy, Sxy, $xy. It is to be emphasized that no sentence of L has two occurrences of the same content word (or non-Iogical constant). This means, in the above terminology, that the system eschews self-predication. Self-predication is here avoided because AristotIe avoids it in the system of the Prior Analy tics (so our model needs to do so for faithfulness) and also because, as J. Mulhern (pp. 111-115) has argued, AristotIe had theoreticai reasons for such avoidance. Thus, contrary to the Lukasiewicz interpretation (p. 45), AristotIe's 'omission of the laws of identity' (All X are X; Some X are X) need not be construed as an oversight. The textual situation is the folIowing : In the whole of the passages which contain the 'second logic' there is no appearance of self-predication. The only appearance of self-predication in Analytics is in the second bo ok of Prior Analytics (63b40-64b25), which was written later. In this passage the sentences 'No knowledge is knowledge' and 'Some knowledge is not knowledge' appear as conclusions of syllogisms with contradictory premises and there are ample grounds for urging the extrasystematic character of the examples. In any case, no affirmative self-predications occur at all. Indeed, it may be possibie to explain the absence of a doctrine of logical truth in AristotIe as being a practical 'consequence' of the faet that there are no logically true sentences in his abstract language. It is readily admitted, however, that the reader's subjective feelings of 'naturainess' will color his judgment concerning which of the choices is an interpolation. If self-predications are thought to be 'naturally present' then our decision to exclude them will seem an interpolation. On the other hand, if they are thought to be 'naturally absent' then the Lukasiewicz inclusion will seem an interpolation. The facts that they do not occur in the second logic and that the system works out without them may tip the scales slightly in favor ofthe present view. Perhaps further slight evidence that AristotIe needed to exclude them can be got by noticing that the mood Barbara with a necessary major and necessary conclusion (regarded as valid by AristotIe) is absurdly invalid when the predicate and middle are identical. Some mayaiso question our omission of the 'indefinite propositions' 100 JOHN CORCORAN like 'Men are greedy' which lack 'quantification' (cf. M. Mulhern, p. 51). Although these are mentioned by Aristotle, he seems to treat them as extra-systematic insofar as his system of scientific reasoning is concerned. In the first book of Prior Analytics (43a24-44) Aristotle also seems to exclude both adjectives and proper names from scientific languages. Lukasiewicz (p. 7) seems correct in saying that both the latter were banned because neither ean be used both in subject and in predicate positions (also see Kneale and Kneale, p. 67 and Patzig, p. 6). It must also be noted that our model makes no room for relatives (and neither does the Lukasiewicz interpretation). Even if subsequent research shows that these opinions are incorreet, our model need not be changed. However, its significance will change. Inclusion of proper nouns, adjectives, relatives and/or indefinite propositions would imply only additions to our model; no other changes would be required. Our language seems to be a sublanguage, at least, of any faithful analogue of the abstract language of Aristotle's system.9 The language L Uust defined) is an abstract mathematical object designed in analogy with what might be called the ideal language envisaged in AristotIe's theory of scientifically meaningful statements. In effect each sentence in L should be thought of as representing a specific categorical proposition. The structure of a sentence in L is supposed to reflect the structure ofthe specific categoricaI proposition it represents. For example, if u and v represent the universals 'man and 'animal' then the structure of Auv should reflect the structure of the proposition' All men are animais' . It is to be emphasized that a sentence in L is supposed to represent a particular proposition (as envisaged by AristotIe's theory) and not a propositional form, propositional function, proposition scheme or anything of the sort. There is no need within Aristotle's theory, nor within our model, of postulating the existence of propositional functions, propositional schemes or even object language variables. Our view is that Aristotle used metalinguistic variables, but that he neither used nor had a doetrine concerning object language variables.10 2.1. Topieal Sublanguages As was said ab ove, Aristotle developed his logic largely (but not solely) as the underlying logic of the various sciences. In the first book of Posterior Ana/y tics, Aristotle develops his view of the organization of sciences and ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 101 at severa1 places therein he makes it clear that each science has its own genus and its own peculiar terms (Posterior Analytics I; 7, 9, 10, 12,28). A given science can have only finitely many terms (88b6-7; cf. Barnes, p. 123; Ross, p. 603) and it is somehow wrong (impossib1e?) to mix terms from different sciences.ll Aristotle even goes so far as to claim that a proposition which seems common to two sciences is really two analogous propositions (76a37-b2). We conclude that each science has its ownfinite language. We call such a speciallanguage a 'topical sublanguage' of the 'master' language. The notion of 'base' in Lewis and Langford (p. 348) corresponds to the finite vocabulary of terms of a topicai sublanguage. It is very likely that Aristotle would have regarded his master language not as literally infinite but rather as indefinitely large or perhaps as potentially infinite. 2.2. Grammatical Concepts Once the language has been defined, we can define some useful concepts which depend only on the language, i.e., which are independent of semantic and/or deductive notions. As above, a premise-conclusion argument (P-c argument) is a set P of sentences together with a single sentence c; P is called the premises and c is called the conclusion. F our things are to be noted at this point. First, Aristotle seems to have no term equivalent in meaning to 'P-c argument' ; each time he refers by means of a common noun to a P-c argument it is always by means of the term 'syllogism' which carries the connotation ofvalidity (cf. Rose, p. 27). Second, Aristotle never refers to P-c arguments having the empty set of premises (which is not surprising, if only because none are valid). Third, although the 'laws of conversion' involve arguments having only a single premise, Aristotle did not recognize that fact, insisting repeatedly that every syllogism must have at least two premises (e. g., Prior Analylics, 42a8, 53b 19; Posterior Analytics 73a9). Fourth, there is no question that Aristotle treated, in detail, syllogisms with more than two premises (e.g., Prior Ana/y tics I, 23, 25, 42; Posterior Ana/y tics I, 25, also see above). In fact, Posterior Analytics implicitly considers syllogisms whose premises are all of the axioms of a science (Posterior Analytics I, 10) and it explicitly considers the possibility of syllogisms with infinitely many premises (Posterior Ana- /ytics I, 19, 20, 21). Underlying much of Aristotle's thought (but never explicitly formu102 JOHN CORCORAN lated) is the notion of form of argument, but onIy in the relational sense in which one argument ean be said to be in the same form as another. This notion is pureIy syntactic and ean be defined given the language alone. In particuIar, let (P, e) and (P', e') be two arguments. (P, e) is in the same form as (P', e') if and only if there is a one-one correspondence between their respective sets of content words so that substitution according to the correspondence converts one argument into the other. In order to exhibit examples let us agree to represent an argument by listing the premises and conclusion indicating the conclusion by a question mark. Example 1: The foIlowing two arguments are in the same form by means of the one-one correspondence on the right: Aab Aed a e Sbe Sda b d $ab $ed c a ?Ned ?Nae d e Example 2: In the folIowing pairs the respective arguments are not in the same form: Aab Aab Sbe Sbe ?Nae ?Nea Aab Aab Sae $ae ?$ae ?$ae Aab Aab ?Nae $ae ?Nae It foIIows from the definition that in order for two arguments to be in the same form, it is necessary that they have (1) the same number of premises, (2) the same number of distinct content words and (3) the same number of sentences of any of the four kinds. It is obvious that one need know absolutely nothing about how the sentences in L are to be interpreted or how one 'reasons' about their logical interrelations in order to be able to decide whether two arguments are in the same form. Relative to this system, the notion ofform is purely grammaticai (cf. Church. pp. 2-3). Define P + s as the result of adjoining the sentence s with the set P. Finally we define Nxy and Axy to be eontradietories respectiveIy of Sxy and $xy (and vice versa) and we define the function C which when appIied to a sentence in L produces its contradictory. The table of the function is given below. ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 103 c Axy $xy Nxy Sxy Sxy Nxy $xy Axy 3. TRE SEMANTIC SYSTEM S Aristotle regarded the truth-values of the non-modal categoricai propositions as determined extensionaIly (Prior Ana/y ties, 24a26 ff.).12 Thus, for Aristotie : (1) 'All X is Y' is true if the extension of X is included in that of Y; (2) 'No X is Y' is true if the extension of X is disjoint with that of Y; (3) 'Some X is Y' is true if an object is in both extensions and (4) 'Some X is not Y' is true if some object in the extension of X is outside of the extension of Y. Thus, given the meanings of the logical constants, the truth-values of the categoricai sentences are determined by the extensions of the universals involved in the manner just indicated. Now imagine that the content words (characters in U) are correlated with the secondary substances (sortal universals) and consider the folIowing interpretation i of L. The interpretation ix of the content word x is the extension of the secondary substance correlated with x. Given i we can easily define a function Vi which assigns the correct truth-value to each sentence in L as follows: (1) Vi(Axy) = t if ix is included in iy, Vi(Axy) = fif ix is not included in iy. (2) Vi(Nxy) = t if ix is disjoint with iy, Vi(Nxy) = fif ix is not disjoint with iy. (3) Vi(Sxy) = t if ix is not disjoint with iy, Vi(Sxy) = fif ix is disjoint with iy. (4) Vi($xy) = t if ix is not included in iy, Vi($xy) = fif ix is included in iy. The function i defined above may be regarded as the intended interpretation of L. In order to complete the construction of the semantics for L we must specify, in addition, the non-intended or 'possible' interpretations of L. The non-intended interpretations of a language are structures which share all 'purely logical' features with the intended interpretation. What 104 JOHN CORCORAN is essential to the intended interpretation is that it assigns to each content word a set of primary substances (individuals) which 'could be' the extension of a secondary substance. Since Aristotle held that every secondary substance must subsume at least one primary substance (Categories, 2a34-2b7), we give the folIowing general definition of an interpretation of L: j is an interpretation of L if and only if j is a function which assigns a non-empty set13 to each member of U. The general definition of truthvalues of sentences of L under an arbitrary interpretation j is exactly the same as that for the intended interpretation. The absence of the notion of universe of discourse warrants special comment if only because it is prominent, not only in modem semantics but also in Aristotles treatment ofaxiomatic science (see above). In the first place, this concept plays no role in the system of the Prior Analyties, which is what we are building a model for. So we deliberately leave it out, although from a modem point of view it is unnatural to do so. [Of course, in an underlying logic based on a topicai sublanguage, universes of discourse are needed (each science has its genus). To supply them we would require that, for eachj, eachjx is a subclass of some set, say Dj, given in advance. Hs omission has no mathematical consequences.] In the second place there may be a tradition (cf. Jaskowski, p. 161; Patzig, p. 7) which holds that Aristotle prohibited his content words from having the universe as extension. (So both the null set and the universe would be excluded. Since the universe of sets is not itself a set, our definitions respect the tradition without special attention and perhaps without special significance. 14) H must be admitted that Aristotle nowhere makes specific reference to alternative interpretations nor do es he anywhere perform operations which suggest that he had envisaged alternative interpretations. Rather it seems that at every point he thought of his ideal language as interpreted in what we would ean its intended interpretation. Moreover, it is doubtful that Aristotle ever conceived of a language apart from its intended interpretation. In other word s, it seems that Aristotle did not separate logical syntax from semantics (but cf. De. Int., chapter 1 and Soph. Re!, chapter 1). 3.1. Semantie Coneepts In terms of the semantics of L just given, we define some additional useful notions as fonows. A sentence s is said to be true [false] in an interpreARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 105 tationj ir Vi (s) = t [Vi (s) = fl. Ir s true inj thenj is called a true interpretation of s. Ir p is a set of sentences all or which are true inj thenj is called a true interpretation of P and if every true interpretation or p is a true interpretation or c then P is said to (logicaIly) imply c (written P'F c). If P implies c then the argument (P, c) is valid, otherwise (P, c) is invalid. A eounter interpretation of an argument (P, c) is a true interpretation of the premises, P, in which the conclusion, c, is false. When (P, c) is valid, c is said to be a logical eonsequence 15 of P. By reference to the definitions just given one can show the folIowing important semantic principle which is suggested by Aristotle's 'contrasting instances' method of establishing invalidity of arguments (below and cf. Ross, pp. 28, 292-313 and Rose, pp. 37-52). (3.0) Principle of counter interpretations. A premise-eonclusion argument is invalid if and only if il has a counter interpretation. The import or this principle is that whenever an argument is invalid it is possibIe to reinterpret its content words in such a way as to make the premises true and the conclusion false. It is worth remembering that the independence of the Parallel Postulate from the other 'axioms' of geometry was established by construction of a counter interpretation, a reinterpretation of the language of geometry in which the other axioms were true and the Parallel Postulate false (cf. Cohen and Hersh, and also, Frege, pp. 107-110).16 Perhaps the most important semantic principle underlying Aristotle's logical work is the following, also deducible from the above definitions. (3.1.) Prineiple of Form: An argument is valid if and only if every argument in the same form is also valid. Aristotle tacitly employed this principle 17 throughout the Prior Analy tics in two ways. First, to establish the validity of all arguments in the same form as a given argument, he establishes the validity of an arbitrary argument in the same form as the argument in question (i.e. he establishes the validity of an argument leaving its content words unspecified). Second, to establish the invalidity of all arguments in the same form as a given argument, he produces a specific argument in the required form for which the intended interpetation is a counter interpretation.18 The latter, or course, is the method or 'contrasting instances'. Inneither of these operations, which are applied repeatedly by Aristotle, is it neces106 JOHN CORCORAN sary to postulate either alternative interpretations or argument forms (over and above individual arguments; cf. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below). The final semantic consideration is the semantic basis of what wiIl turn out to be Aristotie's theory of deduction. The c1auses of the folIowing principle are easily established on the basis of the above definitions. (3.2.) Semantic Basis o/ Aristotle's Theory o/ Deduction: let x, y, and z be dijferent members o/ U. Let P be a set o/ sentences and let d and s be sentences. Law o/ Contradictions: (C) For aIlj, vj(s) -::f= vj(C(s)), [i.e., in every interpretation, contradictions have different truth values). Con version Laws: (Cl) Nxy 'F Nyx. (C2) Axy 'F Syx. (C3) Sxy 'F Syx. Laws o/ Perfect Syllogisms: (PSI) {Azy, Axz} 'F Axz. (PS2) {Nzy, Axz} 'F Nxy. (PS3) {Azy, Sxz} 'F Sxy. (PS4) {Nzy, Sxz} 'F$xy. Reductio Law: (R) P'Fd if P + C(d) 'Fs and P + C(d) 'F C(s). The law of contradictions, the conversion laws, and the laws of perfect syIlogisms are familiar and obvious. The reductio law says that for d to follow from P it is sufficient that P and the contradiction of d together imply both a sentence s and its contradictory C(s). Although AristotIe regarded all of the above c1auses as obviously true, he does not completely neglect metalogical questions 19 concerning them. As far as I can tell AristotIe did not raise the metalogical question concerning reductio reasoning in the Analytics. In Chapter 2 of the first bo ok of the Prior Analytics he puts down the conversion laws and then offers what seem to be answers to the metalogical questions concerning their ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 107 validity. Specifically, he establishes (Cl) by a kind of metasystematic reductio proof which presupposes (1) non-emptiness of term-extensions, (2) contradictory opposition between Nxy and Sxy, and (3) that existence of an object having properties x and y prec1udes the truth of Nyx. Then, taking (Cl) as established, he establishes (C2) and (C3) by reductio reasoning. Two chapters later he gives obviously semantic justification for the four laws of perfect syllogisms. 3.2. An Alternative Semantic System Instead of having a c1ass of interpretations some logicians prefer to 'do as much semantics as possible' in terms of the folIowing two notions : (1) truth-valuation in the intended interpretation and (2) form (cf. Quine, Philosophy, p. 49 and Corcoran, 'Review'). Such logicians would have a semantic system containing exactly one interpretation, the intended interpretation, and they would define an argument to be valid if every argument in the same form with true premises (relative to the intended interpretation) has a true conc1usion (relative to the intended interpretation). Ockham's razor would favor the new 'one-world' semantics over the above 'possible-worlds' semantics (Quine, op. cit., p. 55). Within a framework of a one-world semantics invalidity would be established in the same way as above (and as in Aristotle). It does not seem possibie to establish by reference to the Aristotelian corpus whether one semantic system agrees better with AristotIe's theory than the other. The main objection to the one-world semantics is that it makes logical issues depend on 'material reality' rather than on 'logical possibilities'. For example, ifthe intended interpretation is so structured that for every pair of content words the extension of one is identical to the extension of the other or else disjoint with it then Axy 'logicaIly implies' Ayx. Thus* in order to get the usual valid arguments in a one-world semantics it is necessary to make additional assumptions about the intended interpretation (cf. Quine, op. cit., p. 53). Proponents of the oneworld semantics prefer additional assumptions concerning 'the real world' to additional assumptions about 'possibie worlds'. Since the mathematics involved with the semantics of the previous section involves fewer arbitrary decisions than does the semantics of this section we have chosen to make the former the semantic system of our modelof Aristotle's system. It is very likely that proponents of the one-world view 108 JOHN CORCORAN could honestly weight the available evidence so that attribution of the one-world semantics to Aristotle is more probable. Ifthe current dialogue between proponents of the two views continues the above may well become an important historicai issue. 3.3. Forms of Arguments Above we used the termform only in relational contexts: (P, c) is in the same form as (P*, c*). During previous readings ofthis paper, auditors insisted on knowing what logical forms 'really are' and whether Aristotle used them as theoretical entities. Perhaps the best way of getting clear about the first problem is to first see an 'explication' of the notion. The folIowing explication is a deliberate imitation of Russell's explication of number in terms of the relation 'has the same number of members as'. Consider the class of all arguments and imagine that it is partitioned into non-empty subsets so that all and only formally similar arguments are grouped together. Define Forms to be these subsets. If we use this notion of Form, then many of the traditional uses of the substantive form (not the relative) are preserved. Taking in in the sense of membership, we ean say that (P, c) is in the same form as (P*, c*) if and only if (P, c) is a member of the same Form that (P*, c*) is a member of. A Form is simply a set of formally similar arguments. Unfortunately, this clear notion ofform is not the one that has been traditionally invoked. The traditional 'argument form' is supposed to be like a (real) argument except that it doesn't have (concrete) terms. Putting variables for the terms will not help because new variables ean be substituted without changing the 'form'. Proponents of 'forms' fall back on saying that an 'argument form'is that which all formally similar arguments have in common, but (seriously) what ean this be except membership in a clas s of formally similar arguments? In any case there are no textual grounds for imputing to Aristotle a belief in argument Forms (or, for that matter, in 'argument forms', assuming that sense ean be made of that notion). 4. TRE DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM D We have aiready implied above that a theory of deduction is intended to specify what steps of deductive reasoning may be performed in order to come to know that a certain proposition c follows logicaIly from a certain ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 109 set P of propositions. Aristotle's theory of deduction is his theory of perfecting syllogisms. As stated above, our view is that a perfect syllogism is a discourse which expresses correct reasoning from premises to conclusion. In case the conclusion is immediate, nothing need be added to make the implication clear (24a22). In case the conclusion does not follow immediately, then additional sentences must be added (24b23, 27a18, 28a5, 29a15, 29a30, 42a34, etc.). A valid argument by itself is only potentiaIly perfect (27a2, 28a16, 41b33): it is 'made perfect' (29a33, 29b5, 29b20, 40b19, etc.) by, so to speak, filling its interstices. According to Aristotle's theory, there are only two general methods 20 for perfecting an imperfect syllogism either directly (ostensively) or indirectly (per impossibile) (e.g., 29a30-29bl, 40a30, 45b5-1O, 62b29-40, passim). In constructing a direct deduction of a conclusion from premises one interpolates new sentences by applying conversions and fint figure syllogisms to previous sentences until one arrives at the conclusion. Of course, it is permissibie to repeat an aiready obtained line. In constructing an indirect deduction of a conclusion from premises one adds to the premises, as an additional hypothesis, the contradictory of the conclusion ; then one interpolates new sentences as above until both of a pair of contradictory sentences have been reached. Dur deductive system D, to be defined presently, is a syntactical mathematical modelof the system of deductions found in Aristotle's theory of perfecting syllogisms. Definition of D. First restate the laws of conversion and perfect syllogisms as rules of inference. 21 Use the terms 'a D-conversion of a sentence' to indicate the result of applying one of the three conversion rules to it. Use the terms 'D-inference from two sentences' to indicate the result of applying one of the perfect syllogism rules to the two sentences. A direct deduction in D of c from P is a finite list of sentences ending with c, beginning with all or some of the sentences in P, and such that each subsequent line (af ter those in P) is either (a) a repetition of a previous line, (b) a D-conversion of a previous line or (c) a D-inference from two previous lines. An indirect deduction in D of c from P is a finite list of sentences ending in a contradictory pair, beginning with a list of all or some of the sentences in P followed by the contradictory of c, and such that each subsequent additional line (after the contradictory of c) is either (a) a 110 JOHN CORCORAN repetition of a previous line, (b) a D-conversion of a previous line or (c) a D-inference from two previous lines. All examples of deductions will be annotated according to the folIowing scheme: (1) Premises will be prefixed by , +' so that ' + Axy' can be read 'assume Axy as a premise'. (2) Mter the premises are put down we interject the conclusion prefixed by '?' so that '?Axy' can be read 'we want to show why Axy follows'. (3) The hypothesis of an indirect (reductio) deduction is prefixed by 'h' so that 'hAxy' can be read 'suppose Axy for purposes of reasoning'. (4) A line entered by repetition is prefixed by 'a' so that 'aAxy' can be read 'we have aiready accepted Axy'. (5) Lines entered by conversion and syllogistic inference are prefixed by 'c' and 's', respectively. (6) Finally, the last line of an indirect deduction has 'B' prefixed to its other annotation so that 'BaAxy' can be read 'but we have aiready acceptedAxy', etc. We define an annotated deduction in D to be a deduction in Dannotated according to the above scheme. In accordance with now standard practice we say that c is deducible from P in D to mean that there is a deduction of c from P in the system D. It is als o sometimes convenient to use the locution 'the argument (P, c) is deducible in D'. The folIowing is a consequence of the above definitions (cf. Frege, pp. 101-11). (4.1) Deductive Principle of Form: An argument is deducible in D if and only if every argument in the same form is also deducible. The significance of D is as follows. We c1aim that D is a faithful mathematical modelof Aristotle's theory of perfecting syllogisms in the sense that every perfect syllogism (in Aristotle's sense) corresponds in a direct and obvious way to a deduction in D. Thus what can be added to an imperfect syllogism to render it perfect corresponds to what can be 'added' to a valid argument to produce a deduction in D. In the case of a direct deduction the 'space' between the premises and conclusion is filled up in accordance with the given rules. In order to establish these c1aims as well as they can be established (taking account of the vague nature of the data), the reader may go through the deductions presented by Aristotle and convince himself that each may be faithfully represented in D. We give four examples below; three direct deductions and one indirect deduction. The others raise no problems. ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 111 We reproduce two of Aristotle's deductions (27a5-15; Rose, p. 34), each followed by the corresponding annotated deductions in D. (1) Let M be predicated of no N + Nnm and of All X + Axm (2) (conclusion omitted in text). Then since the negative premise converts N belongs to no M. But it was supposed that M belongs to all X. Therefore N will belong to no X. Again, if M belongs to all N and to no X, X will belong to no N. For if M belongs to no X, X belongs to no M. But M belonged to all N. Therefore X will belong to no N. (?Nxn) cNmn aAxm sNxn +Anm +Nxm ?Nnx aNxm cNmx aAnm sNnx Below we reproduce Aristotle's words (28b8-12) followed by the corresponding annotated deduction in D. (3) For if R belongs to all S, P belongs to some S, P must belong to some R. Since the affirmative statement is convertible S will belong to some P, consequently since R belongs to all S, and S to some P, R must also belong to some P: therefore P must belong to some R. + Asr +Ssp ?Srp eSps aAsr aSps sSpr cSrp To exemplify an indirect deduction we do the same for 28 bl 7-20. (4) For if R belongs to all S, but P does not belong to some S, it is necessary that P does not belong to some R. For if P belongs to all R, and R belongs to all S, then P will belong to all S: but we assumed that it did not. +Asr +$sp ?$rp hArp aAsr sAsp Ba$sp 112 JOHN CORCORAN Readers can verify the folIowing (by 'translating' Aristotle's proofs of the syllogisms he proved, using ingenuity in the other cases). (4.2) All valid arguments in any oJ the Jour traditional figures 22 are deducible in D. 4.1. Deductive Concepts As is to be expected given the above developments, a deductive concept is one which can be defined in terms of concepts employed in the deductive system without reference to semantics. In many cases one relies on semantic insights for the motivation to delimit one concept rather than another. This is irrelevant to the criterion for distinguishing deductive from semantic concepts; just as reliance on mechanical insight for motivation to define mathematical concepts is irrelevant to distinguishing physical and mathematical concepts. Already several deductive notions have been used - 'direct deduction', 'indirect deduction', 'rule of inference', 'deducible from', 'contradictory' (as used here), etc. Relative to D the notion of consistency is defined as follows. A set P of sentences is consistent if no two deductions from P have contradictory conclusions. If there are two deductions from P one of which yields the contradictory of the conclusion of the other then, of course, P is inconsistent. Aristotle did not have occasion to define the notion of inconsistency but he showed a degree of sophistication lacking in somecurrent thinkers by discussing valid arguments having inconsistent premise sets 23 (63b40-64b25). 4.2. Some Metamathematical Results in Aristotie Generally speaking, a metamathematical result is a mathematical result concerning a logical or mathematical system. Such results can also be called metasystematic. The point of the terminology is to distinguish the results codified by the system from results concerning the system itself. The latter would necessarily be stated in the metalanguage and codified in a metasystem. It is also convenient (but sometimes artificial) to distinguish intrasystematic and intersystematic resuIts. The former would concern mathematical relations among parts of the given system whereas the latter would concern mathematical relations between the given system and another system. The artificiality arises when the 'other' system is acactually a part of the given system. ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 113 It is worth noting that the theorem/metatheorem confusion cannot arise in discussion of Aristotle's syllogistic for the reason that there are no theorems. This observation is important but it is not deep. It is simply a reflection of two facts: fint, that within the passages treating the second logic Aristotle did not consider the possibility of 'logical truths' (object language sentences true in virtue of logic alone); second, and more importantly, that Aristotle regarded logic as a 'canon of inference' rather than as a codification of 'the most generallaws of nature'. Given the three-part structure of a logic one can anticipate four kinds of metasystematic results: 'grammaticaI' results which concern the language alone; 'semantic' results which concern the language and the semantic system; 'proof-theoretic' results which concern the language and the deductive system; and 'bridge' results which bridge or interrelate the semantic system with the deductive system. Since the Aristotelian grammar is so trivial, there is nothing of interest to be expected there. The semantics, however, is complex enough to admit of analogues to modern semantic results. For example, the analogue to the L6wenheimSkolem theorem is that any satisfiable set of sentences of L involving no more than n content words is satisfiable in a universe of not more than r objects (for proof see Corcoran, 'Completeness'). Unfortunately there are no semantic results (in this sen se) in Aristotle's 'second logic'. As mentioned above, Aristotle may not have addressed himself to broader questions concerning the semantic system of his logic. As is explained in detail below, most of Aristotle's metasystematic results are proof-theoretic: they concern the relationship between the deductive system D and various subsystems of it. There is, however, one bridge result, viz., the completeness of the deductive system relative to the semantics. Unfortunately, Aristotle's apparent inattention to semantics may have prevented him from developing a rigorous proof of completeness. There are several metasystematic results in the 'second logic', none of which have been given adequate explanation previously. We regard an explanation of an Aristotelian metasystematic result to be adequate only when it accounts for the way in which Aristotle obtained the result. 4.2.1. Aristotle' s Seeond Deduetive System D2. As aIready indicated ab ove, the first five chapters of the 'second logic' (Prior Analytjes I, 1,2,4, 5, 6) incIude a general introductory chapter, two chapters presenting the 114 JOHN CORCORAN system and dealing with the fint figure and two chapters which present deductions for the valid arguments in the second and third figures. 24 The next chapter (Chapter 7) is perhaps the first substantial metasystematic discussion in the history of 10gic. The first interesting metasystematic passage begins at 29a30 and merely summarizes the work of the preceding three chapters. It reads as follows It is clear too that all the imperfect syllogisms are made perfect by means of the first figure. All are brought to conclusion either ostensively or per impossibile. From the context it is obvious that by 'all' Aristotle means 'all second and third figure'. Shortly thereafter begins a long passage (29b 1-25) which states and proves a substantial metasystematic result. We quote (29bl-2) It is possibie also to reduce all syllogisms to the universal syllogisms in the first figure. Again 'all' is used as above; 'reduce to' here means 'deduce by means of' and 'universal syllogism' means 'one having an N or A conclusion'. What Aristotle has claimed is that all of the syllogisms previously proved ean be established by means of deductions whieh do not involve the 'partieular' perfect syllogistic rules (PS3 and PS4). Aristotle goes on to explain in coneise, general, but mathematically preeise terms exactly how one ean construet the twelve particular deduetions which would substantiate the claim. Anyone ean follow AristotIe's directions and thereby construct the twelve formal deductions in our system D. In regard to the validity of the present interpretation these facts are significant. Not only have we accounted for the content of Aristotle's discovery but we have also been able to reproduce exactly the methods that he used to obtain them. Nothing of this sort has been attempted in previous interpretations (ef. Lukasiewicz, p. 45). Let D2 indicate the deductive system obtained by deleting PS3 and PS4 from D. Aristotle's metaproof shows that the syllogisms formerly dedueed in D ean also be deduced in D2. On the basis of the next chapter (Prior Analytics 1,23) of the 'second logic' (cf. Bocheiiski, p. 43; Lukasiewicz, p. 133; Tredenniek, p. 185) it beeomes clear that Aristotle thinks that he has shown that every syllogism deducible in D ean also be deduced in D2. On reading the relevant passages (29bl-25) it is obvious that Aristotle has not proved the result. However, it is now known that the result is correct; it follows immediately from the main theorem of Coreoran 'CompleARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 115 teness' (q. v.). But regardless of the correctness of Aristotle's proof one must credit him with conception ofthe first significant hypothesis in proof theory. 4.2.2. Redundancy of Direct Deductions. Among indirect deductions it is interesting to distinguish two subc1asses on the basis of the role of the added hypothesis. Let us caU an indirect deduction normal if a rule of inference is applied to the added hypothesis and abnormal otherwise. In many of the abnormal cases, one reasons from the premises ignoring the added hypothesis until the desired conc1usion is reached and then one notes 'but we have assumed the contradictory' . Aristotle begins Chapter 29 (Prior Ana/y tics I) by stating that whatever can be proved directly can also be proved indirectly. Re then gives two examples of normal indirect deductions for syllogisms he has aiready deduced directly. Shortly thereafter (45bl-5) he says, Again ir it has been proved by an ostensive syl!ogism that A belongs to no E, assume that A belongs to some E and it wil! be proved per impossibile to belong to no E. Similarly with the rest. The first sentence means that by interpolating the added hypothesis Sea into a direct deduction of Nea one transforms it to an indirect deduction of the same conc1usion. See the diagram below. +---- +--- +--- +---- +---- +--- ?Nea Transforming to: ?Nea Nea hSea Nea BaSea The second quoted sentence is meant to indicate that the same result holds regardless of the form of the conclusion. In other words, Aristotle 116 JOHN CORCORAN has made clear the fact that whatever can be deduced by a direct deduction can also be deduced by an abnormal indirect deduction, i.e., that direct deductions are redundant from the point of view of the system as a whole. 25 We feel that this is additional evidence that Aristotle was self-consciously studying interrelations among deductions exactly as is done in Hilbert's 'proof theory' (e.g., cf. van Heijenoort, p. 137). 4.3. Indirect Deductions or a Reductio Rute? To the best of my knowledge Aristotle considered indirect reasoning to be a certain style of deduction. Af ter the premises are set down one adds the contradictory of what is to be proved and then proceeds by 'direct reasoning' to each of a pair of contradictory sentences. Imagine, however, the folIowing situation: one begins an indirect deduction as usual and immediately gets bogged down. Then one sees that there is a pair of contradictories, say s and C(s), such that (1) s can be got from what is aIready assumed by indirect reasoning and (2) that C(s) can be got from s together with what is aiready assumed by direct reasoning. In a normal context of mathematics there would be no problem the outlined strategy would be carried out without a second thought. In fact the situation is precisely what is involved in a common proof of 'Russell's Theorem' (no set contains exactly the sets which do not contain themselve s ). It involves using reductio reasoning as a structural rule of inference (cf., e.g., Corcoran, 'Theories', pp. 162ff). The trouble is that the strategy requires the addition of aseeond hypothesis and this is not countenanced by the Aristotelian system (41a33-36). The salient differences between a system with indirect deductions and a system with a reduetio rule are the folIowing. In the case of indirect deductions, one can add but one additional hypothesis (viz. the contradictory of the conclusion to be reached) and one cannot in general use an indirectly obtained conclusion later on in a deduction. Once the indirectly obtained conclusion is reached the indirect deduction is, by definition, finished. An indirectly obtained conclusion is never written as such in the deduction. In the case ofthe reduetio rule one can add as many additional hypotheses as desired; once an indirectly obtained conclusion is reached it is written as an intermediate conclusion usable in subsequent reasoning. The deductive system of Jeffrey (q.v.) consists solely ofindirect deducARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 117 tions whereas the system of Anderson and Johnstone (q. v.) has a reductio rule. MetamathematicaIly, one important difference is the folIowing. Where one has a reductio rule it is generally easy to prove the metamathematical result that CCd) is (indirectly) deducible from P whenever each of a pair of contradictions is separately deducible from P + d. This result ean be difficult in the case where one does not have a reductio rule especiaIly when each of the pair of contradictions was reached indirectly. In order to modify the system (or systems) to allow such 'iterated or nested reductio strategies' one would abandon the distinction between direct and indirect deductions; in the place of the indirect deductions one would have (simply) deductions which employ one or more applications of a reductio rule. Statements of such reductio rules are in general easily obtained but they involve several ideas which would unnecessarily complicate this article. Let us assume that D2 has been modified 26 to perrnit iterated or nested reductio deductions and let us call the new system D3. Now we have two final points to make. In the first place, in one clear sense, nothing is gained by adding the reductio rule because, since D2 is known to be complete and D3 is sound, every argument deducible in D3 is aiready deducible in D2. In the second place, Aristotle may well have been thinking of reductio as a rule of inference but either Iacked the motivation to state it as such or else actually stated it as such only to have his statements deleted or modified by copyists. It may even be the case that further scholarship will turn up convincing evidence for a reductio rule in the extant corpus. This is left as an open problem in Aristotle scholarShip.27 4.4. Extended Deductions In the course of a development of an axiomatic science it would be silly, to say the least, to insist on starting each new deduction from scratch. We quite naturally use as premises in each subsequent deduction not only the axioms of the science but also any or all previously pro ved theorems. Thus at any point in a development of an axiomatic science the last theorem proved is proved not by a deduction from the axioms but rather by a deduction from the axioms and previously proved theorems. In effect, we ean think of the entire sequence of deductions, beginning with that of the first theorem and ending with that of the last proved theorem as an 'ex118 JOHN CORCORAN tended deduction' with several conclusions. If the basic deductive system is D (above) then the 'extended deductions' ean be defined recursively as follows. (In D we define 'deduction of c from P' where c is an individual sentence. Now we defined 'extended deduction of C from P' where C is a set of sentences.) Definition of Deductive System DE. (a) All direct and indirect deductions in D of c from P are extended deductions in DE of {c} from P. (b) lf F' is an extended deduction in DE of C from P and F is a deduction in D of d from P + C then the result of adjoining F to the end of F' is an extended deduction in DE of C +d fromP. Thus an extended deduction in DE of {Cl' cz, ... , cn} from P could be (the concatenation of) a sequence of component deductions (all in D) the i + 1st of which is a deduction of Ci+l from one or more members of P + {Cl' cz, ... , cJ. Soundness of the system of extended deductions is almost immediate given the folIowing principle which holds in the 'possibleworlds' semantics of Section 3 above. (4.0) Semantic Principle of Extended Deduction: P 1= d if P + C 1= d and, for all s in C, P 1= s. The significance of the system of extended deductions is as follows. In the first place, it is natural (if not inevitable) to consider such a system in the course of a study ofaxiomatic sciences. Thus, we must consider the possibility that the underlying logic of the axiomatic sciences discussed in Posterior Analytics had as its deductive system a system similar to the system of extended deductions. Secondly, this system loosens to some extent the constraint of not being able to use indirectly obtained results in deductions in D. (Although the constraint there resulted from an absence of a reductio rule, strictly speaking, there is still no reductio rule in DE.)28 It may be relevant to point out here that, since an Aristotelian science has only a finite number of principles (axioms and theorems), for formal purposes each science ean be identified with a single extended deduction. Here we wish to consider briefly the possibility that the underlying logic presupposed in Posterior Analytjcs is a system of extended deducARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 119 tions. At the outset, we should say that there are no grounds whatsoever for thinking that Aristotle restricted the use of the term 'demonstration' to the two-premise cases. Next we note that if Posterior Analytics requires a system of extended deductions then there are grounds for limiting the component deductions (direct and indirect) to ones having at most two premises. Thus we are considering the possibility that every 'demonstration' is an extended deduction whose components are all deductions having one or two premises. If this possibility were established, it could provide an alternative account for the passages where 'syllogism' is clearly used in the restricted sense, given that there are passages which refer to demonstrations as chains of syllogisms. The latter, however, do not seem to exist in Analytics (cf. 25b27, 7l b17, 72b28, 85b23), but there is one tempting passage in Topics {lOOa27). In any case, we have been unsuccessful in our attempt to construct persuasive support for this possibility. (cf. Smiley.) 5. THE MATHEMATICAL LOGIC I In the previous three sections we considered the components of several mathematical logics any one of which could be taken as a reasonably faithful modelof the system ( or systems) of logic envisaged in Aristotle's theory (or theories) of syllogistic. The model (hereafter called I) which we take to be especially important has L as language, S as semantics and D as deductive system. It is our view that I is the system most closely corresponding to Aristotie's explicit theory.29 Concerning any mathematical logic there are two kinds of questions. In the first place, there are internal questions concerning the mathematical properties of the system itself. For example, we have compared the deductive system D with the semantics S by asking whether every deducible argument is valid (problem of soundness) and conversely whether every valid argument is deducible (problem of completeness). Both of these questions and all other internal questions are perfectly definite mathematical questions concerning the logic as a mathematical object. And if they are answered, then they are answered by the same means used to answer any mathematical question viz. by logical reasoning from the definitions of the systems together with the relevant mathematical laws. In the second place, there are external questions concerning the relationship of the model to things outside of itself. In our case the most in120 JOHN CORCORAN teresting question is a fairly vague one viz. how well does our model represent 'the system' treated in Aristotle's theory of the syllogism? As the various components ofthe model were developed, we considered the external questions in some detail and concluded that the model can be used to account for many important aspects of the development of Aristotle's theory, as recorded in the indicated parts of Analytics. Moreover, the logic I adds nothing to what Aristotle wrote except for giving an explicit reference to 'possibie worlds' and formulating a systematic definition of formal deductions. It is especiaIly important to notice that the deductive system involves nothing different in kind from what Aristotle explicitly used no 'new axioms' were needed and no more basic sort of reasoning was presupposed. As far as internal questions are concerned it is obvious that I is sound, i.e., that all arguments deducible in D are valid. This is clear from Section 3 above. The completeness of I has been proved 30 i.e., we have been able to demonstrate as a mathematical fact eoncerning the logic I that every argument valid aeeording to the semantics S can be obtained by means of a formal deduction in D. Thus not only is Aristotie's Iogie selfsufficient in the sense of not presupposing any more basic logie but it is aIso self-sufficient in the sense that no further sound rules ean be added without reduncaney. 5.1. The Possibi/ily of a Completeness Proof in Prior Analytics Aecording to Bochenski's view (p. 43), in whieh we coneur, Chapter 23 follows Chapter 7 in Prior Analytics, Book r. As aiready indicated Chapter 7 shows that all syllogisms in the three figures are "perfected by means of the universal syllogisms in the first figure". Chapter 23 (40bI7-23) begins with the following words. It is clear from what has been said that the syllogisms in these figures are made perfect by means of universal syllogisms in the first figure and are redueed to them. That every syllogism without qualification ean be so treated will be clear presently, when it has been proved that every syllogism is forrned through one or the other of these figures. The same ehapter (41 b3-5) ends thus. But when this has been shown it is clear that every syllogism is perfected by means of the first figure and is reducible to the universal syllogisms in this figure. From these passages a/one we might suppose that the intermediate ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 121 material contained the main part of a completeness proof for D2, which depended on a 'small' unproved lemma. We might further suppose that the imagined completeness proof had the following three main parts. First, it would define a new deductive system which had the syllogisms in all three figures as rules. Second, it would prove the completeness of the new system. Third, it would show that every deduction in the new system ean be transformed into a deduction in D2 having the same premises and conclusion. Unfortunately, the text will not support thi s interpretation. Before considering a more adequate interpretation one ean make a few historicaI observations. In the first place, even raising a problem of completeness seems to be a very difficult intellectual achievement. Indeed, neither Boole nor Frege nor Russell asked such questions.31 Apparently no one stated a completeness problem 32 before it emerged naturally in connection with the underlying logic of modem Euclidean geometry in the 1920's (Corcoran, 'Classical Logic' , pp. 41,42), and it is probably the case that no completeness result (in this exact sense) was printed before 1951 (cf. Corcoran, 'Theories', p. 177 for related results), although the necessary mathematical tools were available in the 1920's. In the second p1ace, Aristotle does not seem to be clear enough about his own semantics to understand the problem. If he had been, then he could have solved the problem definitively for any finite 'topical sublogic' by the same methods employed in Prior Analytics (I, 4, 5, 6). In faet, in these chapters he 'solves' the problem for a 'topicaI sublogic' having only three content words. In the intervening passages of Chapter 23 Aristotle seems to argue, not that every syllogism is deducible in D2, but rather that any syllogism deducible at all is deducible in D2. And, as indicated in his final sentence, he does not believe he has completed his argument. He reasons as follows. In the first place he asserts without proof that any syllogism deducible by means of syllogisms in the three figures is deducible in D2 (but here he is overlooking the problem of iterated reductio mentioned in Section 4.3 above). In any case, granting him that hypothesis, he then argues that any syllogism deducible at all is deducible by means of the syllogisms in the three figures, thus: Every deduction is either direct or hypothetical the latter including both indirect deductions and those involving ecthesis (see above). He considers the direct case first. Here he argues that every 122 JOHN CORCORAN direct deduction must have at least two premises as in the three figures and that in the two-premise case the conclusion has aiready been proved. Then he simply asserts that it is "the same if several middle terms should be necessary" (4IaI8). In considering the hypothetical deductions he takes up indirect deductions first and observes that af ter the contradictory of the conclusion is also assumed one proceeds as in the direct case concluding that the reduction to D2 is evident in this case also (4la35ff). Finally, he simply asserts that it is the same with the other hypothetical deductions. But this he has immediate misgivings about (4lbl). He leaves the proof unfinished to the extent that the non-indirect hypothetical deductions have not been completely dealt with. 6. CONCLUSION As a kind of summary of our research we present a review of what we take to be the fundamental achievements of Aristotie's logical theory. In the first place, he clearly distinguished the role of deduction from the role of experience (or intuition) in the development of scienctific theories. This is revealed by his distinction between the axioms of a science and the logical apparatus used in deducing the theorems. Today this would imply a distinction between logical and nonlogical axioms; but Aristotle had no idea of logical axioms (but cf. 71a22-25). Indeed, he gave no systematic discussion of logical truth (Axx is not even mentioned once). In the second place, Aristotle developed a natural deduction system which he exemplified and discussed at great length. Moreover, he formulated fairly intricate metamathematical results relating his central system to a simpier one. It is also important to notice that Aristotle's system is sound and strongly complete. In the third place, Aristotle was clear enough ab out logical consequence so that he was able to discover the method of counter instances for establishing invalidity. This method is the cornerstone of all independence (or invalidity) results, though it probably had to be rediscovered in modern times cf. Cohen and Hersh). In the fourth place, his distinction between perfect and imperfect syllogisms suggests a clear understanding of the difference between deducibility and implication a distinction which modern logicians believe to be their own (cf. Church, p. 323, fn. 529). In the fifth place, Aristotle used principles concerning form repeatedly and accurately, alARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 123 though it is not possibie to establish that he was able to state them nor is even clear that he was consciously aware of them as logical principles. The above are all highly theoretical points but Aristotle did not merely theorize; he carried out his ideas and programs in amazing detail despite the handicap of inadequate notation. In the course of pursuing details Aristotle originated many important discoveries and devices. Re described indirect proof. Re used syntactical variables (alpha, beta, etc.) to stand for content words a device whose importance in modem logic has not been underestimated. Re formulated several rules of inference and discussed their interrelations. Philosophers sometimes say that Aristotle is the best introduction to philosophy. This is perhaps an exaggeration. One of the Polish logicians once said that the Analyties is the best introduction to logic. My own reaction to this remark was unambiguously negative the severe difficulties in reading the Analytjes form one obstacle and I felt then that the meager results did not warrant so much study. After carrying out the above research I can compromise to the folIowing extent. I now believe that Aristotle's logic is rich enough, detailed enough, and sufficiently representative of modem logics that a useful set of introductory lectures on mathematical logic could be organized around what I have called the main Aristotelian system. From a modem point of view, there is only one mistake which can sensibly be charged to Aristotle: his theory ofpropositional forms is very seriously inadequate. It is remarkable that he did not come to discover this for himself, especiaIly since he mentions specific proofs from arithmetic and geometry. If he had tried to reduce these to his system he may have seen the problem (cf. Mueller, pp. 174-177). But, once the theory of propositional forms is taken for granted, there are no important inadequacies attributable to Aristotle, given the historical context. Indeed, his work is comparable in completeness and accuracy to that of Boole and seems incomparably more comprehensive than the Stoic or medieval efforts. It is tempting to speculate that it was the oversimplified theory of propositional forms that made possibie the otherwise comprehensive system. A more adequate theory of propositional forms would have required a much more complicated theory of deduction indeed, one which was not developed until the present era. 124 JOHN CORCORAN ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Previous versions of sections of this paper have been presented at various places including: Buffalo Logic Colloquium (March 1971), Pennsylvania Logic Colloquium (April 1971), Hammond Society (Johns Hopkins, April 1971), Laval University (June 1971), University of Montreal (October, 1971), SUNYjAlbany (October, 1971), Association for Symbolic Logic (December, 1971), University of Quebec (March, 1972), Cambridge University (June, 1972). Several persons at these talks, or afterward, made useful suggestions, especiaIly Charles Kahn, John Glanville, Lynn Rose, and John Kearns. Throughout the Winter and Spring semesters of 1971-72, I consulted extensively with John Mulhern and Mary Mulhern. My research assistants, Keith Ickes, David Levin, John Herring and Terry Nutter, deserve thanks for conscientious editing and proof-reading of many drafts. Other papers of mine complementing and overlapping this one appear in Journal of Symbolic Logic, Mind and Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie. The first ofthese three contains the completeness proof. The second treats the question of whether syllogisms are arguments or conditional sentences (as Lukasiewicz holds). The third paper is the result of deleting parts from a paper to which additions were made in formulating the present article. In February 1972, Smiley's article (q. v.) which is in remarkable agreement with the above was brought to my attention. It should be noted that Smiley has considered some questions which have not been treated here. Many ideas expressed in this paper have been colored by consultation with Smiley and by Smiley's article. In particular, myestimate of the value of the Lukasiewicz work has been revised downward as aresult of discussion with Smiley. State University of New York at Buffalo NOTES 1 It should be realized that the notion of a 'mode!' used here is the ordinary one used in discussion of, e.g., wooden models of airplanes, plastic models of boats, etc. Here the adjective 'mathematica!' indicates the kind of material employed in the model. I.e., here we are talking about models 'constructed from' mathematical objects. Familiar ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 125 mathematical objects are numbers, (mathematical) points, lines, planes, (syntactic) characters, sets, functions, etc. Here we need as basic elements only syntactic characters, but the development beiowaiso presupposes sets ab initio. It should also be realized that a mathematical model is not a distinctive sort of mathematical entity it is simply a mathematical entity conceived of as analogous to something else. [In order to avoid excessive notes bracketed expressions are used to refer by author (and/or by abbreviated title) and location to items in the list of references at the end of this article. Unless otherwise stated, translations are taken from the Oxford translation (see 'Aristotie').] 2 These ideas are scattered throughout Church's introductory chapter, but in Schoenfield (q. v.) Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 treat, respectively, languages, semantic systems and deductive systems. 3 From the best evidence of the respective dates of the Analytics (Ross, p. 23) and Euclid's Elements (Heath, pp. 1, 2), one can infer that the former was written in the neighborhood of fifty years before the latter. The lives of the two authors probably overlapped; AristotIe is known to have been teaching in Athens from 334 until 322 (Edel, pp. 40, 41) and it is probable both that Euclid received his mathematical training from Aristotie's contemporaries and that he flourished c. 300 (Heath, p. 2). In any case, from internal evidence Ross (p. 56) has inferred that Euclid was probably influenced by the Analytics. Indeed, some scholarship on the Elements makes important use of AristotIe's theory of the axiomatic organization of science (cf. Heath, pp. 117-124). However, it should be admitted that Hilbert's geometry (q. v.) is much more in accord with Aristotie's principles than is Euclid's. For example, Hilbert leaves some terms 'undefined' and he states his universe of discourse at the outset, whereas Euclid fails on both of these points, which were aIready clear Aristotelian requirements. 4 AristotIe may have included deductive arguments which would be sound were certain intermediate steps added; cf. Section 5.1 below. 5 This wiIl account somewhat for the otherwise inexplicable fact aiready noted by Lukasiewicz (p. 49) and others that there are few passages in the Aristotelian corpus which could be construed as indicating an awareness of propositionallogic. 6 In a doubly remarkable passage (p. 13) Lukasiewicz claims that AristotIe did not reveal the object of his logical theory. It is not difficult to see that Lukasiewicz is correct in saying that AristotIe nowhere admits to the purpose which Lukasiewicz imputes to him. However, other scholars have had no difficulty in discovering passages whichdo revealAristotIe's true purpose (cf. Ross, pp. 2, 24, 288; Knealeand Kneale, p. 24). 7 This point has aiready been made by Kneale and Kneale (pp. 80-81), who point out further difficulties with Lukasiewicz's interpretation. For yet further sensitive criticism see Austin's review and also Iverson, pp. 35-36. 8 Although we have no interest in giving an account of how Lukasiewicz may have arrived at his view, it may be of interest to some readers to note the possibility that Lukasiewicz was guided in his research by certain attitudes and preferences not shared by Aristotle. The Lukasiewicz book seems to indicate the folIowing: (1) Lukasiewicz preferred to consider logic as concerned more with truth than with either logical consequence or deduction (e.g., pp. 20, 81). (2) He understands 'inference' in such a way that correctness of inference depends on starting with true premises (e.g., p. 55). (3) He feels that propositional logic is somehow objectively more fundamental than quantificational or syIIogistic logic (e.g., pp. 47, 79). (4) He tends to concentrate his attention on axiomatic deductive systems to the neglect of natural systems. (5) He 126 JOHN CORCORAN tends to underemphasize the differences between axiomatic deductive systems and axiomatic sciences. (6) He places the theory of the syllogism on a par with a certain branch of pure mathematics (pp. 14, 15, 73) and he believes that logic has no special relation to thought (pp. 14, 15). Indeed, he seems to fear that talk of logic as a study of reasoning necessarily involves some sort of psychologistic view of logic. (7) He believes that content words or non-Iogical constants cannot be introduced into logic (pp. 72, 96). The Lukasiewicz attitudes are shared by several other logicians, notably, in this context, by Bochenski (q. v.). It may not be possibie to argue in an objective way that the above attitudes are incorrect but one can say with certainty that they were not shared by AristotIe. 9 Exclusion of proper names, relatives, adjectives and indefinite propositions is based more on a reading of the second logic as a whole than on specific passages (but cf. 43a25--40). M. Mulhern, in substantial agreement with this view, has shown my previous attempts to base it on specific passages to be inconclusive as aresult of reliance on faulty translation. Her criticisms together with re1ated ones by Charles Kahn (University of Pennsylvania) and Dale Gottlieb (Johns Hopkins) have led to the present version of the last two paragraphs. 10 Rose (p. 39) has criticized the Lukasiewicz view that no syllogisms with content words are found in the Aristotelian corpus. Our view goes further in holding that all Aristotelian syllogisms have content words, Le., that AristotIe nowhere refers to argument forms or propositional functions. All apparent exceptions are best understood as metalinguistic reference to 'concrete syllogisms'. This view is in substantial agreement with the view implied by Rose at least in one place (p. 25). 11 In many of the locations cited above AristotIe seems remarkably close to a recognition of 'category mistakes' a view that nonsense of some sort results from mixing terms from different sciences in the same proposition (e.g., 'the sum of two triangles is a prime number'). 12 It must be recognized that other interpretations are possibie cf. Kneale and Kneale, pp. 55-67. However, in several places (e.g., 85a31-32) Aristode seems to imply that a secondary substance is nothing but its extension. 13 This would explain the so-called existential import of A and N sentences. Notice that, according to this view, existential import is aresult of the semantics of the terms and has no connection whatever with the meaning of 'All'. In particular, the traditional concern with the meaning of 'All' was misplaced the issue is properly one of the meaning of categoricai terms. As far as we have been able to determine this is the first clear theoreticai account of existential import based on textual materiaI. 14 Jaskowski (loc. cit.) gives no textual grounds. There are, however, some passages (e.g., 998b22) which imply that the class of all existent individuals is not a genus. In subsequent developments of 'Aristotelian logic' which include 'negative terms', exclusion of the universe must be maintained to save exclusion of the null set. 15 This is the mathematical analogue of the classical notion of logical consequence which is clearly presupposed in traditional work on so-ca1led 'postulate theory' . It is important to notice that we have offered only a mathematical analogue of the concept and not a definition of the concept itself. The basic idea is this: Each interpretation represents a 'possibie world'. To say that it is logically impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false is to say that there is no possibie world in which the prembes actuaIly are true and the conclusion actually is false. The analogue, therefore, is that no true interpretation of the premises makes the conclusion false. Church (p. 325) attributes this mathematical analogue of logical consequence to Tarski ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 127 (pp. 409-420), but Tarski's notion of true interpretation (model) seems too narrow (at best toa vague) in that no mention of alternative universes of discourse is made or implied. In faet the limited Tarskian notion seems to have been already known even before 1932 by Lewis and Langford (p. 342), to whom, incidentally, I am indebted for the terms 'interpretation' and 'true interpretation' which seem heuristically superior to the Tarskian terms 'sequence' and 'model', the latter ofwhich has engendered category mistakes a 'modelof set of sentences' in the Tarskian sense is by no means a model, in any ordinary sense, of a set of sentences. 16 The method of 'contrasting instances' is a fundamental discovery in logic which may not yet be fully appreciated in its historicai context. Because Lukasiewicz (p. 71) misconstrued the Alistotelian frarnework, he said that modem logic does not employ this method. It is obvious, however, that all modem independence (invalidity) results from Hilbert (pp. 30--36) to Cohen (see Cohen and Hersh) are based on developments of this method. Indeed, there were essentiaIly no systematic investigations of questions of invalidity from the time of AristotIe until Beltrami's famous demonstration of the invalidity of the argument whose premises are the axioms of geometry less the Parallel Postulate and whose conclusion is the Parallel Põtulate itself(Heath, p. 219). Although there is not a single invalidity result in the Port Royal Logic or in Boole's work, for example, modern logic is almost characterizable by its wealth of such results all harking back to AristotIe's method of contrasting instances. 17 The Principle of Form is generally accepted in current logic (cf. Church, p. 55). Recognition of its general acceptance is sometimes obscured by two kinds of apparent challenges each correct in its own way but not to the point at issue. (1) Ryle wants to say (e.g.) that 'All animais are brown' implies 'All horses are brown' and, so, that implication is not a matter of form alone (Ryle, pp. 115-116). It is easy to regard the objection as verbal because, obviously, Ryle is understanding an argument to be 'valid' if addition of certain truths as premises will produce an argument valid in the above sense. (2) Oliver makes a more subtle point (p. 463). He attacks a variant of the Principle of Form by producing examples of the folIowing sort. IfAxy then Nxy If Sxy then Axy Nxy Axy ?Axy ?Sxy According to Oliver's usage these two arguments are in the same form and yet the one on the left is obviously invalid (suppose x indicates 'men' and y 'horses') while the one on the right is obviously valid (in faet the conclusion follows immediately from the second premise). The resolution is that Oliver's notion of 'being in same form' is not the traditional one; rather it is a different but equally useful notion. Oliver takes two arguments to be in the same form if there is a scheme which subsumes both. Since both are subsumed under the scheme '(if P then Q, Q/P)' they are in the same form. It so happens that the scheme is not a valid scheme; it subsumes both valid and invalid arguments. He does allow the correctness of the above principle as stated (Oliver, p.465). 18 Rose (p. 39) emphasizes the faet that AristotIe would establish the invalidity of several arguments at once by judicious choice of interrelated counter interpretations. 19 A logical question concerning the validity of an argument is settled by using presupposed procedures to deduce the conclusion from the premises. A metalogical question concerns the validity of the presupposed procedures and is usually 'answered' in terms of a theory of meaning (or a semantic system). 128 JOHN CORCORAN 20 One is impressed with the sheer number of times that AristotIe alludes to the faet that tbere are but two methods of perfecting syllogisms and tbis makes it all tbe more remarkable that an apparent third method occurs, the so-called method of ecthesis. There are two ways of explaining the discrepaney. In the first place, ecthesis is not a method of proof on a par with the direct and indirect methods; rather it con* sists in a c1ass of rwes of inference on a par with the c1ass of conversion rules and the c1ass of perfect syllogism rules (see be1ow). In the seeond place, and more importantly, ecthesis is c1early extrasystematic relative to AristotIe's logical system (or systems). It is only used three times (Lukasiewiez, p. 59), once in a c1early metalogical passage (25a17) and twice redundantly (28a23, 28b14). 21 Specifieally, for example with regard to the first conversion rule (Cl), define the set-theoretic relation [RCI] on L such that for all s and s' in L, s [RCI]s' iff for some x and y in U, s=Nxy and s'=Nyx. Thus the rule [RCI] is, in effect, the set of all 'its applications'. Generally speaking, an n-plaeed rule of inference is an n + 1 placed relation on sentenees. But, of course, not necessarily vice versa (cf. Corcoran, 'Theories', pp. 171-175). 22 Quine has eonveniently listed all such arguments in pp. 76-79 of his Methods o/ Logic. Incidentally, the reader should regard the notion of 'valid argument' in principle 4.2 as eonvenient parlanee for referring to Quine's list so that no semantic notions have been used in this section in any essential way. 23 There seems to be a vague feeling in some current circ1es that an argument with ineonsistent premises should not be regarded as an argument at all and that an 'authentic' deduction eannot begin with an ineonsistent premise set. However, the only way of determining that a premise set is inconsistent is by dedueing contradictory conc1usions from it. Thus it wowd seem that those who wish to withhold 'authenticity' from deductions with inconsistent premise sets must accept the 'authentieity' of those very deductions in order to aseertain their 'non-authenticity'. One must admit, however, that the issue does seem to involve convention (nomos) more than nature (physis). On the other band, how does one determine the natural joints of the fowl except by noting where the neatest cuts are made? (ef. Phaedrus, 265e). 24 For an interesting solution to 'the mystery of the fourth figure' (the problem of explaining why AristotIe seerned to stop at the third figure) see Rose, Aristotle's Syllogistic, pp. 57-79. 25 It is in the interest or accuracy that we reluetantly admit that AristotIe also seems to claim the converse. It is gerrnane also to observe that, although the above c1aim is substantiated not only by examples but also by a general formula, the converse is false. It is also relevant to point out that the existence of this metaproof provides a negative answer to a question raised by William Parry concerning the nature of indirect deductions in Aristotle. Parry wondered whether AristotIe required that the contradiction explicitly involve one of the premises. An affirmative answer would rwe out abnormal indirect deductions which, as indicated above, form the basis of AristotIe's metaproof. 26 For example, the whole revised system D3 ean be obtained from the system of Coreoran and Weaver (p. 373) by the folIowing changes in the latter. (1) Change the language to L. (2) Replace negations by contradictions. (3) Replace the rules of conditionals and modal operators by the conversion and syllogism rwes. 27 As an indication that AristotIe's c1arity concerning reductio is significant one may note with Iverson (p. 36) that Lukasiewicz (p. 55) misunderstood indirect proof. 28 The consideration of extended deductions emerged from a suggestion by Howard Wasserman (Linguistics Department, University of Pennsylvania). ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTION SYSTEM 129 29 Of course one shouId not overlook the historicaI importance of Il (the Iogic having components L, S and D2) nor shouId the possibIe importance of lE (the Iogic having components L, S and DE) be minimized. In this connection we have been asked whether there are deductive systems other than D, DE, D2 and D3 implicit in the second logic. This question is confidently answered negatively, even though Patzig (p. 47) alleges to have found other systems in Prior Analytics I, 45. It is clear that this chapter merely investigates certain interrelationships among the three figures without raising any issues concerning alternative deductive systems. Although AristotIe speaks of 'reducing' first figure syllogisms to the other figures there is no mention of 'perfecting' first figure syllogisms (or any others for that matter) by means of syJlogisms in the other figures. Indeed, because of AristotIe's belief that syllogisms can be perfeeted only through the first figure, one should not expect to find any deductive systems besides those based on first figure syllogistic rules. In addition, one may note that Bochenski (p. 79) alleges to have found other deductive systems outside of the second logic in Prior Analyties II, 10. But this chapter is the last of a group of three which together are largely repetitious of the material in Prior Ana/y ties I, 45 which we just discussed. 30 See Corcoran, 'Completeness' and/or 'Natural Deduction'. 31 Mates (Stoie Logie, pp. 4, 81, 82, 111, 112) has argued that the Stoics believed their deductive system to be complete. But had the Aristotelian passage (from 4Ob23 up to but not including 41bl) been lost Mates would have equivaIent grounds for saying that Aristotle believed his system complete. There are no grounds for thinking that the problem was raised in either case. 32 Unfortunately, the Lukasiewicz formulation makes it possibIe to confuse these problems with the so-called decision problems. The two types of problems are distinct but interreIated to the extent that decidable logics are generally (but not necessarily) complete. It is hardly necessary to mention the fact that ordinary first order predicate logic is complete but not decidable (Jeffrey, pp. 195ff; Kneale and Kneale, pp. 733-734). BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, J. and Johnstone, H., Natural Deduetion, Belmont, Calif. 1963. Aristotle, The Works of Aristotle Translated into English (ed. by W. D. Ross), Vo!. 1, Oxford 1928. Austin, J. L., 'Review of Lukasiewicz's Aristotle's Syllogistic', Mind 61 (1952), 395404. Barnes, J., 'AristotIe's Theory of Demonstration', Phronesis 14 (1969), 123-152. Bochenski, I. M., History of Formal Logie, (trans!. by I. Thomas), Notre Dame, Indiana, 1961. Church, A., Introduetion to Mathematical Logic, Princeton 1956. Cohen, P. J. and Hersh, R., 'Non-Cantorian Set Theory' , Scientifie American, December 1967, pp. 104-116. Corcoran, J., 'Three Logical Theories', Philosophy of Science 36 (1969), 153-177. Corcoran, J., 'Review of Quine's Philosophy of Logic', Philosophy of Science 39 (1972), 88-90. Corcoran, J., 'Conceptual Structure of ClassicaI Logic', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (1972),25-47. Corcoran, J., 'Aristotle's Natural Deduction System', presentation at December 1971 130 JOHN CORCORAN meeting of Association for SymboJic Logic, abstract in Journal of Symbolic Logic 37 (1972), 437. Corcoran, J., 'Completeness of an Ancient Logic', presented at Laval university, June 1971 and at the Buffalo Logic CoIIoquium, September 1971; Journalof Symbolic Logic 37 (1972), 696-702. Corcoran, J., 'Aristotelian SyIIogisms: Valid Arguments or True Generalized Conditionals', forthcoming in Mind. Corcoran, J., 'A MathematicaI Modelof AristotIe's SyIIogistic', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 55 (1973), 191-219. Corcoran, J., and Weaver, G., 'Logical Consequence in Modal Logic', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 19 (1969), 370-384. Edel, A., Aristotle, New York 1967. Frege, G., 'On the Foundations of Geometry', Jahresbericht 15 (1906); reprinted in Kluge (ed. and trans!.), Gott/ob Frege On the Foundations of Geometry etc., New Haven and London 1971. Heath, T., Euclid's Elements, Vo!. 1 (2nd ed.), New York 1956. Hilbert, D., Foundations of Geometry, (trans!. by E. J. Townsend), LaSaIIe, Illinois, 1965. Iverson, S. L., Reduction of the Aristotelian Syllogism, M. A. Thesis in PhiIosophy, State Univers it y of New York at Buffalo, May, 1964. Jaskowski, St., 'On the Interpretations of Aristotelian CategoricaI Propositions in the Predicate Calculus', Studia Logica 24 (1969),161-174. Jeffrey, R., Formal Logic: lts Scope and Limits, New York 1967. Kneale, W. and Kneale, M., The Development of Logic, Oxford 1962. Kreisel, G., 'Mathematical Logic: What Has it Done for the Philosophy of Mathematics?', in Bertrand RusselI Philosopher of the Century (ed. by R. Schoenman), London 1967. Lewis, C. I. and Langford, C. H., Symbolic Logic, New York 1959. Lukasiewicz, J., Aristotle's Syllogistic (2nd. ed.), Oxford 1957. Mates, B., Stoic Logic, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961. Mates, B., Elementary Logic, New York 1965. MueIIer, Ian, 'Stoic and Peripatetic Logic', Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 51 (1969), 173-187. Mulhern, J. J., Problems of the Theory of Predication in Plato 's Parmenides, Theatetus, and Sophista, Ph. D. dissertation in PhiIosophy, State university of New York at Buffalo, February, 1970. Mulhern, M. M., AristotIe's Theory of Predication: The Categoriae Account, Ph. D. Dissertation in PhiIosophy, State university of New York at Buffalo, September, 1970. Oliver, J. W., 'Formal FaIIacies and Other Invalid Arguments', Mind 76 (1967), 463-78. Patzig, G., Aristotie's Theory of the Syllogism (trans!. by J. Barnes), Dordrecht 1968. Quine, W., Methods of Logic (revised ed.), New York 1959. Quine, W., Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1970. Rose, L., Aristotle' s Syllogistic, Springfield Illinois, 1968. Ross, W. D., AristotIe's Prior and Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1965. Ryle, G., Dilemmas (paperback ed.), London 1960. Schoenfield, J., Mathematical Logic, Reading, Mass., 1967. Scholz, H., Concise History of Logic (trans!. by K. Leidecker), New York 1961. ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL DEDUCTlON SYSTEM 131 Smiley, T., 'What is a Syllogism?', Journal o/ Philosophical Logic 2 (1973),136-154. Tarski, A., Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics (trans!. by J. Woodger), Oxford 1956. Tredennick, H., 'Introduetion', in Aristotle, The Organon, Vo!. 1, Cambridge, Mass. 1949, pp. 182-195. van Heijenoort, J., From Frege to Godel, Cambridge, Mass. 1967. Weaver, G. (see Corcoran and Weaver). MAR Y MULHERN CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEOR y Jan Lukasiewicz, by his own account, entered the lists in 1923 as an interpreter of ancient logic from the standpoint of modem formallogic. In that year he began defending his view of the contrast of Stoic logic with Aristotelian logic; this view appeared in print for the fint time in 1930.1 This was followed by the Polish version in 1934, and the German in 1935, of his landmark paper, 'On the History of the Logic of Propositions' [9]. During the same period Lukasiewicz was lecturing on Aristotle's syllogistic. An authorized version of his lectures on this and other logical topics was published by students at the University ofWarsaw in 1929, republished in Warsaw in 1958, and finally translated into English in 1963 under the title Elements of Mathematical Logic [7]. Lukasiewicz elaborated his researches until he issued in 1951 his now famous monograph Aristotie's Syllogisticfrom the Stand point of Modem Formal Logic. A second edition, enlarged but not revised, appeared in 1957, its author's death having occurred in the previous year [6]. Lukasiewicz thus has held the field for nearly half a century. Questions have been raised about some details of his interpretation, and corrections have been made of some of his mistakes in matters of fact, but, so far as I know, no one had brought a direct challenge against the main lines of Lukasiewicz's interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic and its place in ancient logic until John Corcoran did so in 'A Mathematical Modelof Aristotle's Syllogistic' [3]. Indeed, so spectacular a tour de force was Lukasiewicz's book that, despite his own protestations that he was setting out the system merely "in dose connexion with the ideas set forth by Aristotle himself" ([6], p. 77) and "on the lines laid down by Aristotle himself" ([6], p. viii), his account has gained wide acceptance as the definitive presentation of Aristotie's syllogistic, and some writers lead one to believe that Aristotle's system is no more and no less than what Lukasiewicz proposes. Lukasiewicz's view, very briefly put, is this: The logic of Aristotle is a theory of the relations A, E, I, and O (in their mediaeval senses) in the J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, 133-148. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 134 MAR Y MULHERN field of universal terms ([6], p. 14). It is a theory of special relations, like a mathematical theory ([6], p. 15). As a logic of terms, it presupposes a more fundamentallogic of propositions, which, however, was unknown to Aristotle and was discovered by the Stoics in the century after him ([6], p. 49). AristotIe's theory is an axiomatized deductive system, in which the reduction of the other syllogistic moods to those of the first figure is to be understood as the proof of these moods as theorems by means of the axioms of the system ([6], p. 44). Corcoran has proposed, on the other hand, that Aristotle's syllogistic is not an axiomatic science but rather a natural deduction system, and that the theory is itself fundamental, presupposing neither the logic of propositions nor any other underlying logic. Corcoran's proposals have a go od deal to recommend them. First, Corcoran provides a faithful reconstruction of Aristotle's method. Although Lukasiewicz gives a system that does arrive at Aristotie's results, obtaining and rejecting laws corresponding to the moods which Aristotle obtains and rejects, his derivations, by substitution and detachment from axioms, have nothing in common with Aristotie's own method. Indeed, Lukasiewicz must say that Aristotle's proposals about method are wrong, and that Aristotle did not and could not use the technique of perfecting syllogisms, which Aristotle daims over and over again that he is using. 2 Corcoran, on the other hand, not only makes perfect sense of the doctrine ofperfecting syllogisms, but he is willing to take Aristotle at his word instead of being content to elaborate a system allegedly in dose connexion with Aristotie's ideas. The upshot is that Corcoran succeeds, as Lukasiewicz did, in reproducing Aristotle's results, and he succeeds, as Lukasiewicz did not, in reproducing Aristotle's method step by step, so that the annotated deductions of his system D are faithful translations of Aristotle's exposition. Corcoran's concern for method is prompted by his belief that AristotIe shared this concern. I think there can be no doubt that he is correct. Aristotle sets out his method in detail which if concise is yet minute, and when, at the beginning of Chapter XXX of the first bo ok of the Priora (46a4), he summarizes his work so far, he speaks not of the same results in philosophy and every kind of art and study whatsoever, but of the same method (606<;) in all these branches of inquiry. Corcoran's interpretation also has the virtue of making sense of Aristotle's views concerning the place of syllogistic in his doctrine as a CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 135 whole. While Lukasiewicz apparently held that syllogistic was a science which must take its place beside the other sciences in the Aristotelian scheme, Corcoran proposes to take syllogistic as the underlying logic of the demonstrative sciences. Lukasiewicz held further that syllogistic itself presupposes propositional logic as an underlying logic of which Aristotle, however, was ignorant. Corcoran, by contrast, suggests that syllogistic is a fundamentallogical system, presupposing no other. This circumstance, rather than Aristotle's ignorance, Corcoran observes, accounts for their being few passages in the corpus which ean be construed as references to propositionallogic. But these passages are not so few nor so insignificant as Lukasiewicz and some other writers would have us believe. They include, for instance, the use of propositional variables (documented by Bochenski ([2], pp. 77, 97-98) at An. Pr. 4Ib36-42a5; 53b12 sqq; 34a5 sqq; and by Ross ([16], ad loc.) at An. Post. 72b32-73a6), the use and even the explicit statement of laws of propositional logic (documented by Bochenski ([2], p. 98) at An. Pr. 53b7-10; 57a36 sqq; and by Lukasiewicz ([6], pp. 49-50) at An. Pr. 57bl [transposition]; 57b6 [hypothetical syllogism]; 57b3 [both laws]), and the use of, or the discussion of the use of, propositional units of argumentation (among others, De Int. 17a20-24; An. Pr. 48a29, 38-39; Soph. E4. 169aI2-15; 181a22-30). It should be remembered, too, that at the beginning of the Ana/ytica Priora Aristotle starts with premisses and resolves them into terms; he does not start with terms and build them up into premisses. The evidence points rather to Aristotle's awareness of propositional logic but his rejection of it as an instrument unfit for the purposes he intended. Aristotle, I propose, knew enough about propositional logic to have recognized it as the underlying logic of syllogistic and of all the other sciences on a par with syllogistic if it really played this rale.3 We should then expect to find throughout the Analytica references to propositional logic as the underlying logic of syllogistic and of each of the demonstrative sciences. But we do not find them. What we do find, as Corcoran points out, is every indication both that Aristotle regarded syllogistic as a fundamentallogie and that he considered it to be the underlying logic of the demonstrative sciences. My suggestion is, then, that Aristotle could have elaborated a system of propositionallogic, but that the theory of demonstrative science which he envisioned required a system of analyzed propositions, in which the modality of predications could be 136 MARY MULHERN clearly shown. Thus he rejected a logic of unanalyzed propositions in favor of syllogistic. Corcoran, it seems to me, has made a very important contribution to our understanding of Aristotle's logic, and the suggestions offered in what follows should not be construed as impugning in any substantive way the value of that contribution. Of the many points Corcoran raises, I intend to take up four: (1) whether syllogistic is a science; (2) whether the theory of propositional forms presupposed by syllogistic is adequate; (3) whether Aristotle had a doctrine of logical truth; and (4) whether Aristotle considered reasoning natural or conventional. The fint question needs to be divided. Corcoran notes that a theory of deduction is to be distinguished from an axiomatic science and further that theories of deduction have been distinguished as 'natural' or 'axiomatic'. He seeks to refute what he regards as Lukasiewicz's claim that syllogistic is an axiomatic science, and, moreover, a science in Aristotle's terms. However, there seems to be some ambivalence both in the claim and in the refutation. Lukasiewicz, if pressed, would probably not have insisted that syllogistic is a science in Aristotle's terms, since he was well aware of the quarrel between the Stoics and the Peripatetics about the relation of logic to philosophy. In this connection he quotes Ammonius to the effect that the Peripatetics folIowing Aristotle treated logic as an instrument of philosophy, opposing the Stoics who treated it as part of philosophy ([6], p. 13). But Corcoran is correct in that Lukasiewicz's work as it stands leaves itself open to his charge: in contending that syllogistic is a science like a mathematical theory, Lukasiewicz has led us to believe that it would occupy a place beside physics, mathematics, astronomy, and theology in the Aristotelian scheme.4 Corcoran argues convincingly, I think, both that syllogistic is not a science in AristotIe's sense (because it has no genus) and that it is not an axiomatic science in any sense (because either it would be its own underlying logic, which is impossible, or it would presuppose an underlying logic, which is false). Having established that syllogistic is a theory of deduction and not an axiomatic science, Corcoran goes on to refute Lukasiewicz's more serious claim, that syllogistic is an axiomatic deductive system, by showing, again convincingly, that syllogistic is a natural deduction system. CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGI CAL THEORY 137 But I wonder how hard and fast Corcoran himself draws the lines which he accuses Lukasiewicz of overstepping. Corcoran titles his study 'A Mathematical Modelof Aristotle's Syllogistic', and in an earlier version he spoke of mathematica! logic as a branch of applied mathematics which constructs and studies mathematical models in order to gain understanding of logical phenomena. From this standpoint mathematica! logics are comparab!e to the mathematical models of solar systems, vibrating strings, or atoms in mathematical physics and to the mathematical models of computers in automata theory. Thus it appears that, even if syllogistic itself is not a scientific exercise, at least Corcoran's reconstruction of it is a scientific exercise. Furthermore, in 'Three Logical Theories', the comprehensive study laying the ground for his present work, Corcoran describes what he does therein as "a contribution to the philosophy of the science of logic" in the course of which he will "apply a certain methodological principle to logical systems considered as theories [Corcoran's italics]" ([4], p. 153). Hence, if Lukasiewicz, in comparing Aristotle's syllogistic to a part of the science of mathematics, merely intends that we should consider syllogistic as a theory, perhaps he is not so far wrong, even by Corcoran's standards. On the other hand, suppose we take the apparently stricter criterion proposed by Corcoran in his study of syllogistic that a theory of deduction deals metalinguisticaUy with reasoning (it says how to perform constructions involving object language sentences), while a science deals with a domain of objects, insofar as certain properties and relations are involved, and states its axioms in an object language whose non-Iogical constants are interpreted as indicating the required properties and relations and whose variables are interpreted as referring to objects in the universe of discourse. I am still not sure that Lukasiewicz ean be pinned. Lukasiewicz calls the logic of Aristotle "a theory of the relations A, E, I, and O in the field of universal terms" ([6], p. 14). Note that Lukasiewicz says 'universal terms', not 'secondary substances', as Corcoran would have it. Further, Lukasiewicz states that the 'term-variables' of his formalization of Aristotle's system "have as values universal terms, as 'man' or 'anima!''' ([6], p. 77). Here Lukasiewicz not only reiterates his provision that Aristotle's theory concerns not objects but expressions, he also uses the convention of single quotes to indicate, by mentioning 138 MAR Y MULHERN and not using the values of his variables, that these values are not objects but expressions. So Lukasiewicz's reconstruction comes out as theory of object language sentences, not as a theory of objects. Lukasiewicz will not be pushed as far as Corcoran wants to push him, but Corcoran is undoubtedly right in challenging what appears to be Lukasiewicz's identification of syllogistic with axiomatized science. Lukasiewicz did only say that syllogistic was "like a mathematical theory" ([6], p. 13) and "similar to a mathematical theory" ([6], p. 73), but he failed to attach such riders to his claim as would have rendered that claim consistent with the details of his reconstruction as he actually performed it. The second point I wish to take up is the charge Corcoran lays against Aristotle that the theory of propositional forms presupposed in syllogistic is "very seriously inadequate" and "oversimplified". Corcoran gives me to understand that by this charge he means especially that Aristotle's theory of propositional forms is inadequate to the expression of the axioms of science in his own day. Re further invites my attention to three questions which he thinks ought to be distinguished: (i) is the theory of propositional forms presupposed in the second logic the entire Aristotelian theory (Corcoran answers his own question in the negative and says Aristotle would have admitted as much); (ii) is the theory of propositional forms ofthe second logic adequate for, say, geometry (answer: no, again Aristotle would have admitted this); and (iii) is Aristotle's whole theory of propositional forms (as found in the Categoriae, De Interpretatione, etc.) adequate for geometry (a much harder question, says Corcoran). Now, not being a geometrician or even ahistorian of geometry, I shall not attempt to answer the question whether Aristotle's theory of propositional forms is adequate for geometry. What I shall try to point out is that the theory of propositional forms presupposed by analytical syllogistic is not so simple as Corcoran suggests. By 'analyticai syllogistic', I mean the deductive system set out in the Analytica Priora; thi s is a part of syllogistic in general, which also includes non-analytical syllogistic, or dialectical syllogistic, as it is sometimes called, set out in the Topica and elsewhere.5 I further distinguish, within analytical syllogistic, non-demonstrative syllogistic and demonstrative syllogistic. It is true that the theory of propositional forms in use in demonstrative syllogistic is severely limited, and limited for cogent reasons connected with its intended interpretation, but there is no reason to suppose that CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 139 the theory in use in Aristotle's exposition of analytieal syllogistie is any less eomplex than the theory presented in the Categoriae, De Interpretatione, Topica, and elsewhere in the corpus. Coreoran takes the view that Aristotle's syllogistie 'master language' is made up of the logical constants A, N, S, $ (Corcoran's updated A, E, I, O) and the set U of nonlogical eonstants or content words. Coreoran had formerly held, in an apparent effort to assimilate AristotIe's work to that of eontemporary logicians, that the set U comprised infinitely many characters representing infinitely many secondary substanees or universals. Coreoran held further, however regarding what he saw as a contrast with contemporary comprehensive theories of deduction that the only content words appearing in syllogistic premises were the names of secondary substanees and that these premisses exc1uded proper names, adjectives, and relational expressions. He has modified this view so that he now holds simply that the set U of characters is non-empty, while he dec1ines to say what these characters represent, and that, even if proper names, adjectives, and relational expressions are not exc1uded from syllogistic, still they are not "explicitly handled" therein. I believe that in what follows I present some of the evidenee which helped to induce him to modify his view. Myevidence is designed to show: first, that proper names, adjectives, and relational expressions ean appear in syllogistie premisses, although their roles in them are restricted ; second, that the characters in the set U represent designata in all the ten categories and that aecording to AristotIe, although these designata are infinite in number, still the set U of characters representing them is finite; and, third, although it might be the case that Aristotle's theory of propositional forms is inadequate for some purposes, it is adequate for the purposes for which it was devised. To begin, it should be pointed out that in Aristotle's logical syntax 'universal' (Ku90AOU) a prepositional phrase which does not admit of a plural is not a stand-in for 'secondary substanee' or 'name of a secondary substance'. Aristotle reeognizes quantifying conventions for subjeets and for propositions but not for predicates (De Int. 17a39-b6). Designata ('trov npanUl'tmv, 17a39) of subject expressions are universal if they are such that their signs ean be predicated of many subjects ('man', for example); they are individual if they are such that their signs cannot be predicated of many subjects ('Callias', for example). A proposition may have either an individual or a universal subject 140 MAR Y MULHERN (De Int. 17b3). A proposition with an individual subject is a singular proposition. A proposition with a universal subject is either universal, if the predicate applies to all or to none of the subject, or not-universal, if the predicate applies to less than all and more than none of the subject. Aristotle modifies this analysis in the Analytica Priora only by introducing two sub-classifications of not-universal propositions particular and indefinite. Now it is true that, for Aristotle, only expressions whose designata are substances can take the subject place in sentences and only expressions whose designata are secondary substances and these within certain additionallimits can take both the subject place and the predicate place in sentences. The name of an individual primary substance cannot be a predicate; sentences with names of individuals in the predicate place are ill-formed they are predications only accidentally (KU-rU OUI1PePllKO\;; cf. An. Pr. 43a34--35). Names of accidental attributes, on the other hand, may take only the predicate place in sentences, never the subject place (An. Post. 83bI9-22). When accidents appear to be treated as subjects, Aristotle holds, it is actually the object in which the accident is present which is the subject of predication (Cat. 5b ad init.; An. Post. 83a33). But this doctrine of Aristotle's does not exclude proper names and adjectives from the premisses of syllogistic. All it accomplishes is the exclusion of proper names from the predicate place, since these are les s general than their putative subjects, and the exclusion of disembodied accidents from the subject place, since there are no such things as disembodied accidents. Proper names are not excluded from the subject place, nor are adjective-qualified subjects excluded from the subject place. Examples of syllogistic premisses containing proper names (Aristornenes, 47b22; Miccalus, 47b30; Pittacus, 70a16, 26) occur in the Priora, as do examples containing adjectives (good, 24alO, 25a7, etc., white, 25b6 sqq, 26a38, etc.; inanimate, 26b 14, 27b ad fin., etc.). It is true, of course, that proper names are oflittle importance in Aristotelian scientific inquiry; his reasons for this are given in the well-known passage beginning at 43a25: individuals cannot be predicates, except in an accidental sense (lCU-rU oUI1Pef311KO\;), highest genera cannot be subjects, except by way of opinion (KU-rU 06~uv); scientific inquiry is concerned chiefly with the orders intermediate between these two extremes. But this no more excludes proper CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 141 names from the premisses of syllogistic than it excludes the names of highest genera therefrom. As to adjectives, several points ought to be noted. The first is that the ancient Greeks did not distinguish parts of speech preciselyas we do; moreover, they were especiaIly wont to use adjectives as substantives (by prefixing a definite article or by some other device). The second point is that AristotIe's logical syntax does not distinguish adjectives from nouns, nor indeed from verbs. His logical syntax recognizes only the name (OVOIlU) and the verb (piillu). These are best understood, I think, as 'argument', and 'function' or 'predicate'. A name, for Aristotle, is "a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest" (De Int. 16aI9-21). Names stand for states of affairs (1tpaYllu't'oc;, 16b23), and verbs not conjoined with arguments are names in this sense, but they make no assertions about states of affairs unless conjoined with arguments. Names serve as arguments to proposition-forming functors; some inftexions of nouns are excluded because they do not meet this condition (De Int. 16a35-b5). A verb for Aristotle is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time... it is a sign of something said of something else ... i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other thing. (De Inf. l6b6-ll.) Verbs and tenses of verbs are proposition-forming functors; no expression, no matter how complex, is a proposition (AOYOV U1tOCPUV't'tKOV) unless it contains a verb (De Int. 17all-15). The third point is that AristotIe's semantic theory recognizes ten categories, or varieties of designata of expressions substance and the nine accidents. In the definition of 'verb' above, the expression 'something either predicable of or present in some other thing' makes it clear that a verb or predicate may designate any non-individual falling under any of the ten categories. For Aristotle, secondary substances are predicable of other subjects, that is, they effect definitory predications ofthose subjects. Accidents, on the other hand, are present in subjects, that is, they effect descriptive predications of the subjects in which they inhere (Cat. la20lb9). AristotIe's list of categories cuts across distinctions among parts of speech. Likewise, his thematic separation of definitory predication from 142 MARY MULHERN descriptive predication cuts across those distinctions. Thus it is the case that for Aristotle adjectives, as well as more complex expressions, expressive of quantity, quality, relation,6 action, passion, time, place, habitus and situs are admitted to the premisses of syllogistic. 7 They are excluded from the premisses of demonstrative syllogistic, but not because they are adjectives rather because they are mere descriptive predicates, since their designata are accidents. Predicates in demonstrative premisses must be assigned to all of the subjects to which they might belong, and must be assigned to those subjects because ofwhat they are (Ku8'uu'tO).8 Demonstrative premisses are definitory predications. Some adjectives, however, by contrast with expressions whose designata are mere accidents, ean effect the definitory or derivatively definitory predications requisite for demonstration. For instance, 'inanimate', an adjective we have aiready seen exemplified, since it represents a differentia,9 could occur in a demonstrative premiss. To sum up, then, the vocabulary of analyticai syllogistic -and that of dialectical syllogistic as well draws on expressions in all the ten categories. The characters in the set U of non-Iogical constants in Corcoran's syllogistic master language L should be said to represent not only secondary substances but also primary substances (as long as they occur in the subject place only) and accidents (as long as they occur in the predicate place only). These designata represented by the set U are infinite in number, but the set U of characters itself is finite. Aristotle's view, as expressed at Sophistici Elenchi 165a5 sqq, is that while designata are infinite in number (nt os 1tpaYllu'tu 'tov apt81l0v li1tEtpa), these designata themselves are not introduced into discussion, but names are used to stand for them, and names and the sum total of formulae are finite ('tu ... OVOIlU'tU 1tE1ttPUVtat Kui 'to 'tWV 'Aoyrov 1tAfj80r;), so that a single name or formula must stand for many designata (avaYKulov ODV 1t'AElro 'tov u\nOV 'Aoyov Kui 'tOUVOIlU 'to EV cnllluivElV).l° Demonstrative syllogistic, a methodological sub-system of analytical syllogistic, employs a sub-Ianguage of the master language. This sublanguage, however, is not a topicai sub-Ianguage, as are the proper languages of the several sciences in which demonstration is employed. It is rather a topic-neutral but modally partisan language whose non-Iogical constants are limited to characters representing species, genera, differentiae, properties, and definitions. This set of characters also is finite. CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 143 It should be mentioned that there are no modally neutral premisses even in the so-called assertoric syllogistic. Descriptive predications are contingent, and definitory predications are necessary in varying degrees. Hence, 'assertoric syllogistic' is something of a misnomer, although Aristotle apparently is willing to allow predications to be considered prescinding from the modality conferred on them by their content words. Prescinding from modality is one end which his use of variables allows him to accomplish. The relation of this tacit modality to the expressed modality of the so-called modal syllogistic has yet to be fully explored. What I propose in answer to Corcoran, then, is that the theory of propositional forms presupposed in the Analytiea and used for analytical syllogistic is no more limited and no less complex than the theory elaborated elsewhere in the corpus. As I have said, I am not competent to deal with the question whether Aristotle's theory of propositional forms is adequate for geometry. But I would like to draw attention to a statement of Aristotle's whose full force has not been appreciated. Everyone has noted that in the first sentence of the Analytiea Priora Aristotle announces that his inquiry is concerned with demonstration and belongs to demonstrative science. Now 'demonstrative science' (e7ttcr'ttlJlll~ (btO()St1C'tt1Cii~) here could be taken either as a body of knowledge or as a mental activity. But whichever way this phrase is construed, Aristotle has laid double emphasis on the limited scope of his inquiry: he is concerned first of all with a certain method demonstration, and, in addition, depending on how one takes 'demonstrative science', he is concerned with that method, either applied in its own proper field demonstrative science or applied through the exercise of its own proper intellectual virtue demonstrative science. According to Aristotle, some sciences, by reason of the exactitude and necessity of their subject matter, are appropriate fieIds for the method of demonstration. But this is not to say that all the theorems of any given science are susceptible of being demonstrated in the Aristotelian fashion. A science may be counted among the demonstrative sciences because demonstration is used to exhibit some of its propositions. More strictly speaking, however, 'demonstrative science' designates solely the necessary knowledge secured by demonstration. Thus, while the limitations set on propositional forms in demonstrative syllogistic may make them inadequate to the expression of all the theses of, say, Greek geometry, still, 144 MARY MULHERN ex hypothesi, they are adequate to demonstration with its severely limited aims. Hence, if we allow Aristotle the intended interpretation of his demonstrative syllogistic, recognizing that demonstration is a method applied in a number of sciences but that it need not be the method which exhausts any science, then we should find it easier to grant that he played by the rules which he had himself laid down. On Corcoran's view, Aristotle had no doctrine of logical truth. There can be no doubt that he is entirely correct in pointing out that Aristotle did not have a doctrine of logical truth like the doctrines developed in this eentury.ll As Corcoran himself points out, however, and as Bochenski pointed out earlier ([2], pp. 92-93), Aristotle was conversant with the identity relation which plays such an important role in modern theories of logical truth. How could this be so? The answer seems to be connected with the faet that, for Aristotle, identifications are not predieations: on his view, there is no predication unless something is said of something else (An. Pr. 43a2S-43; De Int. 16b6-1I). As he says, predicates must be of a higher order than their arguments (Cat. lb9; 2bIS-21). Thus his syllogistic, which is concerned with predications, leaves little place for the identity formulae that figure so large in theories of logical truth. Logically true statements evidently were employed in deductive contexts by some of AristotIe's contemporaries, but he seems to view the practice with disdain. For example, at Analytica Posteriora 73a6, Aristotle, in seeking to refute those who hold that demonstration is circular, remarks that their claim amounts to maintaining that "from A being so, A is so" (tau A oVtõ "Co A EO""Civ). From this tautology, he correctly observes, it is easy to prove anything. Hence it appears that Aristotle, aIthough he recognized some of the features found in modern theories of logical truth, considered these features disadvantageous in the development of his own method of inquiry. Corcoran also takes the view that Aristotle, because he had no theory of logi cal truth in which logieally true statements are such in virtue of their form alone, had no system of logical axioms buiIt up from logicaIly true statements. Indeed, according to Corcoran, AristotIe did not distinguish logical from non-Iogical axioms beeause he had no idea of logical axioms. This, I think, is a littie too strong. Of course, it is true to say that in Aristotle there is no close analogue of modern discussions of logical CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 145 axioms vis-a-vis non-Iogical axioms. On the other hand, Aristotle does distinguish common principles of demonstrative science from the proper principles of the several demonstrative sciences (An. Post. 77a22 sqq; Metaph. 996b26 sqq). Now it must be admitted that Aristotle includes among common principles not only what might be acknowledged as logical laws for instance, Excluded Middle and Contradiction, but also axioms which apply only to quantity for instance, 'equals subtracted from equals have equal remainders'. These latter are reckoned among common principles because they are applied in the several fieids of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, optics, and so forth. These common principles do differ from proper principles, however, in that they are in the nature of rules which one might plausibly write as the justification of a step in a deduction. Proper principles, by contrast, are the definitions assumed by each science of its own peculiar subject matter. So, granted that Aristotle does not distinguish logical from non-Iogical axioms quite as we do, still I think it is too strong to say that he does not distinguish them at all. Another feature of Aristotle's doetrine of truth which strikes one as anomalous in view both of modem practice and of his own apparent practice is his inclusion of a third variety of syllogistic premiss alongside universal and particular premisses. This third premiss variety indefinite (åOtoptO"'tÕ) seems to resist extensional truth valuation and so to remain outside the set-theoretic interpretation which is usually given to syllogistic and which at least some statements of Aristotle's seem to indicate that he intended for it. Again, I shaH not attempt to settle this question here, but I would like to offer a few suggestions conceming Aristotle's seemingly odd doetrine. It has often been supposed that åOtoptO"'toC; indicates a premiss which might be universal or particular but whose quantity is left in doubt. It has also been proposed that for Aristotle åOtoptO"'tOC; premisses are equivalent to particular premisses (Bochenski [1], p. 43). This last is not true: what Aristotle does say is that in a given syllogistic schema replacement of a particular affirmative premiss by an a3toptO"'tõ premiss will yield the same result either a valid syllogism or no syllogism, as the case may be (cf., for instance, An. Pr. 26b21; 27b36-38; 29a8 sqq; 29a27 sqq). Further, there are at least two items of evidence which suggest that the first supposition that å3toptO"'toC; premisses as yet unquantified might 146 MAR Y MULHERN still become quantified is not true either. ane item of evidence is drawn from Aristotle's examples of Mt6ptcr'tÕ premisses at 24a20-22: "contraries are studied by the same science" and "pleasure is not good". Now 'contraries' and 'pleasure' are universal since they can be predicates according to the rule stated at De Inf. 17a39, but there seems to be some question whether the objects they designate are properly numerable. Ryle in Dilemmas, for example, points out that pleasure is not the sort ofthing that one counts ([17], pp. 54-67, esp. p. 60). The suspected innumerability of these objects brings us to the second item of evidence the term Mt6ptcrTÕ itself. This seems to be a technical term coined by Aristotle, since according to LSJ it does not occur before him and since the Greek word usually rendered 'indefinite' or 'indeterminate' a6ptcr'tÕ was available. Aristotle in fact does avail himself of MptcrTÕ, not only in the De Interpretatione (l6a32, bIS), but right in the Priora (32bll sqq), where modality, not quantity, is in question. If aot6ptcr'tÕ is an ad hoc coinage, what special force does Aristotle mean it to carry? A elue is provided at 26b24, where Mt6ptcr'tÕ is opposed to otcOptcr/lEVOV. Translators customarily render these 'indefinite' and 'definite', but this seems to be a hedge. Aristotle uses otroptcr/lEVOV in the Categoriae in his discussion of the two kinds af quantity (4b20 sqq). Quantity, he says, is either discrete (otroptcr/lEVOV) or continuous (crUVSXE~), and among discrete quantities is number. So, if otroptcr/lEVOV means definite in the sense of 'discrete and numerable', I think we may take Mt6ptcrTÕ as its opposite, not in the sense of 'continuous', because crUVSXE~ aiready takes care of that, but simply in the sen se of 'innumerable'. It would appear, then, on this evidence, that Mt6ptcr'tÕ premisses are not so much quantifiable and as yet unquantified as they are in principle unquantifiable. Corcoran urges that they are extra-systematic with respect to syllogistic, and it is true that they are extra-systematic with respect to demonstrative syllogistic; but then so are particular premisses. an the other hand, aot6ptcr'tÕ premisses are useful in non-demonstrative inquiries, and premisses of this sort do figure, for instance, in the argumentation of Books VII and X of the Ethica Nicomachea. In his conclusion Corcoran raises the tantalizing question whether reasoning on Aristotle's view is natural or conventional. This would be a fit subject for a whole monograph, so I shall content myself here with suggesting the lines along which such a monograph might be composed. CORCORAN ON ARISTOTLE'S LOGICAL THEORY 147 First, one would have to point out that for Aristotle no hard lines divide natural from the conventional. Next, one might observe that for Aristotle the basis of reasoning, that is, the grasp of first principles, is immediate, intuitive, non-discursive, and non-linguistic. The derivation of other knowledge from the first principles is mediated, discursive, and linguistic. For Aristotle, I think it is safe to say that all logic is language and all language is conventional, but that not all conventions are arbitrary. Swarthmore College NOTES 1 Lukasiewicz [8]. See McCall [10], p. 69, n. 1, for Lukasiewicz's remark concerning the date of his first proposais. 2 Lukasiewicz [6], p. 44. For texts in An. Pr. and An. Post., see Corcoran [3]. 3 Please note that I do not make the claim that Aristotle did develop a system of propositionallogic. Such an Aristotelian system, if there is one, waits to be discovered. My claim is only the much more modest one which attributes the absence of a propositionallogic not to Aristotle's ignorance nor to his inability but rather to his having other interests. 4 For including astronomy in the Aristotelian division of sciences, see Merlan [11], p. 6; for excluding mathematics, see Merlan [12]; for including both mathematics and astronomy, see Mulhern [14]. 5 I follow Bochenski ([2], p. 88 passim) in recognizing analyticai and non-analytical branches of syllogistic. 6 Bochenski ([2], pp. 9S-97) finds laws of the logic of relations at Top. 114a18 sqq; 119b3 sqq; 114b40-11Sa2; An. Pr. 48a40b9; 48blO-14, 14-19,20-27; and Top. 114b3811Sa14. It should be noted that C. S. Peirce claimed over and over an Aristotelian precedent for the logic of relatives. Cf. Peirce [IS] 2.532, 2.SS2-SS3, 2.S77, and 3.643. 7 The occurrence of 'white', 'black', 'good', and 'inanimate' in syllogistic premisses has aiready been noted. There also occur in An. Pr. 'wild' (28b adjin.), 'moves' (30a31), 'waking' and 'sleeping' (3lb9), 'biped' (3lb3l), 'intelligent' (34b33), 'upright' (41blO), and so on. Aristotie also discusses the establishment orrefutation, by syllogistic means, of accidents and properties, as well as genera (cf. 42b26 sqq). 8 Cr. An. Post. 73a21-74a3. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Mulhern [13]. 9 Differentiae, for Aristotle, are products, not conditions, of analysis; they do not answer to designata in any category. They are, however, assimilated to genera by Aristotle (Top. 101b19). They do not of themselves constitute definitory predicates, but their role in Aristotle's theory of predication is to express, in combination with the names of genera, analyses of species that is to say, the definitions which are exhibited in demonstration. 10 Cf. Aristotle's statement at Metaph. l007al4-1S that accidents are infinite. Norman Kretzmann has correctly noted the importance of Soph. El. l6SaS sqq for the history of semantics. See Kretzmann [S], p. 362. 11 For a useful precis of such systems, see Corcoran [4], (1) Logical Truth: Logistic Systems. 148 MAR Y MULHERN BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] Bochenski, I. M., Ancient Formal Logie, North-HoIland Publ. Comp., Amsterdam, 1951. [2] Bochenski, I. M., A His/ory o/ Formal Logie, (transI. and ed. by Ivo Thomas), Second ed. corrected, Chelsea Publ. Comp., New York, 1970. [3] Corcoran, John, 'A Mathematical Model of Aristotle's SyIlogistic', Arehiv /iir Gesehiehte der Philosophie 55 (1973), 191-219. [4] Corcoran, John, 'Three Logical Theories', Philosophy o/ Science 36 (1969), 153-157. [5] Kretzmann, Norman, 'Semantics, History of', in Encyclopedia o/ Philosophy (ed. by Paul Edwards), MacmiIlan and Free Press, New York, 1967, Vol. 7, pp. 358-406. [6] Lukasiewicz, Jan, Aristotie's Syllogistie /rom the Stand point o/ Modem Formal Logie, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1951. Second ed. enlarged, 1957. [7] Lukasiewicz, Jan, Element y logiky matematyeznej (ed. by M. Presburger), Publications of Students of Mathematics and Physics in Warsaw Univ.; Vol. 18, Warsaw, 1929. Second ed., Polish Scientific Publ., Warsaw, 1958. English trans!. by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1963. [8] Lukasiewicz, Jan, 'Philosophische Bemerkungen zu mehrwertigen Systemen des Aussagenkalkiils', Comptes rendus des seances de la Societe des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie 23 (1930). English trans!. by H. Weber in McCall [10] as 'PhilosophicaI Remarks on Many-Valued Systems of Propositional Logic', pp. 40-65. [9] Lukasiewicz, Jan, 'Zhistorii logiki zdan', Przeglqd Filozofiezny 27 (1934), 417-437. German version 'Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik', Erkenntnis 5 (1935), 111131. English trans!. from German version by S. McCaIl in McCall [10], pp. 66-87. [lO] McCaIl, Storrs (ed.), Polish Logie 1920-1939, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1967. [11] Merlan, Philip, 'Aristotle's Unmoved Movers', Traditio 4 (1946), 1-30. [12] Merlan, Philip, "On the Terms 'Metaphysics' and 'Being-Qua-Being"', The Monist 52 (1968), 174-194. [13] Mulhern, M. M., 'AristotIe on Universality and Necessity', Logique et Analyse 12 (1969), 288-299. [14] Mulhern, M. M., 'Types of Process According to Aristotle', The Monist 52 (1968), 237-251. [15] Peirce, C. S., Colleeted Papers (ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss), 8 Volumes, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1960-1961. [16] Ross, Sir David, AristotIe's Prior and Posterior Analyties; a revised text with introduetion and commentary, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1965. [17] Ryle, Gilbert, Dilemmas, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1966. PART FOUR STOlC LOGlC JOSIAH GOULD DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC In their logical theory Stoic philosophers made use of a simple but important distinction alleged to hold among valid arguments, adistinetion to which Aristotle had first called attention. l They distinguished those arguments whose validity is evident from those whose validity is not evident and so needs to be demonstrated. The Stoics, having supposed that the distinction obtains, raise and answer the question, how does one demonstrate the validity of those arguments whose validity is not plain? The Stoics appear to have set forth both adiscursive method of demonstration and a test for validity. In this paper lexamine these two facets of Stoic logic. 2 The paper is in three parts. The first is essentially terminological and taxonomic. There I record Stoic definitions of logical terms and I give three Stoic classifications of arguments, appending samples from the writings of Sextus Empiricus.3 This provides and puts on exhibit an array of typically Stoic arguments to which I refer in the second part of the paper. There I examine Sextus' contention that the disagreement among the Stoics over the criterion of truth for a conditional proposition renders inefficacious the test that had been set forth as sufficient for judging the validity of an argument, and I argue that Sextus' charge has to be qualified. Even if an unqualified form ofSextus' accusation could be established, its importance, I maintain, would be diminished by the faet that the Stoics didn't make extensive use of this test anyhow. As I show in the third part of the paper, the Stoics ordinarily claim to prove the validity of all valid arguments 4 not by means of a test but by means of a calculus of propositions 5 having its base in a theory of deduction, which includes a language consisting of connectives and variables, axiomatic inference schemata, and rules of derivability. Iconclude with a statement about the Stoic theory of deduction in relation to systems of logic developed in the 19th and 20th centuries and to Aristotelian syllogistic. J. Corcoran (ed.J, Ancient Logie and Its Modem Interpretatlons, 151-168. All Rlghts Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publtshing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 152 JOSIAH GOULD In Sextus Empirieus' Outlines o/ Pyrrhonism 6 one finds the folIowing Stoic definitions of the expressions 'premises', 'conclusion', and 'argument' (i) 'premises' : the propositions assumed for the establishment of the conclusion, (ii) 'conclusion' : the proposition which is established by the premises 7, (iii) 'argument': a whole eomposed of premises and a conclusion. In terms of these definitions the questions I shaH be attempting to answer are: for the Stoies what are the conditions under whieh the premises in an argument 10gieaHy imply its conclusion ? And, if the premises of an argument in faet imply its conclusion but not evidently so, how aeeording to the Stoies may this relation oflogieal eonsequenee be made evident? Before dealing with these questions, however, I present several classifications of Stoic arguments (see the outline of these classifieations below). The first division of the first classification of arguments is into valid and invalid arguments. An argument is valid "when the eonditional having as its anteeedent the conjunetion forrned from the premises of the argument and as its eonsequent the conclusion of the argument is true" (P.H. ii.137). An example of a valid argument is (1) If it is day, it is light. It is day. Therefore it is light. Arguments whieh do not satisfy this condition are invalid. Next valid arguments are divided into those which are true and those whieh are not true. A true valid argument is one of which both the eonclusion and the premises are true (P.H. ii.l38). An example of a true valid argument is (1) above when set forth during the day. Arguments whieh do not satisfy this condition are not true. An example of a nottrue argument is the foHowing when made during the day: (2) If it is night, it is dark. It is night. Therefore it is dark. DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 153 Of true valid arguments some are demonstrative and some are not demonstrative. Demonstrative arguments are "those which conclude something non-evident through pre-evident premises".8 An example of a demonstrative true valid argument, preserved by Sextus (P.H. ii.140), is (3) If sweat flows through the surface of the skin, there exist imperceptible pores. Sweat flows through the surface of the skin. Therefore there exist imperceptible pores. An argument not satisfying this condition is not demonstrative. Argument (1) is an example of an argument which is valid, true when set forth during the day, and not demonstrative. It will be shown subsequently that there was another kind of argument called undemonstrated, which provides an additional important category of arguments. It is not to be confused with a not-demonstrative argument. Of demonstrative true valid arguments "some lead us through the premises to the conclusion ephodeutikos only" (P.H. ii.l41). I am not sure precisely what 'ephodeutikos' means. Etymologically the word suggests 'advancing over a path towards something' and when the expression attaches to the word 'argument' a reasonable candidate for the 'something' would be the conclusion of the argument. But 'advancing over a path towards a conclusion' is a metaphorical description of arguments generaIly and it fails to bring out what is peculiar to the type of argument to which the label is here attached. I simply transliterate the expression. A kind of this type argument is said to be one which "depends upon belief and memory". One might well ask, 'What kind of argument doesn't?' An example of an argument which depends on belief and memory is (4) If someone said to you that this man would be wealthy, this man will be wealthy. This god said to you that this man would be wealthy. Therefore this man will be wealthy. Sextus' comment on this argument is that we "assent to the conclusion not so much on account of the necessity of the premises as because we believe the assertion of the god" (P.H. ii.l41-142). S O M E S T O IC C LA S S IF IC A T IO N S O F A R G U M E N T S F IR S T < va li d< tr ue ~d em on st ra ti ve -- -- -d ed uc ti on is e . - .. .. 'm e n t _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - p h o d e u t, ko , o n ly n o t tr u e n o td e m o n s tr a ti v e d e d u ct io n i s e p h d . o e u tl ko s & b d ' inva lidIlll ii5~ €§§§ ~=== ==== ==-' y Is co ve ry ~ _ I n c o h e r e n t re d u n d a n t S E C O N D in ba d fo rm <d e m o n s tr a te d ( th e s d e fi ci e n t e a re v a lid ) a rg u m e n t ( fi rs t se n se ( . va lid o r in va lid ) u n d e m o n st ra te d T H IR D se co nd s e n se ( _ _ _ va lid ) < si m p le va lid h o m o g e n e o u s a r g u m e n t< n o n -s im p le < in va lid h e te ro g e n e o u s -Vt .j>. .... O <Il .... > :Il Cl O c:: t"' t:I DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 155 Contrasted with this type argument are those which "lead us to the conclusion not only ephodeutikos but also by way of discovery" (P.H ii.142). An example of such an argument is (3). The element of discovery in this argument is the disc10sure of the existence of pores through the fact that sweat flows through the surface of the skin. The element of belief in the argument, apparently sufficient to provide the ephodeutikos component, is the "prior assumption that moisture cannot flow through a solid body" (P.H. ii.142). The components of a 'demonstration' may be derived from one component of each division in this first c1assification, for a demonstration is a valid and true argument having a non-evident conclusion and disc10sing that conc1usion by the power ofthe premises (P.H. ii.143). I am uncertain as to the point of the last c1ause in Sextus' report. It appears to imply that the conc1usion is obtained without the aid of assumptions external to the premises of the argument, although this would involve the existence ofac1ass ofdemonstrative argumentsdifferent from those which are ephodeutikos. Aseeond Stoic c1assifieation of arguments is also reported by Sextus, and it, too, ought to be kept in mind when thinking about deduetion in Stoic logic. This c1assification begins from a division of arguments into demonstrated and undemonstrated. I take a demonstrated argument in this eontext to be one whose validity has been made evident. I say more subsequently about how the validity of arguments is made evident. An argument is undemonstrated in one of two senses. The first sense is the eontradictory ofthat of 'demonstrated'. In this sense, then, an argument is undemonstrated if it has not been demonstrated (Adv. Math. viii.223), i.e., on my interpretation, ifit has not been shown to be valid. In a second sense an argument is undemonstrated if it is immediately evident that it is valid (ibid.). This distinetion may be brought out by noticing that the first sense is temporal inasmueh as an argument which is undemonstrated in that sense in 100 B.e. may be demonstrated in 50 B.e., while the second sense is non-temporal. 9 An argument is undemonstrated in this second sense if it exhibits one of five forms of argument whieh are referred to respectively as the first undemonstrated, the second undemonstrated, etc. These forms are also called inference schemata, and I have more to say about them below. For now I merely give the forms with illustrative examples (Gould, pp. 83-85): 156 JOSIAH GOULD The first undemonstrated (5) If the fint, the second. The first. Therefore the second. The second undemonstrated (6) If the first, the second. Not the second. Therefore not the first. The third undemonstrated (7) Not both the first and the second. The first. Therefore not the second. The fourth undemonstrated (8) Either the first or the second. The first. Therefore not the second. The fifth undemonstrated (9) Either the first or the second. Not the first. Therefore the second. If it is day, there is light. It is day. Therefore there is light. If it is day, there is light. There is not light. Therefore it is not day. Not both it is day and it is night. It is day. Therefore it is not night. Either it is day or it is night. It is day. Therefore it is not night. Either it is day or it is night. It is not day. Therefore it is night. A third cIassification divides valid arguments first into simple and nonsimple (Adv. Math. viii.228). A simple valid argument is one having the form of one of the five undemonstrated argument forms. A non-simple valid argument is one 'woven together' out of simple valid arguments in order that it may be known to be 'valid' (Adv. Math. viii.229). There are two kinds of non-simple arguments, one forrned from two or more simple arguments all of the same form, and the other composed from two or more simple arguments not of the same form. The former is a homogeneous non-simple and the latter, a heterogeneous non-simple argument DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 157 (ibid.). An example of a homogeneous non-simple argument is (lO) If it is day, then if it is day it is light. It is day. Therefore it is light. For upon analysis it may be seen to have been compounded from two simple arguments having the form of the fint undemonstrated. Analysis of this argument is carried out in accordance with the following 'dialectical theorem' : (11) Whenever we have premises from which a certain conclusion can be validly deduced, potentially we have also that conc1usion among the premises, even ifit is not stated explicitly.l0 One analyzes (10) by drawing the conclusion from the first two premises in accordance with the first undemonstrated inference schema, thus getting (12) If it is day, then if it is day it is light. It is day. Therefore if it is day, it is light. Then by the theorem stated in (11) one gets as premises (13) If it is day, then if it is day it is light. It is day. If it is day, it is light. And by another application of the first inference schema one gets the conclusion in (10). II Now with tbis array of Stoic arguments on display I go on to consider how the Stoics talked about valid argument and valid inference. In three relatively extended accounts of Stoic logic from antiquity (Diogenes Laertius' Vitae vii. 42-83; Sextus Empiricus' Outlines o/ Pyrrhonism ii. and Adversus Mathematicos viii.) the talk about the validity of arguments is of two kinds. On the one hand, and tbis approach is found exc1usively in the reports by Sextus, the validity of an argument is linked to the truth of its corresponding conditional proposition, ie., to the conditional proposition having as its antecedent a conjunction of the propositions forming IS8 JOSIAH GOULD the premises of the argument and as its consequent the conclusion of the argument. Sextus is even more specific. Re makes the truth of its corresponding conditional a sufficient condition for the validity of an argument. On the other hand, and this approach is found both in Sextus (Adv. Math. viii.228-229) and in Diogenes (Vitae vii. 79-81), the validity of some arguments is said to be evident and the validity of others, it is maintained, has to be shown by the analysis or resolution of them into those which are evidently valid. I want first to consider Sextus' ascription to the Stoics of the view that a sufficient condition for the validity of an argument is the truth of its corresponding conditional (henceforth 'the conditionalization test'). One doesn't find in the logic fragments of the Stoics very many references to such a test or its use, but that's a historicaI point. It cannot, I think, be denied that Sextus is right in suspecting that the conditionalization test would yield ambiguous results as long as the disagreement over the criterion for the truth of a conditional proposition remained unsettled, but I shaH argue that there is something to be said here in defense of the Stoics. Four different criteria are attested and three of them are identical with three kinds of 'implication' which have had advocates in the 19th and 20th centuries. I briefly treat these four criteria and then return to the conditionalization test. The first criterion is that "the conditional proposition is true when it does not begin from the true and conclude with the false" (Adv. Math. viii.1l3). This form of implication, as the texts make abundantly clear, is what is now caHed 'material implication' (Mates, p. 44). After its author, Philo, I caH a conditional true by this criterion a Philonian conditional. The second of the criteria is that "the conditional proposition is true which neither could nor can beginning from the true conclude with the false" (Adv. Math. viii.llS). This criterion is attributed to Diodorus, and I caU a conditional true by this criterion a Diodorean conditional. As Mates has convicingly shown (pp. 44-47), a Diodorean conditional is an always true Philonian conditional. This, then, appears to have been an ancient version of Whitehead's and Russe1l's formal implication.l1 The third and fourth criteria, which are not attributed to any individual, are authored by persons who seem to have interpreted conditional propositions as statements of necessary connection. As Martha Kneale writes, it "seems likely that they were formulated by philosophers who had in mind DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 159 the use of conditionals in place of entailment statements" (p. 134). The third criterion of the truth of a conditional proposition is that such a proposition is true "whenever the contradictory of the consequent in it is incompatible with the antecedent in it" (P.H. ii.111). This looks very much like strict implication.12 It is not explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus, but I think he is its author and have said why elsewhere (Gould, pp. 7282). A conditional true by this criterion I call a Chrysippean conditional. The fourth criterion is that "the conditional proposition is true whose consequent is potentially included in its anteeedent" (P.H. ii.1I2). This criterion is ascribed to "those who judge by way of signification" and it, according to its unnamed authors, explicitly excludes conditionals with duplicated propositions, such as 'if it is day, it is day', on the gro und that every such duplicated conditional will be false (ibid.). I shall not recur to thi s type of true conditional, for I am not at all sure that Iunderstand it, and anyhow the Stoics countenanced true duplicated conditionals (Adv. Math. viii. 108-110), and so it is probable that none of them adhered to the signification theory. Now, returning to the conditionalization test, if the Stoics did invoke it to test the validity of arguments, it makes sense to raise the question, as Sextus did, whether the conditional corresponding to the argument being tested has to be a Philonian conditional, a Diodorean conditional, or a Chrysippean conditional? And I wish to consider that question, making use of the sample Stoic arguments presented in the first part of this paper. Consider first the conditional proposition corresponding to argument (1). It is (14) If (it is day, and if it is day then it is light), then it is light. For a Philonian a conditional is true when it does not begin from the true and conclude with the false. In particular for a Philonian, then, this proposition is true if (i) it is true that it is light and (ii) false that it is day and (iii) false that if it is day it is light. For in that case it begins from the false and concludes with the true. And so the corresponding argument, (1), is valid. But this is an incredibly weak test, for it would also yield the verdict valid on the folIowing argument: (15) If it is day, then it is day. It is day. Therefore, it is not day. 160 JOSIAH GOULD For the corresponding Philonian conditional is true if, say, it is true (i) that it is not day and false (ii) that it is day. Thus the test, using Philonian true conditionals, would pronounce valid an argument whose conclusion was the contradictory of one of its premises. Judging by examples of valid Stoic arguments which have survived in the literature, the Stoics did not use a Philonian conditional in the conditionalization test. And, as has been seen, there is a go od reason why they shouldn't have. So, if adispute broke out at all over this is sue, it would have been over the remaining three types of conditionals as candidates for use in the conditionalization test. Advocates ofthe Philonian conditional may have claimed that for purposes of a conditionalization test an always true Philonian conditional is required. And that would have been to concede that for purposes of the test a Diodorean true conditional is required. Now if one applies the conditionalization test and regards as true conditionals those which are Diodorean true, one will let pass all those conditionals for which it is never the case that while the antecedent is true the consequent is false. And arguments of the folIowing sort immediately come to mind: (16) If it is day and it is not day, then it is light. It is day and it is not day. Therefore it is light. (17) If it is day, then day is day. It is day. Therefore day is day. Leaving aside the faet that the Stoics may not have regarded (17) as being well-formed, its corresponding conditional will always be true, for it will never have a false consequent; and the corresponding conditional of (16) will always be true, for its antecedent will never be true. This brings out one of the consequences of regarding true conditionals as Diodorean true, and this is that it is not easy to see how one could ever conclude that such a conditional is true, unless it be stating a logical truth (Mates, p. 50; Hurst, p. 488). It is interesting to observe in this connection, however, that none of the sample arguments which have survived are degenerately valid arguments like (16) and (17) in form. A typical extant argument is (3), and its corresponding conditional is DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 161 (18) If (sweat flows through the surface of the skin, and if sweat flows through the surface of the skin then there exist imperceptible pores), then there exist imperceptible pores. The Diodorean says that this conditional is true if it is never the case that it is true both (i) that sweat flows through the surface of the skin and (ii) that if sweat flows through the surface of the skin, there exist imperceptible pores, while it is false (iii) that there exist imperceptible pores. And by this criterion the conditional proposition is of course true. It is never the case that one meets with this combination of truth values, because one cannot logicaIly have that combination. If the conjunction forming the antecedent is true, then the consequent must by logic be true, and so of course for any time you choose if at that time the antecedent is true, then the consequent is true. But, if this is so, the Diodorean truth of the conditional is being warranted by the incompatibility test, i.e., by the recognition that (18) is Chrysippean true. It is the case not just as a matter of fact that the antecedent is never true while the consequent is false, but rather it could not be the case that the antecedent is true while the consequent is false. And this is a 'could not' that derives not from a logically always false antecedent nor from a logicaIly always true consequent, but one which deri ves from the logical incompatibility of the antecedent with the negation of the consequent. The conditional, (18), is tautologous, but that it is tautologous is guaranteed by the fact that its consequent is strictly implied by its anteeedent. Judging by the shape of the surviving arguments the Stoics must have believed that a sufficient condition and, given the limitations of the human understanding and restrietions on what was to be regarded as logicaIly true (arguments which are degenerately valid apparently were not to be regarded as logicaIly true), also a necessary condition for concluding that a conditional is Diodorean true is fint concluding that it is Chrysippean true. linfer, then, that Sextus was right in thinking that the Stoic disagreement over the criterion of a true conditional proposition would be reflected in their doetrine that the truth of an argument' s corresponding conditional is a sufficient condition for the validity of the argument. Philonians would have had to concede that Philonian true conditionals are far too weak a test, passing arguments which no one would regard as valid. But there is no reason why they couldn't have said that for pur162 JOSIAH GOULD poses of the conditionalization test, an always true Philonian conditional (a Diodorean true conditional) is required. And, while in principle logical truth generally guarantees Diodorean truth, in practice, to judge by the extant argument samples, it was thought that the Diodorean truth of an argument's corresponding conditional had itself to be warranted by a strict implication between the statement in its antecedent and that in its consequent. In his criticisms of the Stoics Sextus was right in princip le, but the Stoics perhaps felt the force of his remark less because of the circumstances I have described. It is clear that the Stoics maintained that if an argument's corresponding conditional is true, then the argument is valid. It is not equally evident that the dispute over the criterion for the truth of a conditional made the conditionalization test inefficacious. Indeed, it is not even evident that the Stoics made much use of the test. As I suggested above, the evidence shows the Stoics talking more about the proof of the validity of arguments than about the application of a criterion for the validity of arguments, and it is to this side of their theory of deduction that I now tUfll. III The Stoics assumed as basic or axiomatic the five 'undemonstrated' inference schemata (Bochenski, p. 96). These five inference schemata were thought to be evidently valid and were called undemonstrated precisely because no demonstration was thought to be required to make their validity evident. Secondly, they maintained that the validity of all valid arguments in forms other than one ofthe five basic argument forms could be shown by analysis, 13 a procedure of reducing these other arguments by means of certain rules to a series of two or more arguments exhibiting one or more ofthe basic inference schemata. The variables in the schemata were the first two ordinal numerals, 'the first' and 'the second'; and the substituends for these variables were to be sentences expressing propositions and denoting truth values. As was suggested two sentences back, the Stoics apparently claimed that their propositional calculus was complete (P.H. ii. 156-157; Mates, pp. 81-82). Galen (SVF II 248) refers to four rules in accordance with which the analysis of non-simple arguments was to be carried out. We know two and possibly three of these rules. They are: DEDUCTION IN STOl C LOGIC 163 (19) First rule: 'If from two propositions a third is deduced, then either of the two together with the denial of the eonclusion yields the denial of the other.14 (20) Third rule: 'Whenever from two premises a third is dedueed, and other propositions from whieh one of the premises is deducibie are assumed, then from the other premise and those other propositions the same eonclusion will be deducible'. (Alexander, In Arist. An. Pr. Comment. 278, 12-14). Neither ofthe remaining two ru1es is given as such in the extant fragments, but Sextus has preserved (Adv. Math. viii 231) what he ealls a dialectieal theorem, and Mates has argued eonvineingly (p. 78, note 77) that this must have been the Stoics' seeond rule. It goes as follows: (21) = (11) Second rule: 'Whenever we have premises from which a certain eonclusion ean be valid1y dedueed, potentially we have also that conclusion among the premises, even if it is not stated explicitly'. We don 't know what the fourth rule was nor very mueh ab out how the Stoies applied these rules. Mates' discussion and examples are wellknown. I give now two samples, preserved by Sextus, of heterogeneous non-simple arguments. Eaeh makes use of the third rule for an analysis of the argument whieh makes its validity beeome evident. The seeond of them shows that the Stoics must have had some principle about the interdefinability of connectives. One sueh argument is the following (Adv. Math. viii.234): (22) (i) Ifthe phenomena appear in the same way to all those who are in a similar eondition and signs are phenomena, then signs appear in the same way to all those who are in a similar condition. (ii) Phenomena appear in the same way to all those who are in a similar condition. (iii) Signs do not appear in the same way to all those who are in a similar condition. (iv) Therefore signs are not phenomena.15 Putting (i) and (iii) of this argument together one ean deduce the negation 164 10SIAH GOULD of the antecedent in (i) in accordance with the second inference schema. Next in accordance with the third rule one can put this negation together with (ii) and by the third inference schema obtain the conclusion (iv). A second sample argument found in Cicero (De Divinatione xxxviii. 82-83), a more complex variety of the non-simple heterogeneous form, goes as foIIows: (23) (i) If the gods exist and they do not dec1are to men beforehand what future events wiII be, then either they do not love men, they do not know what future events wiII be, they judge that it is of no importance to men to know what the future wiII be, they think it is not consonant with their dignity to preannounce what future events wiII be, or the gods cannot reveal what future events wiII beo (ii) It is not the case that they do not love us, nor is it the case that they are ignorant of the things which they themselves form and design, nor is it of no importance for us to know those things which wiII happen in the future, nor does giving signs of the future comport badly with their dignity, nor is it the case that they cannot reveal what future events wiIl beo (iii) Therefore it is not true that there are gods and that they do not give signs of future events. (iv) There are gods. (v) Therefore the gods do give signs of future events. In this argument (ii) could have been regarded as the negation of the consequent in (i) only if there had been some principle which permitted negated conjuncts in a conjunction to be defined in terms of a negated disjunction having as disjuncts those conjuncts unnegated. I assume that the Stoics had some such principle of the interdefinabiIity of connectives (Bochenski, p. 92). Step (iii) is derivable from (i) and (ii) by the second undemonstrated inference schema and by Rule Two may appear together with the premises. From it together with (iv) the conclusion (v) is derivable by the third undemonstrated inference schema.16 In light of what the Stoics said about valid arguments, their c1assification and examples of invalid arguments (as reported by Sextus P.H. ii. 146-151) has some curious features. Briefly, they categorized invalid arguments as incoherent, redundant, in bad form, or deficient. An exDEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC ample (P.H. ii.146) of an incoherent argument is (24) If it is day, it is light. Wheat is being sold in the market. Therefore Dion is walking. 165 An inchoherent argument, then, appears to be one in which the propositions forming premises and conclusion are all logicaIly independent of one another. Notice that an incoherent argument could pass a conditionalization test, given the appropriate circumstances, if the conditional in the test were regarded as true because Philonian true, but would not pas s that test if the conditional in it had to be either Diodorean true or Chrysippean true. An example (P.H. ii.147) of a redundant argument is (25) If it is day, it is light It is day and Dion is walking. Therefore it is light. Such an 'invalid' argument appears to be one having an unused premise. Given a rule for conjunction elimination, the argument could be shown to exhibit the first undemonstrated argument form and to pass the conditionalization test. The example of an argument in bad form preserved by Sextus (P.H. ii.l47) is (26) If it is day, it is light. It is light. Therefore it is day. This argument, obviously an instance of the fallacy of affirming the consequent, could pass the conditionalization test if the conditional in question were required to be only Philonian true but not otherwise. Finally, an example of an argument invalid because of deficiency is (P.H. ii.150) (27) Wealth is either go od or bad. But wealth is not bad. Therefore wealth is good. The argument is deficient inasmuch as the first premise does not state an exhaustive disjunction of the possibilities, having left out that of wealth 166 JOSIAH GO ULD being indifferent. This extra-logical consideration was evidently thought to militate against the validity ofthe argument, an argument which passes the conditionalization test whether the conditional invoIved be regarded as PhiIonian, Diodorean, or Chrysippean true. DeveIopment of a caIcuIus of propositions in the wake of Aristotelian logic is a brilliant achievement, whether it be the achievement of the Megarians, the Stoics, or the Megarians and the Stoics (Bochenski, pp. 78-79). How preciseIy and rigorously the system was deveIoped is difficult to say on the basis of the extant fragments. Probably it would be going toa far to ascribe to the Stoics a logistic including a language of primitive symbols (logical connectives and variables), formation rules, ruIes of inference, and definitions. But in their theory of deduction one finds an astonishing number of anticipations of work in modem logical theory. What is more striking and what has gone more unnoticed is the symmetry between the Stoic logic of propositions and Aristotle's syllogistic. Corresponding to Aristotle's four perfect syllogisms are the Stoics' five basic inference schemata. Corresponding to Aristotle's rules of conversion, reductio, and ecthesis are the Stoics' ruIes for the anaIysis of nonsimple valid arguments. In faet, the first inference rule of the Stoics just is a version of reductio ad absurdum (Bochenski, p. 81). Each logic makes the claim that all valid arguments ean be shown to be so on the basis of its axioms and ruIes of derivability. Finally a Stoic demonstrative argument is a species of valid argument having true premises just as for Aristotle a demonstrative syllogism is a species of valid syllogism having true premises. And, just as Aristotle had maintained that one cannot demonstrate all propositions, so the Stoics maintained that "one mustn't demand a demonstration of all propositions" (Adv. Math. viii.367). In concIusion, then, I should say that the Stoics' logic of propositions has several structural similarities with Aristotle's syllogistic and that it also Iooks forward to the more sophisticated deductive systems of the 19th and 20th centuries. State University of New York at Albany NOTES l Prior Analytics I.24b22-26, 27al6-18. The distinction between plainly valid syIIogisms and non-evidently valid syIIogisms is for AristotIe the distinetion between 'perfect' DEDUCTION IN STOIC LOGIC 167 syllogisms, on the one hand, and 'imperfect' syllogisms, on the other. A perfect syllogism is one in which, as AristotIe frequently puts it, the necessity (of the conclusion if the premises be assumed) is evident. That the Stoics presupposed this distinetion is made clear in Part 111 of this paper. 2 I wish to thank: my colleagues, James A. Thomas and Harold Morick, for helpful critical remarks on an earlier draft of this paper. I am also enormously indebted to John Corcoran for many incisive remarks and helpful suggestions on two later versions of the paper. 3 Sextus is the richest source we have for a knowledge of Stoic logic. Being a Sceptic he is extremely critical of the Stoics. He also tends to be tediously repetitious. He appears to have quoted and paraphrased with care, though there aren't always non-circular ways of checking this. As Mates has observed (p. 9), "any parts of Stoic logic which he found either toa difficult or too good to refute will be absent from his account", but even so there is enough material in Sextus to extract a fairly good aceount of the elements of Stoic logic. 4 Mates refers in several places (pp. 4, 58, 82) to and gives evidence for the Stoics' claim that their propositional logie was complete. 5 The Stoics didn't call their logic a calculus of propositions (Diogenes Laertius groups Chrysippus' books dealing with the subject under the heading 'Logie in Relation to Arguments and Moods', Vitae vii. 193); but Stoic logic shares so many similarities with modem propositionallogic, calling their logic 'a calculus of propositions' while anachronistic is at least not baneful, and it is, in faet, in my view iIIuminating to use this expression to refer to Stoic logic. 6 ii.135-136. This work will be referred to in the remainder of the paper as P.H. 7 Thomas has rightly pointed out that the intent here must have been something like "the proposition which is allegedly established by the premises". Otherwise every conclusion would be the conclusion of a valid argument. s P.H. ii.l40. Sextus reports (P.H. ii.97-98) that the 'dogmatists' distinguished three kinds of non-evident objects. Some are absolutely non-evident; these are those which are not ofthe sort to fall under our apprehension, e.g., that the stars are even in number. Some are on occasion non-evident; these are of a sort to be evident but are made nonevident on occasion by external circumstances, e.g., as a city in which I am not present now is to me. Finally, some are naturally non-evident; these are naturally incapable of falling under our clear apprehension, e.g., that there are imperceptible pores. 9 I am indebted to John Corcoran for having suggested to me this feature of the distinction. 10 Adv. Math. viii.231. I discuss this theorem below (p. 18) in conjunction with other Stoic rules of inference. 11 'When an implication, say rpx. => .IfIX, is said to hold always, i.e. when (x) :rpx. => .'IIX, we shall say that rpxformally implies IfIx; and propositions oftheform '(x):rpx. => .XIfIX' will be said to state formal implications.' Alfred N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica to *56 (2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964), p. 20. I am not altogether certain that Diodorean implication is a species of formal implication, but it seems to me to wear that aspect, for, as Mates says (p. 45), '''If [Diodorean] it isday, thenitislight'holdsifandonlyif, 'If [Philonian] it is day at t, then it is light at t' holds for every value of t". And this appears to me to mean that if a Philonian conditional (material implication) holds always, it is Diodorean true, which is very like Russell's and Whitehead's characterization of formal implication as given above. Since Diodorus holds that what is always true is necessarily true, one might also feel 168 JOSIAH GOULD some temptation to say that Diodorean implication is an ancient version of C.I. Lewis' striet implication (see folIowing note and Mates' remark on this point, p. 47). 12 "Thus 'p implies q' or 'p strietly implies q' is to mean 'It is false that it is possibIe that p should be true and q false' or 'The statement 'p is true and q is false' is not self-consistent'. When q is dedueible from p, to say 'p is true and q is false' is to assert, implicitly, a eontradietion." c.1. Lewis and C.H. Langford, Symbolie Logie, 2nd ed., Dover Pub!., Ine., New York, 1959, p. 124. 13 The substantive term used here is 'analysis' (il ava 1..U(7t<,;), 'Sextus Empirieus', Adv. Math. viii.229. The verbal term is 'to analyze' (åvaMttv), SVF II 248. 14 This is Mates' translation (p. 77) of the passage from Apuleius, In De Interp., 277-278. 15 This argument is aseribed by Sextus to Aenesidemus (Adv. Math. viii.234, 215), but when Sextus goes on to say (Ibid. 235), "An argument sueh as this is eomposed from a second and third undemonstrated argument, as it is possibIe to learn from anal ysis ... " we may infer that the analysis he applies is a Stoie analysis. 16 For other passages in whieh some of the Stoic argument forms are exhibited, see SVF II 952, 1011, and 1012. BIBLIOGRAPHY Alexander, In Aristotelis Analytieorum Priorum Librum I Commentarium, G. Reimer, Berlin, 1883. Aristotelis, Analytiea Priora et Posteriora (ed. by W. D. Ross with Preface and Appendix by L. Minio-Paluello), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964. Arnim, Hans von, Stoieorum Veterum Fragmenta, Vol. II., B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1903. Bochenski, I. M., Andent Formal Logie, North-Holland Pub!. Co., Amsterdam, 1963. Cicero, De Divinatione, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1959. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae, Book vii, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1950. Gould, Josiah B., The Philosophy o/ Chrysippus, E. J. Brill (reprinted), Leiden, 1971. Hurst, Martha, 'Implication in the Fourth Century B.C.', Mind 44 (1935), 484-495. Kneale, William and Kneale, Martha, The Development o/ Logie, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. Lewis, C. I. and Langford, C. H., Symbolic Logic. 2nd ed. Dover Publications, New York,1959. Mates, Benson, Stoic Logie, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, Calif., 1961. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines o/ pyrrhonism, Book ii, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, Book viii, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957. Whitehead, Alfred N. and Russell, Bertrand, Principia Mathematica to *56, 2nd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964. JOHN CORCORAN REMARKS ON STOlC DEDUCTION The purpose of this note is to raise and clarify certain questions concerning deduction in Stoic logic. Despite the fact that the extant corpus of relevant texts is limited, it may nevertheless be possibIe to answer some of these questions with a considerable degree of certainty. Moreover, with the answers obtained one might be able to narrow the range of possibIe solutions to other problems concerning Stoic theories of meaning and inference. The content of this note goes somewhat beyond the comments l made during the discussion of Professor Gould's paper [8], 'Deduction in Stoic Logic', in the symposium. l am grateful to Professors Gould and Kretzmann for pointing out the implications of those comments as well as for encouraging me to prepare them for this volume. One of the obstacles to a careful discussion of Stoic logic is obscurity of terminology. Clarification of terminology may catalyze recognition of important historicaI facts. For example, in 1956 a modern logician suggested (incorrectly) in a historicaI note [4, fn. 529] that the distinction between implication and deduction could not have been made before the work of Tarski and Carnap. But once historians had clarified their own terminology it became obvious that this distinction played an important role in logic from the very beginning. Aristotle's distinction between imperfect and perfect syllogisms is a variant of the implication-deduction distinction and Gould [8] suggests the existence of a parallel distinction in Stoic logic. 1. lMPLICA TION AND INFERENCE Let us clarify our terminology. We use the two-placed verb 'to imply' (P implies c) to indicate the converse of the logical consequence relation. For us, its subject is always a set of sentences and its object is always a single sentence. For example, we might say that Euclid's Postulates imply J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, 169-181. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. Dordrecht-Holland 170 JOHN CORCORAN Playfair's Postulate. As is common in ordinary English, we use the threeplaced verb 'to infer' to indicate a certain rational action. Thus, we might say that Playfair inferred his postulate from Euclid's postulates. The subject is always human, the direct object is always a single sentence and the prepositionaI object is always a set of sentences (but it is sometimes omitted by ellipsis). 'To deduce' is a synonym for 'to infer'. The more common English usage of 'implies' presupposes that the subject contains only truths. Occasionally a logician has adopted this convention, e.g., Frege [7; pp. 82, 105, 107] and Lukasiewicz [10, p. 55]. When it is not known whether the presupposition obtains, the common usage requires the verb to be put in the subjunctive in order to 'cancel' the presupposition. Thus Frege might say something like the following: the axiom of choice, if true, would imply Zorn's lemma. However, in this article the verb 'implies' never carries the presupposition. Our usage reftects Aristotle's fundamental discovery that the logical consequence relation is separable from issues of the material truth of premises. In effect, Aristotle saw that the so-called ground-consequence relation can be analyzed into a propert y (being 'grounds') and a relation ('implication'). Likewise, 'to infer' is often used with the presupposition that the subject knows that the prepositional object is true. According to this usage we might assert, "if Zorn inferred his lemma from the axiom of choice, he must have known that the axiom of choice is true and he must have discovered that the axiom of choice implies his lemma." However, in this article our use of 'to infer' never carries the presupposition. To infer c from P is simply to deduce c from P, i.e., to discover by logical reasoning that Pimplies c. (Warning: according to this usage 'incorrect inference' is not inference, just as 'false pregnancy' is not pregnancy.) My opinion, stemming in part from reading Mates' Stoic Logic [12], Bury's translation of Sextus' writings [3], Gould [8] and other works, is that the Stoics did use the distinction between implication and inference. Here we come to the first problem. Problem l: (a) To explicate the Stoic analogue of the implication-inference distinction. (b) To determine whether the Stoic usage involved presuppositions. (c) To determine whether the Stoics articulated the distinction (which is much more than simply using it). (d) To develop extensive textual support for the answers to the above. REMARKS ON STOle DEDUCTION 2. ARGUMENTS, THEIR DEDUCTIONS AND THEIR COUNTERINTERPRET ATIONS 171 According to Gould [8] and others [e.g., 12, p. 58], the Stoics had a technical term (logos) which translates exactly into our technical term 'argument' in the sense of a set P of sentences together with c, a single sentence (P is the premise set and c is the conclusion). Our technical term does not agree with common usage in several respects, the most noteworthy of which is that one ean produce an argument (technicai sense) without engaging in any argumentation (reasoning, inference). To do this one simply specifies a set of sentences together with a single sentence. In the technical sense, arguments never express reasoning. In faet, one must engage in reasoning in order to determine the validity of an argument; therefore, the reasoning is not aiready expressed in the argument. An argument (P, c) is valid if and only if P implies c, otherwise invalid. Another confusion results from the faet that the terms 'premises' and 'conclusion' suggest that someone to ok the premises as 'his premises' and inferred the conclusion. Resnik [14] and Copi [5] define the term 'argument' in such a way that to call (P, c) an argument is to presuppose that someone to ok the premises as his premises and inferred the conclusion; but, of course, their subsequent usage accords with the definition, which does not make that logically irrelevant presupposition. Another confusion results from the inclination to regard 'argument' as an honorific term and to refuse to count as arguments certain 'bad' arguments (those which are invalid or which have contradictory premises or which include the conclusion among the premises). This confusion is encouraged to some extent by translating Aristotle's term syllogismos as 'argument' because for Aristotle all 'syllogisms' are valid; an invalid argument cannot be a 'syllogism' at all (not even an imperfect one). These reflections bring up the second problem. Problem 2: (a) What were the non-technical uses of the Stoic terms for 'argument', 'premise', 'conclusion' and 'valid' ? (b) What were the common connotations of these words ? (c) What kinds of confusions were likely to arise in technical usage because of the non-technical connotations ? (d) Which of these confusions actually occurred? To proceed we need to review the well-known asymmetry between the normal mode of establishing validityand the normal mode of establishing 172 JOHN CORCORAN invalidity. For example, in Prior Analytics (I, 4, 5, 6) in order to establish that an argument (P, c) is valid, Aristotle produces a deduction, a list of easy logical steps leading (although not necessarily directly) from P to c and "making clear that the conclusion follows". On the other hand, in order to establish that an argument (P, c) is invalid, Aristotle produces a counter interpretation, i.e., he interprets the non-Iogical terms in such a way as to verify the premises and falsify the conclusion. It's the same in more complicated cases. To establish that Euclid's postulates (and axioms) imply the Pythagorean Theorem, one produces a step-by-step deduction of the latter from the former. To establish that the fifth postulate does not follow from the others one produces a counterinterpretation making the others true and the fifth false. The asymmetry between Aristotle's method of establishing validity and his method of establishing invalidity is more than just echoed by modern logicians. Tarski, for example, relegates the two methods to separate (but adjacent) sections ofhis Introduetion to Logic [16, §36, §37]. Af ter a brief discussion of deduction within an axiomatic framework, Tarski adds [op. cit., p. 119] More generally, if within Iogic or mathematics we estabIish one statement on the basis of others, we refer to this process as a derivation or deduction ... A few pages later [p. 124], he takes up the problem of showing that a certain sentence does not follow from certain premises. Here he discusses areinterpretation of the basic terms in a manner that willieave the premises true while making the conclusion false. Because the dichotomy of methods may not have been emphasized sufficiently in recent literature, it may appear to persist only in a somewhat muted form. However, I think that a case ean be made for the historicai thesis that what we now call 'proof theory' has its roots in the method of establishing validity whereas what we now call 'model theory' is rooted in the method for establishing invalidity. Our main concern here is with the Stoic method for establishing validity, but we ean still wonder about the Stoic method for establishing invalidity. As far as I have been able to determine, very little has been written about the latter and it may well be the case that the Aristotelian dichotomy was not preserved by the Stoics. They may have been concerned onIy with establishing validity. If this conjecture seems strange we may note that REMARKS ON STOl C DEDUCTION 173 there is nothing about establishing invalidity either in The Port-Royal Logic or in Boole's The Laws o/ Thought. Moreover, lang before the method of counterinterpretations was used to establish the invalidity of the argument from the other postulates of geometry to the parallel postulate, the argument was widely assumed to be invalid [cf. 4, p. 328]. Notice that a deduction is a piece of extended discourse consisting of several sentences over and above the premises and condusion. As an aside we might point out that our term 'lemma' which usually indicates an especially important intermediate line in a lang deduction was used by the Stoics to indicate a premise [loc. cit.]. As another aside which may be relevant to avoiding confusion we might note that some recent writers have used the terms 'a deduction' and 'an implication' interchangeably, sometimes using 'an implication' to indicate a valid argument (but, of course, for some older writers an implication is just an if-then sentence l). It is useful to imagine that the deductions and the counterinterpretations all exist prior to being 'produced' so that 'produetion' is re ally only exhibition. If this is too much, just imagine that all deductions and all counterinterpretations potentially exist. In any case think of both dasses of 'objects' as 'there'. Now we ean ask interesting questions about the completeness of the method for establishing validity and about the completeness of the method of establishing invalidity. First, does every valid argument have a corresponding deduction? Second, does every invalid argument have a corresponding counterinterpretation? Notice that only one of these questions ean be trivial. 1/ valid means having a deduction then the first question is trivial but the second is significant. On the other hand, if valid means having no counterinterpretations then the second question is trivial while the first is significant. Standard practice seems to be to take the latter point of view, Le., to assume that valid means having no counterinterpretations. The significant question, then, is whether to every argument lacking counter interpretations there corresponds a deduction (to establish its validity). If not, then there are valid arguments whose validity cannot be established. In any case we are led to consider three large dasses : the das s of arguments, the das s of deductions and the das s of interpretations. In the balance of this note we focus on the dass of deductions; but, of course, the dass of arguments and the das s of interpretations are both continually in the background. 174 JOHN CORCORAN 3. AI MS OF THEORIES OF DEDUCTION It is unlikely that God gave men language and left it to Aristotle or to the Stoics to invent deductions. When Aristotle began his work there was an extant corpus of deductive discourses and a well-established activity of producing deductions. In fact, historians believe that there were at least two axiomatizations of geometry which existed prior to Aristotle's time. This situation leaves Aristotle with three options as far as the aim of his theory of deduction is concerned. He could have had a descriptive aim or a prescriptive aim or a conventionalistic aim. That is, roughly, he could have set himself the task of describing the class of deductions (by cataloging the rules according to which they had been produced) or he could have prescribed the rules which should be used to produce ideally 'correct' deductions or he could have devised rules which would produce discourses which would serve the same purpose that ordinary deductions serve (viz. establishing that conclusions follow from premise-sets). There seems to be a tendency among mathematicians to assume that the descriptive approach is the dominant one not only in Aristotle but even in modern logic. Bourbaki [2, p. I], whose foundational writings have been influential, has said, Proofs had to exist before the structure of a proof could be logically analyzed; and this analysis, carried out by Aristotle, and again and more deeply by the modem logicians, must have rested then, as it does now, on a large body of mathematica! writing. Indeed, on reading the Analytics, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Aristotle's aim was descriptive. However, as Mueller [13] has shown, Aristotle's final product felI far short of success as a descriptive effort because even the most elementary deductions in Euclid cannot be produced by Aristotle's rules. Here we come to another problem. Problem 3: (a) To decide whether the Stoic logicians had set themselves descriptive or prescriptive or conventionalistic aims. (b) If the fint, to decide whether their 'data' incIuded the mathematical and scientific deductions available to them or whether they restricted their data so as to incIude only 'philosophicaI' discourse. If the second, to discover the criterion of correctness used to ground the 'should' of the prescriptions. If the third, to discover the reason they abandoned (or overlooked) the first REMARKS ON STOIC DEDUCTION 175 two goals. (c) In any case to adduce persuasive philological arguments for the above. 4. SENTENTIAL AND ARGUMENTAL SYSTEMS OF DEDUCTION There are many different styles of systems of deduction and it is historically important to know the exact style that the Stoic system exemplified. Here we will characterize two styles which seem relevant to discussion of Stoic deduction. In order to determine the style of the latter it may be necessary for the historian to first construct an exhaustive survey of the extant styles and even then there is no reason to think that the Stoic system will necessarily conform to one of them. When a person first starts to think ab out deductions he often conceives of a deduction of c from P as a list of sentences beginning with those of P, having intermediate sentences added according to rules and ending with c. A deduction whose 'lines' are all sentences is called a sentential deduction. A direct, linear sentential deduction is one of the sort described above one goes from the premises step-by-step directly to the conclusion. As I have suggested, I think that there is an inclination to think at first that all deductions are direct, linear and sentential. But this would be to overlook the indirect, linear, sentential deductions which proceed from P to c by assuming sentences in P, supposing also 'the denia!' of c and then adding immediate inferences until one arrives at a sentence and its own denial. Aristotie's deductive system is a linear sentential system with direct and indirect deductions. In regard to style the systems of Boole and Hilbert are more primitive than that of Aristotle because their deductions are all direct and linear. Systems of direct, linear, sentential deductions can have binary rules (which proceed from two local premises to a local conclusion, e.g. modus ponens) unary rules (which proceed from a single local premise to a local conclusion, e.g. universal instantiation) and nullary rules (which need no local premises and produce a local conclusion ab initio). Nullary rules are commonly referred to as logical axiom schemes. In addition to linear rules which proceed from finitely many local premises to a local conclusion, a sentential system can als o have suppositionaI rules which correspond to inference of a local conclusion (not from IocaI premises but) on the basis ofa 'pattern' of reasoning. For ex176 JOHN CORCORAN ample conditionalization can be stated as a suppositional rule which proceeds to a conditional on the basis of a pattern of reasoning from the antecedent to the consequent. Thus the class of sentential deductive systems is quite diverse. It includes systems of direct linear deductions (Boole and Hilbert), systems of direct and indirect linear deductions (Aristotle) and systems of suppositional deductions (Jaskowski, Fitch, etc.). Many (but by no means all) of the so-called natural-deduction systems are sentential (cf. [6, lIlD. Opposed to the sentential deductions (which are lists of sentences) there are those which are lists of arguments. Systems which consist entirely of lists of arguments are called argumental deductive systems. The systems of Lemmon [9], Suppes [IS] and Mates [11] are in this style. In creating an argumental deduction one does not start with premises and proceed to a conclusion but rather one takes ab initio certain simple arguments and constructs from them, line-by-line, increasingly complex arguments until the argument with desired premises and conclusion is reached. In argumental systems the rules produce arguments from arguments (not sentences from sentences). Given a certain minimal clear-headedness about the notion of a deduction, the problem of determining the exact nature of the Stoic deductive system (or systems) emerges. Let us put this down with a little care. Problem 4: (a) To describe the class(es) of discourses which the Stoic logicians regarded as deductions, i.e., which were taken to establish the validity of arguments. (b) For the (each) Stoic deductive system we need both an exact description of the rules and also an account of how the rules were used to produce extended discourses (deductions). 5. THE STOl C FRAGMENTS The main purpose of this section is to review and interpret some of the available information concerning Stoic deduction in order to contribute toward a solution of the problem of discovering the style of the Stoic system. It has been suggested that the theory of deduction may have been of minor importance in Stoic logic because, since the Stoics had truth-tables, they could establish the validity of arguments by a computational rather than discursive means. Two points are relevant here. First, Mates claims REMARKS ON STOlC DEDUCTION 177 that there is no evidence that the Stoics used any computational means for establishing validity. Apparently the faet that truth-functional validity admits of a computational decision procedure, as embarrassingly trivial as it is, had to wait untill920 to be noticed. Second, the existence oftruth table methods should not disguise the faet that validity is always established by a deduction to compute a truth-table for a truth-functionally valid argument is nothing more (or less) than writing a deduction-by-cases in tabular form. Incidentally, I find it very difficult to understand how anyone could believe that the Stoics knew that their deductive system was complete when there is no evidence that they availed themselves of truth-table methods for establishing validity. Indeed, as has been pointed out elsewhere, if the Stoics had demonstrated completeness then sureIy they must have worked on the problem and, yet, there seem to be no fragments which admit of interpretation either as deliberation on the problem of demonstrating completeness or as alluding to such deliberation. In my opinion, it is not even clear that the Stoics believed their system complete (cf. [12, pp. 81-82]). (A) Language: The Stoics analyzed sentences as truth-functional combinations of atomic sentences using as connectives: the conditional, conjunction, exclusive disjunction, and negation. Here we use =:>, &, v and ~ . (B) Sentential rules: There were evidently five rules which 'produced' a single sentence from a pair of sentences and it is clear in each case that whenever the operands are true the resultant is true. Thus these five rules could serve as immediate sentential-inference rules (SIR, plural: SIRs) These can be written as follows: (SIRI) (SIR2) (SIR3) (SIR4) (SIR5) p=:> q,p/q, p =:> q, ~ q/ ~ p, ~ (p & q),p/~ q, pvq,p/~ q, pvq, ~q/p. (C) Argumental rules: There were evidently four ruIes which produced an argument from a pair of arguments or (in at least one case) from a single argument. It is clear in the three known cases that whenever the operands are valid the resultant is also valid. Thus these rules could serve as immediate argumental-injerence rules (AIR, plural AIRs). This concept will 178 JOHN CORCORAN be discussed below but, for the present, we will write these ruIes using a symboIic notation. For later reference we will quote the rule before symbolizing it. In symbolizing the argumental rules we use the arrow to separate premises from conclusion and we use the double slant line to separate operands from resultant Uust as we used the single slant line to separate operands from resultant in the sentential rules). (AIRI) Jf from two propositions a third is dedueed, then either of the two together with the denial of the eonclusion yields the denial of the other. This evidently gives two subrules. (AIRl.l) p, q --+ r I I p, '" r --+ '" q, (AIR1.2) p, q --+ r I I '" r, q --+ '" p. Here it should be noted that the Stoics could have been using the term 'the denia!' ambiguously to indicate either the result of adding a negation to asentence or the result of deleting a negation from asentence (which stands with a negation). If this is so, one wouId get sixteen subrules (when r is a negation, when p is a negation and when q is a negation). (AIR2) Whenever we have premises from whieh a certain eonclusion ean be validly deduced, potentially we have also that eonclusion among the premises, even if it is not stated explicitly. To symbolize this let S be a set of premises and let S + p be the result of adding p to S. (AIR2) S --+ p; S + P --+ r II S --+ r. Today this rule is sometimes called 'the cut rule'; but there are other 'cut' rules as well. (AIR3) Whenever from two premises a third is dedueed and other proposi/ions from whieh one of the premises is dedueible are assumed, then from the other premise and those other propositions the same eonclusion will be deducible. (AIR3) p, q --+ r; S --+ p II q + S --+ r. This is another 'cut' rule. A modem logician might be bamed by the presence of two cut rules. That the 'force' of (AIR2) is so close to that of (AIR3) causes some speculation concerning the accuracy of the sources. REMARKS ON STOlC DEDUCTION 179 It is not known what the fourth rule is but it has been alleged that the Stoics 'had conditionalization'. One AIR version of conditionalization ean be written as follows. (AIR4) S+p-q//S-(p:::lq). Incidentally, it is important to distinguish between having a rule of conditionalization and knowing the principle of the corresponding conditional (which is semantic). The latter ean be stated: an argument is valid if and only if the corresponding conditional (if 'conjunction-of-premises', then 'conclusion') is logically true. A rule of conditionalization is a rule for constructing deductions whereas the principle of the corresponding conditional is asemantic metatheorem. Obviously one could have either without the other. As far as I have been able to tell the Stoics knew the principle of the corresponding conditional but there is noevidence to indicate that they employed a deductive rule of conditionalization. (Note that the rule of conditionalization does not mention the conjunction connective.) Another possibility for the fourth rule is one which would permit something like indirect deductions. One way of putting this is as folIows. (AIR5) A set of premises implies a conclusion if the premises together with the denial of the conclusion imply a contradiction. (AIR5) S + P q, S + P - ~ q / / S - ~ p. On grounds of common sense one would be inclined to accept the hypothesis that the Stoics had a rule for constructing 'indirect deductions'. However, there seems to be no textual evidence to corroborate that hypothesis. (D) The Stoic System: Because of the existence of the argumental rules it is impossible that the Stoics had a sentential system. On the other hand, a sentential ruleean easily be adapted for use as an ab initio (nullary) argumental rule. Fõ example, modus ponens ean be adapted to the following nulIary argumental rule. Thus it seems possibie that the Stoic system was an argumental system. Taste for simplicity tends toward this conclusion. However, it may have 180 JOHN CORCORAN been the case that the argumental rules were thought of as rules for producing sentential rules from sentential rules so that the Stoics had a double-tiered sentential system: a kind of argumental system for producing sentential rules which were then incorporated into a sentential system for producing sentential deductions. To exemplify the idea of producing sentential rules from sentential rilles by means of argumental rules we offer the folIowing. (SIR6) p, '" ql'" (p => q) (from (SIRI) by (AIRl.1)), (SIR 7) '" '" q, pi'" (pvq) (from (SIR4) by (AIR1.2)). In order to settle these questions it is necessary to review the extant corpus and isolate all passages which are expressions of deductions. One must then try to discover the kind of rules which would best account for each passage. As far as I can see we still do not know exactly what the ruIes are because one cannot know what a rule is unIess one knows how it is used. There is a final consideration which may be important. Imagine that a deductive system emerges from a kind of operational conception. For example if we think of a logical consequence of a set of sentences as being somehow 'contained in' the set then we are inc1ined to view deduction as an operation of 'analyzing' a set of sentences to find out what is 'contained in' it. From this conception the linear, direct, sentential systems emerge (logical axioms will have to be thought of as catalysts which may be added in an analytic proces s without adding to the 'content' of the set of sentences being analyzed). An argumental system, especiaIly those of Lemmon [9], Mates [Il] and Suppes [15], may be seen as emerging from a constructional or synthetic conception; one starts with trivially valid arguments and uses them to synthesize increasingly complex arguments. According to Mates [12, pp. 64, 77] the Stoics spoke of analyzing complex arguments and of reducing complex arguments to simple arguments. If this is to be taken literally then we can assume that the Stoics thought of complex arguments as some how 'composed of' simple arguments and that they used the argumental rules backward, so to speak, i.e. that they established the validity of a given argument by first finding simpIer arguments which could be synthesized to yie1d the given argument, then doing the same thing to the simpIer arguments, and so on until a set of 'simple arguments' was reached. If this is so then the Stoic 'deductions' were REMARKS ON STOIC DEDUCTION 181 actually tree diagrams fanning out to simpier arguments from the given argument and having simple arguments at the extremities. This conc1usion seems to be compatibie (at least) with the evidence that Mates cites but it goes counter to Mates' own conc1usion. However, Mates' own account of the Stoic deductive process [12, p. 78] does not involve the argumental rules at all. State University of New York at Buffalo BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] AristotIe, Prior Analytics . [2] Bourbaki, N., 'Foundations of Mathematics for the Working Mathematician', Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1949), 1-8. [3] Bury, R. G. (trans!.), Sextus Empiricus, Vols. 1 and 2, Cambridge, Mass. 1933. [4] Church, A., lntroduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton 1956. [5] Copi, I., Symbolic Logic (2nd ed.), New York 1965. [6] Corcoran, J., 'Discourse Grammars and the Structure ofMathematical Reasoning, I, II, nr, Journal of Structural Learning 3 (1972). [7] Frege, G., On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic (trans!. by E. W. Kluge), New Haven 1971. [8] Gould, J., 'Deduetion in Stoic Logic', this volume, p. 151. [9] Lemmon, E. J., Beginning Logic, London 1965. [lO] Lukasiewicz, J., AristotIe's Syllogistic (2nd ed.), Oxford 1957. [11] Mates, B., Elementary Logic, New York 1965. [12] Mates, B., Stoic Logic, Berkeley 1961. [13] Mueller, I., 'Greek Mathematics and Logic', this volume, p. 35. [14] Resnik, M., Elementary Logic, New York 1970. [15] Suppes, P., Introduetion to Logic, Princeton 1957. [16] Tarski, A., Introduetion to Logic (3rd ed.), New York 1965. PART FIVE FINAL SESSION OF THE SYMPOSIUM JOHN CORCORAN FUTURE RESEARCH ON ANCIENT THEORIES OF COMMUNICATION AND REASONING In Die Meistersinger one finds some adviee whieh to some extent expresses the general attitude of this symposium. It reads as follows: "If you by rules would measure what doth not with your rules agree, forgetting all your learning, seek ye first what its rules may be". It is interesting to refleet on some possibie explanations of why it is now possibie for us to 'forget all our learning' and seek 'the rules that the aneients had purposed' . Perhaps the most relevant faet is that we now possess a framework rieh enough to eneompass and eategorize many diverse theories of language and reasoning. In the seeond place, as aresult of what must have appeared as 75 years of game-playing, we now have, in reasonably developed form, literally hundreds of possibie abstraet languages and logies. Consequently, we ean now afford to look with an unjaundieed and objeetive eye at the writings of the aneients. The danger of forcing an ancient theory into a procrustean bed is eonsiderably diminished. Even though many of us have opinions eoncerning 'the truth' in some of these matters, many possibie interpretations of aneient logie are now so obvious that even the most enthusiastie zealot ean see the issues whieh must be objeetively settled in order to establish one interpretation as more plausible than another. For example, prior to the 1950's the idea of a eomprehensive 10gie devoid of anything resembling truth-funetions was practically ineoneeivable. But sinee then Tarski, Scott, and Kalieki investigated what are now ealled equationallogies, inspired no doubt by the faet that truth-funetions play a deeidedly minor role in many elementary developments in algebra. In high sehool, we learned to solve equations without using truth-funetions in our sehematie diseourses. In any case, theoretieally possibie logies devoid oftruth-functions were studied in some detail and found to be sufficiently rieh to form underlying logics for a fair amount of scientifie aetivity. In a sense this development made it possibIe to look at Aristotle without assuming in advanee that he must have smuggled truth-funetions in somewhere. Examples like this ean be repeated. I do not want to overemphasize J. Corcoran (ed.J, Anc/ent Logic and It. Modern Interpretation., 185-187. All Right. Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publi.hing Company, Dordrecht-Holland 186 JOHN CORCORAN logic here, but another logical example is too telling to pass over. Prior to 1934, all published logics were developed in the so-called axiomatic framework which was devised by Frege and aped by all informed logicians. In 1934, however, both Gentzen and Jaskowski published logics which were as rich in deductive power as the axiomatic logics, but which had radically different structures. Thereafter it was no longer plausible to assume that if a person had developed a logic then he necessarily had an axiom system. This, of course, opened the path to a new assessment of Aristotie's logic and, predict, to a new assessment of Stoic logic. Before discussing some of the open problems in the understanding of ancient theories, I would like to undermine an overly narrow construal of our work today. Notice that, in almost all of our expositions of ancient doctrines, the emphasis was on placing those doctrines accurately and objectively within modern settings. To be more specific, most of us were concerned to say, ofthe things that we know, which ofthem were aiready known by the ancients. This, of course, is of great importance, not only for our own understanding of the historicai development of our own technical fields, but also because, in order to be part of the cultures of subsequent generations, ancient texts must be reinterpreted from the standpoint of each subsequent generation. The Renaissance interpretation of classical antiquity is hardly relevant to our understanding of it. If classical antiquity is now of importance to us, then we must try to relate it to the categories and is sues of our own times. To assume that the Renaissance humanists were more accurate than modern classicists because the former were temporally closer to antiquity would be preposterous and irrelevant. However, the above approach to ancient theories overlooks one crucial and potentially valuable possibility: namely, that the ancients had insights, perhaps even fairly well developed theories, which are substantially better than our own views on the same topics. Notice that if some Renaissance figures had understood Aristotle's theory of perfecting syllogisms, then some areas of modern logic could have been developed earlier. (I have in mind natural deduction systems. We could have had them in the late 1800's jf people in the Renaissance had aiready understood that Aristotle had one.) I think that we have a responsibility to make it impossibie for future generations to say of us that, for example, had we understood the Categories, we would have been able to develop theories of semantics far superior to those that we are now developing. In other FUTURE RESEARCH ON ANCIENT THEORIES 187 words, I think that we must look at the ancients with the hope of finding in them doetrines and ideas which would be substantial contributions to modern linguistics and logic. Perhaps the resolution of the current chaos in modern modallogie will turn on recapturing the meaning of some of the convoluted passages in the Aristotelian corpus. Incidentally, although I ean point to no one item, I do feel that my own grasp of logic has been enhanced and broadened by my studies of Aristotle. But I do not recommend aspiring logicians to start there. In addition to the technical insights which may emerge through modernistic interpretations of ancient logic, we also search for philosophic insights. Attempts to understand ancient theories seem to force us to reconsider the fundamental and enduring questions concerning logic and language. As we all sadly know, successful technical advances have a tendency to engender trains of imitative variations which cloud fundamental issues. Investigation of ancient theories tends to force us to get clearer about what is really important in modern technical developments. It challenges us to clarify the philosophic value of modern achievements. We are invited to ask of modern developments what they ean provide, vis-a-vis the fundamental questions, that the ancient views could not provide. In the light of modern developments, one is surely refreshed by discovering in Aristotle's works that logic is about reasoning and that linguistics is about the system of communication which seems to distinguish us from animais and make science and history possible. Again we are refreshed to discover that Aristotle saw deduction as objective and natural rather than subjective and contrived. When most logic texts fail to consider that it is humans that produce deductions, and that humans engage in such activity for a reason, Aristotle offers us his modest observation that perfect syllogisms "make plain that the conclusion follows". And of course the refreshment is twofold. We are reminded of the basic motivation for studying logic and linguistics and we are moved to rejoin the centuries-old dialogues on the fundamental issues. State University of New York of Buffalo A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH IN ANCIENT LOGICAL THEOR y Participants in order o/ appearance: LYNN RosE, SUNY Buffalo JOHN CoRCORAN, SUNY Buffalo JOSIAH GoULD, SUNY Albany IAN MUELLER, University o/ Chicago MARY MULHERN, Swarthmore CollegeNEWTON GARVER, SUNY Buffalo WILLIAM PARRY, SUNY Buffalo JOHN GLANVILLE, California State University (San Francisco) JOHN MULHERN, Bryn Mawr College JOHN SWINIARSKI, Buffalo, New York KEITH IcKES, University o/Indiana NORMAN KRETZMANN, Cornell University JOHN RICHARDS, University o/ Georgia. INTRODUCTION What follows is very nearly a word-for-word transcription of tape recordings of a discussion which took place in the final session of the symposium. The reader will notice a certain spontaneity and liveliness not usually found in scholarly writings. Some of the speakers would want to revise their remarks were they to be published as scholarly dieta. Therefore, the reader should take this as a record of free conversation and not as part of the research archives of the history of logic. J.e. Lynn Rose: One of the topics that has intrigued me for some time is the relationship between Plato and the Prior Analytics. I would like to state a view that seems to diverge from some of the things that have been said in the sessions. Prof. Mueller mentioned that the syllogistic logic seems to have been developed independently of Greek mathematics. If my notes are right, I think he also mentioned in passing that it was deve10ped more or less independently ofPlato and his School, who had almost no interest in logic. Then later on John Corcoran said that the assertoric logic is extensional where modallogie is somewhat more intensional. I think he connected the intensional aspect of the modallogie with Plato and regarded that approach as an error. It seems to me that the assertoric logic is closer to Plato than the modallogie is. I would agree that Plato's forms are very much intensional rather than extensional, but it seems to me that the project of taking a Platonic position about forms and seeking a J. Corcoran (ed.). Andent Logle and It. Modem Interpretation •• 189-208. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company. Dordrecht-Holland 190 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH formallogic that is extensional is quite a consistent one and that in modem times people like Russell and Goodman have done these two things at once without any real inconsistency. They sound very much like Plato when they are talking about forms and qualities and universals or whatever and yet their logical position puts a lot of emphasis on an extensional viewpoint. What I am suggesting is that, in spite of Plato's position ab out the forms, he was moving toward a formallogic, that the stage had been set for the Prior Analytics by Plato. Briefly, I see the Parmenides as a first and abortive search for something like a formallogie (which is why the Parmenides is a mess) and the method of division as an approach which was somewhat more suecessful from Plato's own point of view. Whether anything in the Prior Analytics is attributable to Plato rm not sure, but I think he at least set the stage for the Prior Analytics. I ean't see the Prior Analytics springing fully elaborated from the brow of AristotIe or the brow of anyone else. It must have had a history. There must have been a lot of work going on before it got set up in that form. So my suggestion is that maybe it is the other way around. Maybe the first work in logie by AristotIe was on the assertorie syllogistie and that was under Platonie influenee. Then the modallogic, which presumably came later, would be more likely to be AristotIe's own work. So, I see the bad part of the Prior Analytics as Aristotle's independent work. John Corcoran: I really see it the other way around, although I don't know Plato as well as you do. Y ou may very well be right, but I think the flavor that one gets out ofthe two men is that Aristotle takes eonerete individuals as being of much more fundamentalontological nature than the universals, and for Plato it's the other way around. In the assertorie logie it's the concrete individuals that seem to be what's important. In the modallogie it's the universals that seem to be the more important. But in eonnection with the Parmenides you may very well be correct. Josiah Gould: There is a eurious passage in the Phaedo, the one where it appears that the arguments which had been quite good no longer appear to be go od and Soerates wams everybody against misology. And you may remember in that passage he says that just as when a couple of friends let you down you may come to hate all men, so when a couple of arguments let you down you come to hate all arguments. The corrective that is needed is an art oflogic (techne logike). What's odd is that, I think, A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 191 it is the only reference to such an art in the whole Platonic corpus. It seems to me that your point is well taken in so far as that kind of remark falling on the mind of a person like Aristotle to ok seed and grew. I don't see that Plato himself contributed to the development of such an art. What's odd about it is that it was he himself who saw the need. Lynn Rose: Well, where I'm not at all confident is what the exact relationship between Plato and the Prior Analytics is. I am confident that he was moving toward the Prior Analytics and that the Parmenides represents one effort, the method of division another effort. I see the method of division as leading naturally to the Prior Analytics, which is better than division and, of course, better than the Parmenides. Almost anything would beo Ian Mueller: It seems to me that the most crucial thing missing in Plato's notion of a techne logike is the concept of form. That seems to be the breakthrough of the Prior Analytics. Y ou get some cases in Plato where Socrates says that from 'All A are B' you can't necessarily infer 'All B are A'. It's clear that Plato is trying to make a general point. But there is very little in Plato which suggests what John (Corcoran) called a revolutionary idea: that the validity of an argument depends on its form. John Corcoran: Incidentally, this revolutionary idea isn't explicitly stated in Aristotle. Ian Mueller: No. John Corcoran: He just uses it over and over again. As I said in my reply to (and, as it turned out, my agreement with) Mary Mulhern, just because someone uses the principle is no grounds for saying that it was part of his theory. Ian Mueller: Maybe I am changing the subject, but the crux of your discussion with Mary Mulhern seems to me to be the distinction between having a theory and having an isolated insight. To say that Aristole has a propositional logic of some kind just because he states some propositionallaws seems improper to me. Mary Mulhern: Let me point out that I didn't say that he did actually have a logic of propositions. What I wished to point out was that I thought there was evidence for enough insights so that he could have gone on to elaborate a propositional logic if he had been interested to do so. My position was that he was not interested in doing so. He did not elaborate such a logic but elaborated the other one instead. 192 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH Ian Mueller: I'd still maintain that the issue arises when you say he could have if he had wanted to. Are you implying that he in some sense had the idea of stating fundamental propositional arguments or axioms and deriving others from them? Are you making that strong a c1aim? Or is your c1aim just that there are some rudimentary things in Aristotle which, if he had had a propositional logic, you would have called its roots? Or something weaker? Mary Mulhern: Well, it seems to me that he is able to handle propositions as units in arguments. Re can work with them. Re has propositional variables and what not. Re can work with that sort of basic unit. That unit didn't have sufficient explanatory power for him so he had no interest in pursuing it further. AIthough I think it can be shown that he did know how to deal with them, he didn't give us a theory concerning them because he had other fish to fry. Ian Mueller: Could one draw an analogy with a mathematician who says, "I see I could go into algebra, but algebra is boring, so 1'11 do something else."? In this case the discipline is aiready there (I don 't mean that it pre-exists) and the mathematician sees that he could develop it, but it doesn't look interesting to him. That seems like an awfully strong c1aim to make about AristotIe and propositionallogic. John Corcoran: I think that what Mary Mulhern is saying has a firm kernelof truth in it. But it is going to take a lot of pages and a lot of delicate writing to say it in such a way as to be more true than false. I think there are no grounds at all for saying that AristotIe envisaged the possibility of a theory of truth-functionallogic on a par with the theory of syllogistic. Mary Mulhern: Row eould it be? As you have pointed out there are important differences between them. I don't know that you eould begin to treat them as being on a par. Newton Garver: As Iunderstand your point, Mary (Mulhern), it's a fairly restrieted one. In order to eombat the eriticism that Aristotie's logie is deficient for not having taken account of propositional interests, you c1aim: well, he makes enough mention of speeifie propositional inferenees that we ean suppose that he would have seen this as a defieieney in his system, were it really a deficiency. John Corcoran: Oh. This seems to support my point. Newton Garver: No. You're adding a eertain amount of sophistication A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 193 to his logical insight. I take it that Mary's point was that he in faet made use of a certain type of argument. Now that kind of argument was needed to complete the arguments that he deals with in the syllogistic, so he had enough familiarity with it .So we can now say that he didn'tjust overlook this because he wasn't even familiar with what a propositional inference is at all. Mary Mulhern: That is what I mean. Lukasiewiczhadmadethec1aim that Aristotelian syllogistic presupposed propositionallogic as an underlying logic. As an interpretive procedure this was completely cockeyed. He made the further c1aim that, although it was true that propositional logic was the underlying logic of syllogistic, Aristotle had no idea in the world of this kind of system and that it wasn't invented or thought of or talked about or discussed, no one had an inkling of it until it was developed by the Stoics. Now what John Corcoran showed was that syllogistic is itself a fundamentallogical system; it does not presuppose propositional logic as an underlying logic, nor does it presuppose any other logical system as an underlying logic. And he suggested in his paper that it was then gratuitous to speak of Aristotle's ignorance here. But he didn't go on to say what we might speak of. I just followed it up by pointing out what I thought were Aristotle's motives in the matter. John Corcoran: So your point is mainly that if it were needed he would have easily seen it. Okay. That's a very different kind of a point. Ian Mueller: A question just occurred to me. Don't you need transitivity of implication for what you do? John Corcoran: It comes out in the wash. H's not presupposed there. It's there, but not in the form of a law of propositionallogic. William Parry: Actually sometimes Aristotle is much more correct than many modern logicians in refraining from hast y generalizations. Now you see, for instance, the principle of direct reduction is perfectly sound in the syllogism. I mean these arguments (reducing one syllogism to another by direct reduction) are valid. But logicians infer in general that when the conjunction P and Q entails R, the conjuction P and not-R will entail not-Q. They made a hast y generalization and this gives them the paradoxes of strict implication, which, of course, you may swallow if you want to, but if you don't want to you don't have to. Aristotle didn't have to. Direct reduction works perfectly in a syllogism because there any two propositions have all the terms and you never get any novelties. But when 194 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH you make a general rule out of it then you go from 'P and Q entail P' to 'P and not-P entail not-Q'. So you can get the conclusion which is completely irrelevant to the premises. But you can never get that in the use of reduction in the syllogism. So Aristotle, if he thought of it, would have been smart enough not to generalize the propositional logic too hastily from the syllogisms. I want to make a different point going back to what Lynn Rose was getting at there. Now it seems to me that beginning with assertoric syllogistic is quite consistent with Aristotle's first stages of syllogism being more Platonic, beeause ifyou are dealing only with forms (and remember, of course, only by way of exception does he use singular terms) you want general terms, of course. And if your general terms are, e.g., men, animaIs, and stones the kind of terms he usually uses when he gives counterexamples then here it would be redundant to bring in questions of necessity or possibility, because this is all in the realm ofnecessary matter, as the medievals would say. To say that all men are necessarily animais is redundant, if you are talking about the relation of men to animais. So, starting with forms, Platonic forms shaH we say, then there is no necessity for bringing in modality. Everything is either necessary or impossible. If you do bring in real contingencies, and talk about contingent matters, it is then that the distinction becomes pertinent. So, I think that assertoric logic properly comes first in order. Remember for a proposition to be assertoric doesn't mean it isn't necessarily true, of course. I think it is important to distinguish apodictic and necessary. 'All men are animais' is necessary but not apodictic. So I think it is quite natural if he is thinking in Platonic forms or something analogous to them at any rate his own version of them that he would begin with the assertoric and only later go on to the modal. When you want to bring both the contingent and necessary into the same system, only then is it necessary to make this distinction. John Glanville: Contingency makes modal logic necessary, not the Platonic forms. William Parry: Yes, that's right. John Coreoran: I think that is going to clear up a lot of problems that I have in interpreting the Analylies as a whole. Because the Posterior Analyties is obviously a treatise on axiomatic science and in it there is practicaHy no reference (or maybe literally no reference) to modalities. A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 195 y our idea would explain why it's not needed even though necessity is an essential aspect of scientific knowledge. That's very interesting. Josiah Gou/d: Except I think there is the problem that the demonstrative syllogism is supposed to apply in all the natural sciences. When we start talking about the natural world it tums out that the sentences we use to talk ab out that world are, for the most part, themselves for-the-most-part sentences. That is, when you say so-and-so is the case for the most part, it is aiready by definition the kind of sentence that can't be plugged into a demonstrative syllogism. John Corcoran: I guess Icould take this time to say some things about future research. I think one thing that has emerged from this conference is Prof. Mueller's observation that for Aristotle modus ponens is not a valid rule of inference. He says that any if-then must be established syllogistically first. So, taking an if-then as a premise is an illegitimate move. He says these things aren't really arguments. I think that in that passage the conclusion that Aristotle is using if-then in the sen se of logical consequence is unavoidable. It would be interesting to look at the rest of the corpus and see whether there are any grounds whatever for thinking that Aristotle was aware of the truth-functional use of if-then. It may very well be the case that if-then for him did express logical consequence and that only. That would shed more light on why no propositionallogic got developed. You can't get off the ground without truth tables. That's one pos si ble piece of future research. Ian Mueller: I think you ean really. The opposite assumption seems to me to have played too great a role in some interpretation s of Stoic logic. One could have just five unproved arguments and a few ways for manipulating them without going into the questions of the interpretation of the connectives involved. One could have a logic without interpreting the connectives. John Corcoran: Just a deductive system without semantics. I think that the only reason that you ean think that's possibie is because we have just gone through a wave of formalism where people took seriously the idea of having a logic that didn't have any semantics in it. It was just pure manipulation of symbols. Ian Mueller: The wave itself shows it to be possible. John Corcoran: Okay. That's a hypothesis that could be investigated. 196 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH Maybe the Stoics were really formalists and it was foot-dragging reactionaries that put the truth-tables in. Ian Mueller: All I mean is that you don't have to have a semantics to have a logic. John Corcoran: I have something written up here about some problems with the Categories and some problems with the Analytics and some problems in Stoic logic. The first thing I want to talk about is a problem in Categories. In the Categories there are two prominent vertical hierarchies. Namely, the one involving individuals this man, thi s plant, and so on and substantial universals, man, plant and so on. And the other involving instances of qualities this shape, this color, and so on. And qualitative universals spherical, green, and so on. These correspond roughly to nouns and adjectives. Alongside these two hierarchies of Categories there is another hierarchy which is not in Categories; namely, the one involving what we call in our native untutored tongue substance, mass, matter or better perhaps, stuff. Words for stuff (cheese, water, earth, metal, meat, so on) are called mass words by linguists. They behave in some respects like nouns and in other respects like adjectives. In any case, we have an ontologically different category. In their primary senses these words, like adjectives, do not take numerical modifiers. In the primary sen se of cheese, we don 't talk about several cheeses or one cheese or two cheeses. We always have to say a piece of cheese. In other ways, they behave more like nouns. Someone called them mass nouns rather than mass words, while referring to nouns themselves as count nouns, thereby letting on that the former do not admit numerical modifiers as the latter do. To a modem linguist the absence of hierarchy of stuff constitutes an obvious gap in Categories. The questions that this situation suggests are many. Does this indicate a lacuna in the text? That is, could there have been a category of mass nouns that was completely omitted, one that AristotIe had worked on? Now assuming that it isn't a gap in the text, did AristotIe have some doctrine which 'eliminated' mass or which reduced it to primary being or to quality or to something else? Could you be a reductionist and reduce mass to one of the other categories? How does AristotIe's account of change compare with an account which encompasses the flow of stuff? Now, as you recall, in Categories Aristotle's theory of change is that change always occurs in concrete individuals and the way it occurs is by instances A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 197 of qualities coming into being and passing away in the thing. Now this account of change doesn't allow for the flow of stuff through a concrete individual. And as we all know from our own private experiences, mass does flow through us. And the scientists tell us that what is our mass today is no part of us in 13 years or something, that our entire bodily substance is replaced by different substance after 13 years. So this common sense observation about change, and also the scientific observation, isn't accounted for by the theory of change in Categories. At least the one that's still there. To add that new category gives you a new theory of change and gives you lots of other new things. 1'm just suggesting that as future research this be looked into. Mary Mulhern: 1'11 send you an off-print. [See Mary Mulhern, 'Types of Process According to Aristotle', The Monist 52 (1968), 288-299 (Editor's note).] John Cocoran: You've done this! Mary Mulhern: Five years ago. John Mulhern: Also there are problems for you in the Second Book of Physica. John Corcoran: This comes in Physics? John Mulhern: The reduction of substance to matter, which he is not favorably inclined to, in individuals. John Corcoran: If this is in Physics, and the standard chronology is right, then this indicates a change in viewpoint. John Mulhern: I don't think so. John Swiniarski: The medievals run across a problem in a slightly different way. Suppose I promise you five pounds of riee out of this barre! of rice. The nominalist would like to analyze it into some definite five pounds of rice in that barrel, but then they have to think of permuting all the grains of rice in the barrel into all pos si ble five pound packets that I might be promising you. But if I promise you five quarts of wine out of my barre! of wine, it's a little more mysterious how I could permute all the molecules of water. What exactly am I promising you? The mass factor there causes a problem in terms of their having a simple analysis. If I promised you one out of ten books, well, it's easy. But if l promise you a certain amount of a mass item, it becomes tricky. John Corcoran: lt's interesting that I can promise you a bo ok. Suppose you say, "1'11 go to the store for you if you give me a bo ok out of your 198 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH bookshelf". I say, "Okay, go to the store and 1'11 give you a book out of my bookshelf". That doesn't imply that there exists a book on the bookshelf that I promised you, does it? John Swiniarski: There might not be any books on the bookshelf when Ileave for the store. There might be many when I get back or there might be one. John Corcoran: There are apparently two uses ofthe word 'some', that people who wrote dictionaries noticed but logicians haven't. We need to do something with that too to bring logic up to date with the dictionary. Keith Ickes: What are those two uses? John Corcoran: One is what the dictionary calls the indefinite use, and the other is the definite, where 'some book' is a kind of proper name. If I say, "some book is on the desk", I may be saying: "exists x, x is a bo ok and x is on the desk" . I could be saying that I probably wouldn't beo 1'm probably referring to that book by the phrase 'some book'. If you were handy I'd say this book is on the desk. Some people have speculated that the difference between those two uses of som e is all the difference between classicallogic and intuitionism. Where the intuitionists always use the definite sense. The intuitionists never say some unless they ean come up with one, whereas in classicallogic you can say some and you don't have to come up with one. It's getting way off the mass-word problem. John Swiniarski: I don't remember enough about Greek grammar and syntax. There might be some features of Greek grammar or syntax itself that might obscure the problem of mass nouns or somehow absorb it into the structure. Mary Mulhern: There's no indefinite article, for instance, in Greekwhich gives you a problem with your count nouns. There are some nouns in Greek which can be either count nouns or mass nouns depending on how you use them. John Corcoran: We have those in English, you know. Like beer and beers. Lynn Rose: Wire, string, rope. All the lengths. John Corcoran: In any case, this is an example where something that has been made a big deal of in modem linguistics may be worth using as a category to go back and look at Aristotle. Mary Mulhern: I think it's from a different analysis though. It wouldn't A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 199 fit in his seheme of categories. Now eertainly an analysis like that is useful, but you eouldn't add it in an eleventh category. John Corcoran: It's interesting that the Aristotelian framework is really aped by Wittgenstein in Tractatus. I mean mass nouns ean hardly fit in the Tractatus either. Newton Garver: That's not clear. Why not? John Corcoran: Beeause facts are just individuals in eertain relations. Newton Garver: So whenever you get a mass noun oecurring in a sentenee, this has to be built into an understanding that there are certain individuals, a limited selection of them, standing in limited relations. But the objects are entirely abstract. Objeets in the Tractatus are something of which there are no examples, hence no limitations on what you consider the objects to be or the concatenations of the objects to represent in the way of ordinary sentences. John Corcoran: I'm embarrassed. rm just going on flavor. I think that's something we could get into though. How does mass fit into the Tractatus? The second set of problems with the Categories comes up when you notice that relations don 't seem to form a separate vertical hierarchy in the same sense that quality and substance do, but that the relations themselves divide into substantial, qualitative, and massive. What do I mean by that? Well, what's a substantial relation? It's a relation that relates individual substances, like brother, sister, parallel. They are on a par with substantial predicates at a secondary level. So you have individual substances, then you have secondary substances and then you have, in a different direction, substantial relations. Y ou also have qualitative relations darker, brighter, smoother, more rough, and so on. So over the individual instances of qualities, you have ordinary qualities and then you have qualitative relations. Then you have relations which relate masses heavier and lighter. Ian Mueller: It's not clear that these three are distinguished by Aristotle. Besides heavier and lighter could be thought of as relations between two objects: e.g. this object is heavier than that object. John Corcoran: Okay. How about denser? rm just saying that such relations might enter the Categories. John Swiniarski: Could you set up a ten point grid and take a look at each category relative to each other category? 200 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH John Corcoran: That's another thing I didn't even bring up. But, in addition to the relations that are clearly within a category, you ean have cross categoricai relations. For example, the relation of being-in between an instance of a quality and an individual would be a relation that wouldn't be in either category but it would be cross categoricaI. It would be a relation between instances of qualities and primary substances. There are others too, but the others would get too far away from the categories. In faet, the division of the Aristotelian category of relation into substance and quality may be the beginning of a viable doetrine of internal and external relations. In any case, observations along these lines at the very least provide motivation for taking a fresh look at the Categories. Ian Mueller: I would like to add aremark on relations. I haven't found a satisfactory discussion of just what a relation is for Plato or Aristotle. Scheibe's article (Phronesis XII (1967)] is a start. It seems to me that this is an open problem which an industrious person with a knowledge of logic could attack and get important results. Newton Garver: Certainly the chapter on relations is one that strikes a modern reader as most difficult. John Glanville: Well the distinction that later on is called the distinction between the secundum esse and secundum dici by the Scholastics, I think, really does come out of Aristotle. The relation 'according to be' is taken to be the relation in one of the categories and the other relation is 'according to be said'. Think back into the Greek what that must represent. It's the 'to be said toward'. When you say, potency is said toward aet. This, to me, has always seerned to be the antecedent of what later in British logic gets called the internal relation. But I think that's there already in Aristotle's logic. There's not sufficient reflection on that. What he is primarily reflecting on is the adventitious sort of relation which is external and which he treats in one of the chapters of the Categories. But the other thing is there all over the map and it's part of what holds the system together. So that in talking about an accident being in a substance, you wouldn't have to multiply entities here and say that the 'in' is another relation in between the accident and the substance. It's part ofwhat it is to be an accident, to be in a substance. And this would be a feature internal to accident as such. John Corcoran: I don't know what you mean by another. A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 201 John Glanville: The other is substance. Of course, in order for accident to be it has to be in a substance. John Corcoran: You don't think I'm saying anything like ... well, imagine that God ereated the world in stages. Could he have put down the individuals and the instances of qualities without putting the relation of 'is in' in? No, I'm not saying that. No, after God created the individuals and the instances of qualities, it was of the nature of the latter to be in the former. John Glanville: Is that in Aristotle? I think that's your question. John Corcoran: What I just said I put in the terms of the myth of creation, but the idea behind it, that it's pointing to, I think is in Aristotle. All I was doing is pointing out that the relation is there and that it's a cross-categorieal relationship. I wasn't making any ontologieal hay out of it all, which is what you were thinking of me as doing. Is that right? John Glanville: No. I was saying that the relation 'aecording to be said' (or, as it later on gets ealled, 'the transcendental relation') is there and it doesn't multiply entities. I wasn't supposing that you were multiplying entities either by pointing it out. As a matter of faet, you protected yourself from that by using the modem notion of internal relation. So I didn't misunderstand you. Newton Garver: The question of whether Aristotle would a1low this as a relation is something that needs to be worked out. John Glanville: It's older than Aristotle. It's in Plato. The original pros ti is an internal relation. What's new in Aristotle is a eategory of relation. Newton Garver: Yes, but he talks about a bird having a wing and says that we shouldn't eonsider the wing as something that's related to the bird, because that would be to misspeak, that the relation is not between the wing and the bird but rather between the wing and winged-thing or something like that. So what he does is to insist that for every relation you have to have a correlative. Exaetly this point about not allowing the bird to be the correlative of the wing is not entirely clear. This is something that needs more research. Ian Mueller: I'd like to ask another question about relations. Galen talks about relational arguments, relational syllogisms. Most of them do involve relations, but one that he incudes is this argument from the Stoics: 'It is day; you say that it is day; therefore you speak the truth', or 'You say that it is day; you speak the truth; therefore it is day'. I was wondering 202 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH if anyone has any idea why sueh an argument is classed as relational. My view is that the classification is aeeidental. Galen eoined the word 'relational' to cover a whole clas s of arguments whieh originally had another name. All the other arguments he ealls relational do turn on relations like double or equal, but this one doesn't. From our point of view it turns on the semantie notion of truth. Norman Kretzmann: The one is between what it is you say and the way the world is. The other is between the speaker and what he says. Certainly both of these are picked out in Aristotle as relations. Certainly the relation, between what is said and the way the world is, is picked out, but I don't know if it is eategorized. It is diseussed. A terminology is built up for the thing that is said, but I ean't reeall any plaee where there's a diseussion of a relation between the sayer and what is said. It looks as if it's easy to import enough stuff to make that relational in one of two ways, but whether those are Aristotelian relations or not, I don't know. John Corcoran: I have two classes of problems with the Analytics that I would like to mention. The most obvious open problem in the Analytics is to give the exaet nature of the theory of perfeeting of modal syllogisms. Assuming that my interpretation is eorreet, the general framework of doing this is already down. That is, we have the generaloutline of what a perfeet syllogism is. It's going to be a generalization of what I've done, if I'm right. The problem is to add the rules of perfeeting the modal syllogisms. The other Aristotle seholars here ean eorreet me if there is disagreement, but I think there is wide agreement that there are at least two, if not maybe as many as five, different modal systems there, all ineompatible on a superficiallevel. So that there are going to be different kinds of neeessity. So perhaps the most fruitul approach is to try to ferret out as many different semantie notions of neeessity as possibie and then to eoneoet systems of perfeet syllogisms according to those semantie ideas. And then to go back and see how they fit with the text, try to develop these things to cover as mueh ofthe text as possible. You may say "Aha, that's all very nice but one problem is that if what you have aiready said is right, it's going to be a natural deduction system, but all the modal systems that have been so far worked out are either axiomatie deduction systems or else are Gentzen-type systems, neither of whieh fits the Aristotelian framework". That's not exaetly true. There is a modallogie which was worked out by Weaver and me in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 203 June, 1969, that has a natural deduetion version of S5 which eould easily be earried over to the Aristotelian framework. One of the main rules is that if all your premises are modal and you get a conc1usion then you ean add as the next eonc1usion the neeessity of that eonc1usion. That rule is almost certainly one of the rules in Aristotle. So the framework for doing this investigation of the modallogie is aiready there and it's a question of doing the dirty work. Ian Mueller: I wonder how mueh really turns on the difference between natural deduction and axiomatics. It seems to me that if somebody carried out the investigation in terms of a regular axiomatie deductive system, the problem of translating the result into the natural deductive system might not be so great. John Corcoran: Well for Aristotle there weren't any connectives. There's no way of translating it. Ian Mueller: But just think of the relation between your work and Lukasiewicz's. Your seeing the incorrectness of Lukasiewicz's interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic is an important insight. But given this insight, the adjustments of Lukasiewicz's work required to get a correct interpretation are largely teehnical. If you have a lot of modal apparatus in an axiomatic system it might be preferable to use the system to attack Aristotle's modallogic. I don't know. For getting the basies right I'm not sure that the difference between natural deduction and an axiomatic system is going to be crucial. John Richards: A large part of it is intent. More, I think, than the final result is the intent that was originally there. Ian Mueller: Ultimately you want to get it exactly right. But using hammers seems to me a good way to get at things. Later one ean start chopping away with lighter mallets. John Corcoran: The natural thing really is the lighter mallet, if you work with it. Ian Mueller: Perhaps it makes a difference. I was suggesting that I don't see the differences between natural deduction and axiomatics in broad structure but in finer points. John Corcoran: To get this you have to write on the blaekboard a lot. It's a fact that we do reason, and it's also faet that we don 't reason axiomatically. The natural deduction systems are called natural because they jibe more with our normal way of doing business than the axiomatic 204 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH systems do. So the defter to ol is going to be the natural deduction approach. Ian Mueller: Well, that's what seems to me not to follow. It doesn't follow from the fact that we naturally reason in a certain way that for a certain purpose it doesn't help to represent reasoning in another way. John Corcoran: Okay. Rere the purpose is understanding what the Aristotelian system is and, if our general modus operandi is doser to Aristotle to begin with, it will be easier to say what the differences are than ifwe have a modus operandi that's very far away. Then we will always have all kinds of fiddlings to do to move back and forth. Ian Mueller: Let me make one more analogy. Then we'll drop the topic, or you can reply to me. It seems to me that the distance between what one understands af ter reading Lukasiewicz and what one understands af ter reading Maier is a much greater and a much more important gap to dose than the distance between what one understands after reading Corcoran and after reading Lukasiewicz. I would be willing to say that if someone has the axiomatic apparatus he should use it rather than develop an alternative apparatus. Lynn Rose: Storrs McCall has several different systems of modal logic which he says can all be found in the Prior Analytics, but they're not consistent. I was wondering if that could be just what you want. John Corcoran: Re could have the key ideas. John Swiniarski: There seems to me to be one approach that in a weird way correlates with what Dr. Parry was saying earlier. When you gave the brief summary of your system, you seem to put all the predicates on a par, so to speak. But if it's a science we are talking about, one of those predicates that enters must be the supreme genus of the science and also some of them must be special insofar as they are divisions away from that supreme genus in accordance with the proper rules of divisions. So the predicates that are going to enter into your whole machinery aIready have a certain ordering among them. Now it might be the case that, once you go through the ordering and use Aristotle's rules of definition and proper division and organize your predicates, then you can make any distinction between which propositions have to do with necessary matter and which propositions have to do with contingent matter. Of course, you still preA PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 205 suppose almost that you do have all the data of the science in. Y ou might be able to somehow work at it from that angle. John Corcoran: That kind of thing can be another step to take after my thing. Something that can be incorporated in it. Y ou can take a complete theory and then extract out of it a hierarchy of this sort by looking at the forms of the true sentences of the theory. Those true sentences will induce a hierachy of predicates. That outlook may explain some of the chapters in the Book II of Prior Analytics. Okay, so that's the problem with doing the modallogic. There's another batch of problems too which comes from the fact that Aristotle actually was the first proof-theorist. Re set down several metatheorems about the system and the ones I've been able to figure out are all true. They were not only true but one was important in getting the metatheoretic results about the system that I got. In one place where I got myself in a bind, I was trying to prove a certain theorem and I couldn't. I worked backwards from the theorem and got to a lemma that I had to get. Then I worked forward and got to a lemma that was very c10se to the one that I needed. Then I showed it to another guy and he pulled out a line from Aristotle which he used to link up the two and fill the gap. So Aristotle was doing some very heavy proof-theoretic thinking. The problem is to go through Book A and Book B of Prior Analytics, to figure out what those metatheorems are and to figure out what Aristotle's proofs of them were. So that's another batch of problems. I should mention Smiley in this regard. Re has gotten some of them out aiready. Ris work is very interesting, but there is still a lot left to be done. (See Timothy Smiley's 'What is a Syllogism?', Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1973), ed.) Ian Mueller: Is there a proof of a metatheorem in Aristotle? John Corcoran: Yes. There's the proof that the direct proofs can be thrown out. Ian Mueller: But that's the one you said doesn't really hold together. John Corcoran: That one does hold together. The one that shows, in effect, that you can use just the universal rules to perfect all of the twopremise syllogisms, that holds also. The completeness proof doesn't. The general theorem that the whole system is equivalent to the one with just the universal rules, that one doesn't go through either. But limagne there is a lot to leam about my version of Aristotle's system that can be gotten out of Aristotle. That's another batch of problems. 206 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH Norman Kretzmann: I don' t see the line in Aristotle that links your two lemmas as evidenee that Aristotle was deeply into proof-theoretie work. I'm not sure that I understand the situation described very clearly. The faet that something that Aristotle says enabled you to hook these two up doesn't suggest to me that there's anything like the same approach to this juneture in Aristotle as you were taking when you arrived at that point and your friend luekily supplied the link. John Corcoran: Yes, I don't expeet that the few vague things that I've said should be eonvincing on that at all. Norman Kretzmann: But you have evidenee of a different sort. John Corcoran: Yes, you ean read the details in my article and see the kinds of arguments I have. Lynn Rose: Row ean these metatheorems that you mention fail? John Corcoran: One problem is that Aristotle doesn't allow nested reductio strategy. It's very subtle. Ifyou wrote the proof down it wouldn't be at all obvious that you needed to presuppose that you need nested reductio strategy to make it go through. But then when you try to put down the details then you see they do presuppose it. For example, he patehes perfeet syllogisms together. Re knows if you ean get from here to here and you ean get from here to here then you ean get a perfeet syllogism that goes all the way down, but it eould be that you used reductio in both of them. If you used it in one or the other then you eould put the one that you used it in fi.rst and have the whole thing be an indireet proof. But you ean't pateh two indireet proofs together and still get a perfeet syllogism, beeause you may have only one reductio in the whole thing. Re lays down at several plaees that you ean have only one. So that's one ofthe main problems. There is also a eertain vagueness in Aristotle about what you really have to show in order to prove that these things work. That vagueness may be partly or largely in my reading of Aristotle. It mayaiso be partly or largely in the translators who were eompletely oblivious to these possiblities. The things I'm saying I by no means regard as definite or established. Well, the last problem that I have is the one I aiready raised after Josiah Gould's talk: what style deduetive system did the Stoics have? (Cf. John Coreoran, 'Remarks on StoieDeduetion', this volume, p.169, ed.) Ian Mueller: I have another kind of hard-working problem for an industrious person with a knowledge of logie and Greek, or for another A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH 207 kind of industrious person. Actually there are two ways to make Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentary on the Prior Analytics accessibIe to students of the history of logic. One is to translate the work and perhaps produee a study ofit as a whole. The other is to go to libraries and destroy its indices; someone else will then do the translation because he ean no longer use the indices to find the passages he needs. John Swiniarski: There was one general point that came to my mind in the discussion earlier today. I remember Wittgenstein made a comment someplace that introduetion of a symbol into mathematicallogic is a momentous event. I don't remember the context, but in that context it expressed an important point. But that kind of speech, I think, sometimes leads a person to have a too respectful attitude toward the notational device s that do exist. Someone who's deeply involved with these notational devices seems to get to a point where there is an almost playful attitude toward the different notations and different devices. Do you think logic is taught to philosophy students and undergraduates with that kind of an attitude? I know it's dangerous to try to teach that kind of attitude at too Iowa level, but it seems to me sometimes that maybe a person remains chained to the particular types of symbolism and conventions that they happen to learn when they go through their logic courses. John Corcoran: The same problem of having to teaeh virtue. If you do good acts in front of the learner maybe he ean figure out what the principle is. You ean teach a logical system to the students, and if what they learn is a whole bunch of symbol manipulations, then they will be worse off for it. If they learn what the person who devised the whole thing was up to and what he was trying to do with it, then maybe they will be able to adapt those purposes to other problems and not be wedded to the particular formalism that they got started with. But, how you teach that, I have no idea. I think one way of doing it is to teach a couple different symbolisms which are to some extent incompatible, that give genuinely different analyses of the same material. To try to ineu1cate arespectful attitude toward the problem ofwhether one is more correct than the other. Ian Mueller: Have you ever tried that? My experience has been that teaching different symbolisms has the opposite effect. The student comes to think that notation is essential and that logic is nothing but notation. lalmost agree with what you said before. I don't think a person is worse 208 A PANEL DISCUSSION ON FUTURE RESEARCH off for having learned only symbolic manipulation but that he is hardly any better off. Newton Garver: It's very difficult. I noticed that one ofthe big stumbling blocks in theoreticai physics is that you have different notations for statisticai mechanics, using one to deal with certain problems and using another with other problems. Norman Kretzmann: Well, that was a feature ofa logic book I did and it seemed to me to work pretty well. At any rate, when I taught from it I did it with the intention of cutting the language loose from notation and cutting the operations loose from the notation and every time I switched notation I brought the previous one in and showed how it could be adapted to do the next job, but then dropped it and went on to a new one. They seemed to Gome out much more sophisticated with regard to the marks than they do with a single straight-line development. Ian Muel/er:. But was that just Polish and Principia notation? Norman Kretzmann: No, it was also an adaption of Lukasiewicz notation for traditionallogic and, well, it attempted, in every one of the different branches that Idealt with in that text, to show how there was a choice between notations and what differences could result in the choice. John Glanville: There was one thing about where John Mulhern started that I' d like to mention. Of course, he was talking about the application of modern symbolic teehniques. But he really did, in effect, start his preAristotelian logic by telling about Plato, although he referred in a word or two, I suppose, back to the possibilities of something before that. There is continental work on Zeno and Parmenides and other pre-Platonie phllosophy that seems to me to need whatever light we ean throw on it. Perhaps, symbolic teehniques would help. Ian Mueller: I want to push the post-Aristotelians. I have the feeling that modern logie is too heavy an apparatus to get a great deal more out of Aristotle, Chrysippus, and their predecessors in terms oflogical theory. I think one ean use modern logie very nicely to analyze partieular arguments, e.g. in the Platonic dialogues, but sueh analyses do not yield the conclusion that the author of the arguments was a logician. On the other hand, Alexander's commentary on the Prior Analyties may well be a goldmine for the history of logie. Somebody who is less lazy than I ought to go to work on it. INDEX OF NAMES Ackrill, J. L. 3, 8, 11, 15, 16-21,27,29 Aenesidemus 168 Alexander of Aphrodisias 51, 55, 58-63, 68,69,163,168,207,208 Ammonius 19,61, 136 Anderson, J. 117,129 Antipater 85 Aphrodisias, Alexander of see Alexander of Aphrodisias Apollonius 35,43 Apuleius 79, 168 Aquinas, Thomas of 12, 19 Archimedes 35, 43, 48 Aristomenes 140 AristotIe ix, 3-25,27-31,35,37,41,43, 46,48-57,60,62,64,66-70,71,73-78, 85-130, 133-148, 151, 166-170, 172, 174-176, 181, 185-187, 190-206,208 Arnim, H. van 168 Aubengue, P. 19 Austin, J. L. 32, 125, 129 Autolycus 49 Badawi, A. 18 Barnes, J. 90,101,129 Becker, A. 75, 76, 80 Becker, O. 69 Beckmann, F. 68 Bekker, I. 18,70 Beltrami, E. 127 Benveniste, E. 31 Beth, E. W. 72,80 Blanche, R. 71,80 Bochenski, I. M. 71, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79-81, 88, 114, 120, 126, 129, 135, 144, 145, 147, 148, 162, 164, 166, 168 Boethius 19, 21, 29 Bonitz, H. 7, 19, 70 Boole, G. 121, 123,127, 173, 175, 176 Bourbaki, N. 174, 181 Brandt, R. 19 Brehier, E. 70 Bury, R. G. 170, 181 Busse, A. 19 Capella, M. 79 Carneades 70 Cassiodorus 79 Cherniss, H. F. 81 Chisholm, R. 78, 81 Chomsky, N. 31 Chrysippus 35, 37, 57-59, 63, 66, 159, 161,165-167,208 Church, A. 86, 87, 89, 90,92, 98, 102, 122, 125, 127, 129, 181 Cicero 70, 164, 168 Cohen, P. J. 105, 122, 127, 129 Cook, H. P. 19 Copi, I. 171, 181 Corcoran, J. 32,77,81,87,89,92, 107, 113, 114, 116, 121, 128-130, 133-148, 167, 181, 193, 202, 206 Crinis 58 Cronert, W. 65, 70 De Pater, W. A. 76, 81 Dedekind, R. 68 Derrida, J. 32 Dieis, H. 68 Dijksterhuis, E. J. 68 Diodes Magnes 57, 58 Diodorus 78, 159-162, 165-167 Diogenes Laertius 57-59, 69, 70, 157, 158, 167, 168 Durr, K. 71,79, 81 Edel, A. 130 Edghill, E. M. 19 Eudid 35-37, 39-46, 48-53, 64-67, 89, 98, 125, 174, 181 Eudemus 54 Eudoxus 46, 48 210 INDEX OF NAMES Fant, C. G. M. 31 Fitch, F. B. 176 Frege, G. 105, 110, 121, 130, 170, 181, 186 Friedlein, G. 67 Galen 58, 61-65, 67, 69, 70, 79, 162, 201 Germinus 64-66, 70 Gentzen, G. 38, 67, 186, 202 Goodman, N. 190 Gottlieb, D. 126 Gould, J. B. 155, 159, 168, 169, 171, 181 Halle, M. 31 Hasse, H. 68 Heath, T. C. 46, 67, 68, 125, 127, 130 Heiberg 45 Heron 65 Hersh, R. 105, 122, 127, 130 Hilbert, D. 67, 78, 89, 116, 125, 127, 130, 175, 176 Hippocrates 52, 54 Householder, F. W. 31 Hurst, M. see Kneale, M. Hurst HusserI, E. 31 Iamblichus 57 Isaac, J. 19 Ishåq Ibn Hunayn 18 Isidore of Seville 79 Iverson, S. L. 125, 129, 130 Jakobson, R. 31 Jaskowski, S. 89, 104, 126, 130, 176, 186 Jeffrey, R. 116, 129, 130 Johnstone, H. 117, 129 Kalicki, J. 185 Kahn, C. 126 Kalbfleisch, C. 67, 69 Katz, J. 28, 31 Kleini, F. 68 Kneale, M. Hurst 68, 76-78, 81, 91, 97, 100, 125, 126, 129, 130, 158, 160, 168 Kneale, William 68, 76, 77, 81, 91, 97, 100, 125, 126, 129, 130,168 Kreisel, G. 86,130 Kretzmann, N. 19, 23, 147, 148, 169 Langford, C. H. 101,127,130,167,168 Lemmon, E. J. 176, 180, 181 Lewis, C. I. 78, 101, 127, 130, 167, 168 Lukasiewicz, J. 51, 55, 67-69, 73-79, 81, 125-130, 133-138, 147, 148, 170, 181,193,203,204,208 Maier, H. 204 Malinowski, B. 31 Mates, B. 67, 70, 77-79, 81, 91, 129, 130,158,160,163,167,168,170,176, 180,181 Matschmann, H. 69 Mau, J. 69,70 McCall, S. 76, 81, 147, 148, 204 Meiser 20, 21 Merlan, P. 147, 148 Miccalus 140 Mill, J. S. 68 Minio-Paluello, L. 18 Moerbeke, Wm of 19 Morick, H. 167 Mueller, I. 123, 130, 174, 181 Mugler, C. 67 Mulhem, J. J. 81, 99, 130 Mulhem, M. M. 87,88, 100, 126, 130, 147, 148, 197 Neugebauer, O. 65, 70 Nuchelmans, G. 21 Oehler, K. 19 Oesterle, J. T. 19 Ogden, C. 31 Oliver, J. W. 127, 130 Pacins, J. 20 Pacio, G. 20 Parmenides 71,208 Parry, W. 128 Patzig, G. 75, 81, 92-94, 100, 104, 129, 130 Peano, G. 78,90,98 Peirce, C. S. 147, 148 Philo 158-162, 165-167 INDEX OF NAMES 211 Philoponus, J. 59-61, 67 Pittacus 140 PIas berg, O. 70 Plato 10, 13, 19-21, 23, 25, 48, 57, 71-73, 189-191, 194, 200, 201, 208 Posidenius 63-66 Prantl, C. 69 Prior, A. N. 74,76, 78, 81 Proclus 60, 64-68, 70 Quine, W. V. 107, 128, 130 Rescher, N. 76, 79, 81 Resnik, M. 171, 181 Richards, I. 31 Riondato, E. 18 Rose, L. E. 76, 77, 81, 92-94, 101, 105, 111, 126, 128, 130 Ross, W. D. 49,68,77,88,90,92, 101, 105,125,130,135,147 Russell, B. 78, 108, 121, 158, 167, 168, 190 Ryle, G. 127, 131, 146, 147 Scheibe, E. 200 Schoenfield, J. 125, 131 Scholz, H. 68, 88, 90, 96, 131 Scott, D. 185 Searle, J. R. 32 Sextus, Empirius 58-70, 151-153, 155, 157-159, 161-165, 167, 168, 170, 181 Simplicius 68, 69 Smiley, T. 92, 131, 205 Socrates 190, 191 Sprague, R. K. 71, 81 Stamatis, E. S. 68 Steinthal, H. 19 Sullivan, M. W. 79, 81 Suppes, P. 176, 180, 181 Szabo, M. E. 67 Tarski, A. 87, 89, 127, 131, 172, 181, 185 Thomas, J. A. 167 Thomas of Aquinas see Aquinas, Thomas of Titte!, K. 70 Tredennick, H. 88, 114, 131 Van Den Dreissche, R. 79,81 Van Fraassen, B. C. 73, 82 Van Heijemont, J. 116, 131 Verbeke, G. 19 VIastos, G. 64, 70, 72, 82 Vrin, J. 19 Waitz, T. 19 Wallach, L. 70 Wallies, M. 67-69 Wasserman, H. 129 Weaver, G. 128, 131,202 Wedberg, A. 72, 82 WehrilL F. 68 Whitehead, A. N. 158, 167, 168 William of Moerbeke see Moerbeke, Wm of Wittgenstein, L. 31, 32, 199, 207 Zeller, E. 70 Zeno of Elea 208 Zeno of Sidon 64-66, 70 Zermel0, E. 90, 98 Zeuthen, H. 67 Zirin, R. 21 SYNTHESE HISTORICAL LIBRARY Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy Editors: N. KRETZMANN (Cornell University) G. NUCHELMANS (University of Leyden) L. M. DE RUK (University of Leyden) 1. M. T. BEONIO-BROCCHffiRI FUMAGALLI, The Logic of Abelard. Translated from the Italian. 1969, IX + 101 pp. 2. GOTTFRffiO WILHELM LEIBNITZ, Philosophical Papers and Letters. A selection translated and edited, with an introduetion, by Leroy E. Loemker. 1969, XII + 736 pp. 3. ERNST MALLY, Logische Schri/ten, ed. by Karl Wolf and Paul Weingartner. 1971, X+340pp. 4. LEWIS WHITE BECK (ed.), Proceedings af the Third International Kant Congress. 1972, XI + 718 pp. 5. BERNARD BOLZANO, Theory af Science, ed. by Jan Berg. 1973, XV + 398 pp. 6. J. M. E. MORAVCSIK (ed.), Patterns in Plato's Thought. Papers arising out af the 1971 West Coast Greek Philosophy Conference. 1973, VIn +212 pp. 7. NABIL SHEHABY, The Propositional Logic af Avicenna: A Translation from alShi/ii': al-Qiyiis, with Introduetion, Commentary and Glossary. 1973, XIII + 296 pp. 8. DESMOND PAUL HENRY, Commentary an De Grammatico: The Historical-Logical Dimensions af a Dialogue af St. Anselm's. 1974, IX + 345 pp. 9. JOHN CORCORAN, Ancient Logic and 1ts Modem Interpretations. 1974, X + 208 pp, SYNTHESE LIBRARY Monographs on Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science and of Knowledge, and on the Mathematical Methods of Social and Behavioral Sciences Editors: DONALD DAVIDSON (The Rockefeller University and Princeton University) JAAKKO HINTIKKA (Academy of Finland and Stanford University) GABRIEL NUCHELMANS (University of Leyden) WESLEY C. SALMON (University of Arizona) l. J. M. BOCHENSKI, A Precis of Mathematical Logic. 1959, X + 100 pp. 2. P. L. GUIRAUD, Problemes et methodes de la statistique linguistique. 1960, VI + 146 pp. 3. HANS FREUDENTHAL (ed.), The Concept and the Role of the Model in Mathematics and Natural and Social Sciences. Proceedings of a Colloquium held at Utrecht, The Netherlands, January 1960. 1961, VI + 194 pp. 4. EVERT W. BETH, Formal Methods. An 1ntroduction to Symbolic Logic and the Study of Effective Operations in Arithmetic and Logic. 1962, XIV + 170 pp. 5. B. H. KAZEMIER and D. VUYSJE (eds.), Logic and Language. Studies dedicated to Professor Rudolf Carnap on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday. 1962, VI+256pp. 6. MARX W. WARTOFSKY (ed.), Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, 1961-1962, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume I. 1963, VIII + 212 pp. 7. A. A. ZINOV'EV, Philosophical Problems of ManyValued Logic. 1963, XIV + 155 pp. 8. GEORGES GURVITCH, The Spectrum of Social Time. 1964, XXVI + 152 pp. 9. PAUL LoRENZEN, Formal Logic. 1965, VIII + 123 pp. 10. ROBERT S. CoHEN and MARX W. WARTOFSKY (eds.), In Honor of Philipp Frank, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume 11.1965, XXXIV +475 pp. 11. EVERT W. BETH, Mathematical Thought. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics. 1965, XII + 208 pp. 12. EVERT W. BETH and JEAN PlAGET, Mathematical Epistemology and Psychology. 1966, XXII + 326 pp. 13. GUIDO KliNG, Ontology and the Logistic Analysis of Language. An Enquiry into the Contemporary Views on Universals. 1967, XI + 210 pp. 14. ROBERT S. CoHEN and MARX W. WARTOFSKY (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1964-1966, in Memory of Norwood RusselI Hanson, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume III. 1967, XLIX +489 pp. 15. C. D. BROAD, Induction, Probability, and Causation. Selected Papers. 1968, XI+296pp. 16. GtiNrHER PATZIG, Aristotie's Theory of the Syllogism. A Logical-Philosophical Study of Book A of the Prior Analytics. 1968, XVII + 215 pp. 17. NICHOLAS RESCHER, Topics in Philosophical Logic. 1968, XIV + 347 pp. 18. ROBERT S. COHEN and MARX W. WARTOFSKY (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Colloquiumfor the Philosophy of Science 1966-1968, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume IV. 1969, VIII + 537 pp. 19. ROBERT S. CoHEN and MARX W. W ARTOFSKY (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Colloquiumfor the Philosophy of Science 1966-1968, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume V. 1969, VIII + 482 pp. 20. J. W. DAVIS, D. J. HOCKNEY, and W. K. WILSON (eds.), Philosophical Logic. 1969, VIII + 277 pp. 21. D. DAVlDSON and J. HlNTIKKA (eds.), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. 1969, VIII + 366 pp. 22. PATRICK SUPPES, Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science. Selected Papers from 1911 to 1969. 1969, XII + 473 pp. 23. JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Models for Modalities. Selected Essays. 1969, IX + 220 pp. 24. NICHOLAS RESCHER et al. (eds.). Essay in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. A Tribute on the Occasion of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday. 1969, VII + 272 pp. 25. P. V. TAVANEC (ed.), Problems of the Logic of Scientific Knowledge. 1969, XII +429 pp. 26. MARSHALL SWAIN (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief 1970, VII +232 pp. 27. ROBERT S. COHEN and RAYMOND J. SEEGER (eds.), Ernst Mach; Physicist and Philosopher, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume VI. 1970, VIII + 295 pp. 28. JAAKKO HINTIKKA and PATRICK SUPPES, Information and Inference. 1970, X+336 pp. 29. KAREL LAMBERT, Philosophical Problems in Logic. Some Recent Developments. 1970, VII + 176 pp. 30. ROLF A. EBERLE, Nominalistic Systems. 1970, IX + 217 pp. 31. PAUL WEINGARTNER and GERHARD ZECHA (eds.), Induction, Physics, and Ethics, Proceedings and Discussions of the 1968 Salzburg Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science. 1970, X + 382 pp. 32. EVERT W. BETH, Aspects of Modern Logic. 1970, XI + 176 pp. 33. RISTO HILPINEN (ed.), Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings. 1971, VII + 182 pp. 34. JEAN-LoUiS KRIVINE, Introduction to Axiomatic Set Theory. 1971, VII + 98 pp. 35. JOSEPH D. SNEED, The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics. 1971, XV + 311 pp. 36. CARL R. KORDIG, The Justification of Scienti/ic Change. 1971, XIV + 119 pp. 37. MILle CAPEK, Bergson and Modern Physics, Boston Studies in the Philosophy ofScience (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume VII. 1971, XV+414pp. 38. NORWOOD RUSSELL HANsoN, What I do not Believe, and other Essays, ed. by Stephen Toulmin and Harry Woolf. 1971, XII + 390 pp. 39. ROGER C. BUCK and ROBERT S. COHEN (eds.), PSA 1970. In Memory of Rudolf Carna p, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science {ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume VIII. 1971, LXVI + 615 pp. Also avaiIable as a paperback. 40. DONALD DAVIDSON and GILBERT HARMAN (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language. 1972, X + 769 pp. Also available as a paperback. 41. YEHOSUA BAR-HILLEL (ed.), Pragmatics of Natural Languages. 1971, VII +231 pp. 42. SOREN STENLUND, Combinators, l-Terms and Proof Theory. 1972, 184 pp. 43. MARTIN STRAUSS, Modern Physics and Its Philosophy. Selected Papers in the Logic, History, and Philosophy of Science. 1972, X + 297 pp. 44. MARIO BUNGE, Method, Model and Matter. 1973, VII + 196 pp. 45. MARIO BUNGE, Philosophy of Physics. 1973, IX + 248 pp. 46. A. A. ZINOV'EV, Foundations of the Logical Theory of Scienti/ic Knowledge (Complex Logic), Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume IX. Revised and enlarged English edition with an appendix, by G. A. Smirnov, E. A. Sidorenka, A. M. Fedina, and L. A. Bobrova. 1973, XXII + 301 pp. Also available as a paperback. 47. LADISLAV TONDL, Scienti/ic Procedures, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume X. 1973, XII + 268 pp. Also available as a paperback. 48. NORWOOD RUSSELL HANSON, Constellations and Conjectures, ed. by Willard C. Humphreys, Jr. 1973, X + 282 pp. 49. K. J. J. HINTIKKA, J. M. E. MORAVCSIK, and P. SUPPES (eds.), Approaches to Natural Language. Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics. 1973, VIII + 526 pp. Also available as a paperback. 50. MARIO BUNGE (ed.), Exact Philosophy Problems, Tools, and Goals. 1973, X + 214 pp. 51. RADU J. BOGDAN and ILKKA NIINILUOTO (eds.), Logic, Language, and Probability. A selection of papers contributed to Sections IV, VI, and XI of the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Bucharest, September 1971. 1973, X + 323 pp. 52. GLENN PEARCE and PATRICK MAYNARD (eds.), Conceptual Change. 1973, XII + 282 pp. 53. ILKKA NlfNILUOTO and RAIMO TUOMELA, Theoreticai Concepts and HypotheticoInductive Inference. 1973, VII + 264 pp. 54. ROLAND FRAi'ssii, Course of Mathematical Logic Volume I: Relation and Logical Formula. 1973, XVI + 186 pp. Also available as a paperback. 55. ADOLF GRUNBAUM, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. Second, enlarged edition, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume XII. 1973, XXIII + 884 pp. Also available as a paperback. 56. PATRICK SUPPES (ed.), Space, Time, and Geometry. 1973, XI + 424 pp. 57. HANS KELSEN, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, selected and introduced by Ota Weinberger. 1973, XXVIII + 300 pp. 59. ROBERT S. COHEN and MARX W. W ARTOFSKY (eds.), Logical and Epistemological Studies in Contemporary Physics, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume XIII. 1973, VIII + 462 pp. Also available as a paperback. In Preparation 58. R. J. SEEGER and ROBERT S. CoHEN (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume XI. 60. ROBERT S. COHEN and MARX W. WARTOFSKY (eds.), Methodological and Historicai Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences. Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science, 1969-1972, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume XIV. 61. ROBERT S. CoHEN and MARX W. WARTOFSKY (eds.), Scientifie, Historical, and Political Essays in Honor of Dirk J. Struik, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science (ed. by Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky), Volume XV. 62. KAZlMIERZ AJDUKIEWICZ, Pragmatie Logic, trans!. from the Polish by Olgierd Wojtasiewicz. 63. SOREN STENLUND (ed.), Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis. Essays Dedicated to Stig Kanger on his Fiftieth Birthday.